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Foreword
Following the Nationalist defeat on the mainland in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek and his  
followers retreated to Taiwan, relocating the Republic of China (ROC). To many it 
seemed almost certain that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would attack and take 
Taiwan, perhaps as early as the summer of 1950. Control over a number of offshore 
islands, especially Quemoy (Jinmen) and Matsu (Mazu), became a deciding factor in 
whether the PRC could invade Taiwan or, conversely, the ROC could invade the main-
land. Twice in the 1950s tensions peaked: during the first (1954–55) and second (1958) 
Taiwan Strait crises. During both events the U.S. government intervened diplomatically 
and militarily. This study will discuss the origins of these conflicts, the military aspects 
of the confrontations, and in particular the complicated and largely secret diplomatic 
negotiations—including two previously unknown Eisenhower-Chiang secret agree-
ments—going on behind the scenes between the U.S. government and the Nationalist 
government on Taiwan.
bruce a. elleman
William V. Pratt Professor of International 
History 
Naval War College
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The Two Chinas and the Battle for Control of  
Offshore Islands
War is death’s feast. (战争是死神的筵席.) 
This Newport Paper will examine the role of offshore islands in twentieth-century East 
Asian history, in particular those islands in the Taiwan Strait that were disputed by the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) during the 1950s 
and afterward, and how these apparently insignificant islands impacted Cold War his-
tory. The history of the 1945–91 Cold War can be divided into three periods: breaking 
apart the Sino-Soviet monolith, forging Sino-American cooperation against the Soviet 
Union (or USSR), and the two-front destruction of the USSR. The Harry S. Tru-
man Presidential Library and the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library contain 
especially pertinent information on the first of these three periods, allowing a greater 
understanding of how and why Washington adopted policies with the strategic goal of 
breaking apart the Sino-Soviet alliance. 
For much of this period, from 1950 to 1979, the U.S. Navy conducted a buffer operation 
in the Taiwan Strait. The most important goal of this operation was to neutralize the 
region—to ensure that neither side attacked the other and so perhaps brought on global 
war. While it is often assumed that the U.S. government’s focus was just the Taiwan 
Strait, in fact there were equally valid concerns that after “China [was] Communized, 
the remainder of Asia and the islands to the south and east [would] be vulnerable to 
rapid Communization.” Owing to East Asia’s geography, “there are no natural barriers 
to the advance of Communism from China to Indo-China, Siam, Burma and thence to 
Malaya, India, Indonesia and the other islands of the Western Pacific.”1 Because of the 
enormous Nationalist losses in China’s civil war, by late 1949, when the Nationalists 
were driven off the mainland to Taiwan, America’s defense line had moved from China’s 
Pacific coast to the various islands of the Aleutians and from there down through the 
Kurils, Hokkaido, the main Japanese islands, Okinawa, Formosa, and the Philippines. 
2  the newport papers
Macintosh HD:Users:Ursula.Curran.ctr:Desktop:_NP_44_Taiwan_s Offshore Islands_PRINTER:NP_44 book Folder:NP_44_Chapter1.indd January 29, 2019 4:05 PM 
Formosa, in particular, was “in the direct line—in fact, it is the center of our whole 
defense.”2 Seen in this perspective, the defense of Taiwan was essential to the defense of 
all of East Asia. 
To set the stage, this chapter will examine the strategic importance of the Taiwan Strait 
in the creation of the “two Chinas” conflict, the adoption by the Nationalists of a naval 
blockade against the PRC, and their cooperation with anticommunist guerrillas on the 
offshore islands. It will also examine in greater detail the location of the various offshore 
islands, their military or strategic importance, and factors that led to their retention by 
the Nationalists or to their return—either by force or after an orderly withdrawal—to 
the control of the PRC. 
Historical Background
The collection of offshore islands between mainland China and Taiwan has often played 
an important military role.3 The Taiwan Strait is a very strategic region, since it lies 
along the primary north–south sea-lane in East Asia. Japanese, Korean, and northern 
and central Chinese luxury goods and produce flowing primarily from north to south 
must transit this strait to reach Southeast Asia, as must luxury goods and raw materials 
flowing from south to north. The Taiwan Strait has long been a choke point, and which-
ever of the two competing regimes dominated both sides could close it to international 
shipping. Such an action would force commercial vessels to take the longer and more 
exposed route to the east of Taiwan.
Taiwan has accordingly been fought over many times, including in the seventeenth cen-
tury between Ming loyalists and the Manchus, who had displaced the Ming dynasty in 
1644; in the eighteenth century between the Manchus and local rebels; and during the 
1880s’ Sino-French War. In the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki that ended the first Sino-
Japanese War, China ceded Taiwan to Japan in perpetuity. Japan maintained sovereign-
ty over Taiwan for fifty years, until 1945, at which point, according to the terms of the 
Cairo and Potsdam agreements, Taiwan was returned to “China”—which at this stage 
meant “Nationalist China,” the internationally recognized government. 
The division of China into a Taiwan-based Republic of China and the mainland-based 
People’s Republic of China was a direct outcome of World War II and the Chinese civil 
war. During World War II, the U.S. government encouraged the Nationalists and Com-
munists to form a coalition government. As Nationalist rule imploded, the Communists 
orchestrated an increasingly effective campaign to rally popular backing. It looked like 
the USSR might attack in their support. President Truman decided it was not worth the 
billions of dollars and millions of men it would take to defend China. On July 26, 1946, 
Fleet Adm. William D. Leahy, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), duly reported 
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to Truman that if there was a Soviet attack all U.S. troops in China would immediately 
withdraw “southward” to be evacuated through the city of Tsingtao (Qingdao, in Shan-
dong Province).4 
The U.S. government refused to get involved in the Chinese civil war. As early as Novem-
ber 14, 1945, Congressman Ellis E. Patterson wrote to Truman condemning “interven-
tion on our part” on the side of any Chinese faction.5 Truman assigned Gen. George C. 
Marshall, his special envoy to China, to find a solution, telling Secretary of Commerce 
Henry A. Wallace on December 18 that he had instructed Marshall to use American 
influence “to the end that the unification of China by peaceful democratic methods 
may be achieved as soon as possible.” Marshall, for his part, reported back that “a China 
disunited and torn by civil strife could not be considered realistically as a proper place 
for American assistance,” whether technical, military, or economic. Truman then 
ordered Wallace to suspend all ongoing talks with Chinese officials that “might encour-
age the Chinese to hope that this Government is contemplating the extension of any 
type of assistance to China, except in accordance with the recommendations of General 
Marshall.”6 The Marshall mission would be widely considered a failure, but as Mau-
rice Votaw, an American academic who had advised the Nationalists, would point out, 
Marshall had had “all the cards stacked against him in advance, so . . . could not have 
possibly brought about a settlement.”7 
On June 2, 1947, the Department of State warned that Nationalist troop morale in Man-
churia was so poor that “there is a possibility of a sudden military debacle which would 
lay all Manchuria open to the Communists.”8 During September 1947, in fact, the Com-
munists were able to shift to the offensive in Manchuria. They pushed the retreating 
Nationalist troops into a small triangle bounded by the cities of Jinzhou, Changchun, 
and Mukden. 
By May 1948, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had cleared most of the Nationalist 
troops from Manchuria. That November, the Communists wiped out another hundred 
thousand Nationalist troops. Finally, on December 15, 1948, after sixty-three days of 
fighting, the Communists took Xuzhou, opening the road south to the Yangzi River and 
to Nanjing.9 The U.S. Army had at that point a small number of troops—sixty officers 
and four thousand men—in Qingdao, and during November 1948 the Joint Chiefs had 
begun seriously to discuss withdrawing them.10 American military advisers in China 
were “unanimous in the view that short of the actual employment of US troops in China 
no amount of military assistance can now save the Chiang Kai-shek regime in the face 
of the present political, military and economic deterioration.”11 Even Chiang’s personal 
secretary called the defeat in Manchuria a “shameless debacle.”12 
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But although they had lost North China, the Nationalists retained their traditional 
power base in South China. Moreover, as early as November 29, 1948, no less a person-
age than the mayor of Boston, James M. Curley, had suggested to Truman that “our 
most important ally in the event we should have trouble with Russia should prove [to 
be] China, with its tremendous natural resources and enormous population[;] . . . the 
powerhouse of Russia’s war industries is located in the vicinity of Siberia and the nearest 
approach to Siberia is from China.”13 A year later, Frederick C. McKee argued, “China 
is the key to the defense of Asia. . . . [I]f we help the Chinese to hold West China, its 
airfields could be our closest bases for counter attack on the Soviet Atom Bomb plants 
North of Lake Baikal.”14 
On January 6, 1949, members of the National Assembly of the Republic of China begged 
Truman for assistance in their “campaign against totalitarian rule in defense of freedom 
and democracy.”15 On February 9, 1948, William C. Bullitt, a former American am-
bassador to Moscow, accused Truman and Marshall of not doing enough to stop the 
Communists: “If Manchuria falls to the Communists, their sweep south to the Yang-
tze River will be rapid, and they may then be able to conquer all China; and you, Mr. 
President, will, thereafter, have to account to the American people for the consequences 
to them and to the world of control of China by [Joseph] Stalin [the Soviet dictator].”16 In 
fact, Bullitt was convinced, “you and your Secretary of State, General Marshall, would 
go down in history as having been unintentional patrons of the Soviet campaign for 
destruction of the United States and domination of the world.”17 Maj. Gen. Claire Lee 
Chennault agreed, warning the White House on June 10, 1949, “that all of South East 
Asia will rapidly go Communist once China has fallen.”18 
Nevertheless, on August 3, 1948, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessment of the 
Nationalists concluded that “Chiang’s position is steadily deteriorating, and his Govern-
ment is in such [a] precarious situation that its collapse or overthrow could occur at any 
time.”19 Four months later, an update reiterated that Chiang might be “removed from 
his position as President of the Republic of China at any time,” adding that “his removal 
would be brought about by forced resignation or a coup d’etat, possibly including his 
assassination.”20 According to John Leighton Stuart, American ambassador to China 
since 1946, “any effort to keep Chiang in power through American aid would not only 
be undemocratic but would also arouse greater sympathy for the Communist cause and 
create violent anti-American feeling.”21 
Many foreign commentators assumed that China would now be divided into a north 
and south. For example, Irving Zuckerman advised Clark Clifford at the White House 
on November 30, 1948, that “it is quite possible that peace in China may be almost 
immediately possible by letting the Red Chinese have the northern part of China 
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(Manchuria), with Chiang having the southern part of China,” a region the Nationalists 
would find “easier to administer.”22 Ambassador Stuart effectively concurred, projecting 
on November 26, 1948, that the Nationalists would make an “all-out effort to contain 
the Communists north of the Yangtze River.”23 The CIA assessed that if the Nationalists 
relocated to South China, American “aid in the form of capital, food, equipment, and 
intelligent direction could probably give the National Government [a] reasonable chance 
of carrying on effective anti-Communist resistance from South China,” although there 
would be “little future safeguard from eventual defeat and collapse.”24 
To many, then, the Yangzi River could act as the new boundary, at least temporarily 
dividing China equally between a Communist north and a Nationalist south. Stalin 
had reportedly ordered Mao not to cross the Yangzi River;25 the U.S. embassy explained 
on January 31, 1949, that “the Kremlin planners are fearful that the Communists may 
be able to develop too strong and independent a state.”26 But on February 25, 1949, the 
Nationalist navy’s flagship, Chongqing (the former light cruiser HMS Aurora), muti-
nied. This event was a symbol of the waning Nationalist mandate to rule, and Secretary 
of State Dean Acheson referred to it at a National Security Council (NSC) meeting in 
those terms: “The defection to the Communists of the only cruiser in the Chinese fleet 
is symptomatic of the uncertainties in the present situation, particularly with respect to 
political conspiracy and ‘deals’ in the higher echelons.”27 By the end of April 1949 much 
of the rest of the Nationalist fleet guarding the Yangzi River had also defected. On April 
20, 1949, Communist forces crossed the Yangzi and three days later overran Nanjing. 
Thereafter, the PLA quickly consolidated control over all of mainland China, taking 
Shanghai and Wuhan in May, Xi’an and Changsha in August, Guangzhou in October, 
and the Nationalist wartime capital of Chongqing in November.28 
The PLA rapid advance southward forced the remaining Nationalist units to retreat to 
Taiwan. According to a CIA analysis of October 19, 1949, the 681,000 Nationalist com-
bat forces had lost the “will to fight,” for six major reasons: 
(1) Army politics, which keep incompetent officers in positions of high command; (2) general 
professional incompetence in the armed forces; (3) the personal interference of Chiang Kai-shek 
in tactical operations; (4) Chiang’s refusal to supply money and materiel to commanders on the 
mainland; (5) inadequate pay, food, clothing, and equipment for the troops; and (6) chronic graft 
and corruption practiced by senior officers at the expense of the men.29 
By contrast, the PLA experienced enormous growth, from an estimated half a million 
troops in mid-1945 to 1.3 million in mid-1946, two million in mid-1947, 2.8 million by 
mid-1948, and four million by early 1949.30 American officials at this time considered 
the Chinese communists to be little better than Soviet puppets; according to Secretary 
of State Dean Acheson, “This Chinese Government is really a tool of Russian imperial-
ism in China.” The most important thing to avoid was adopting “any course of action 
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that would solidify the Chinese people behind the Communist regime.”31 Later, Ache-
son predicted that “conflict would eventually develop between China and the USSR” 
and argued that “we should seek to take advantage of this conflict when it developed 
and meanwhile avoid actions which would deflect Chinese xenophobia from Russia to 
ourselves.”32 
Chiang Kai-shek and his advisers officially moved the Nationalist government to 
Taiwan on December 8, 1949, the eighth anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor, to continue their anticommunist struggle.33 Even then, Chiang claimed that 
the ROC regime remained the legitimate government of all of China. Meanwhile, in 
late September 1949, Mao Zedong assembled a new Political Consultative Conference 
that elected him chairman of the central government and made Beijing the capital once 
again. On October 1, 1949, Mao officially proclaimed the creation of the People’s Re-
public of China. Concerned about the strategic weakness of its colony Hong Kong, Great 
Britain, the main U.S. ally in Europe, extended official recognition to the PRC govern-
ment on January 6, 1950.
During the summer and fall of 1949, Nationalist forces fiercely defended the numerous 
offshore islands that they held. The Nationalists initially kept one regiment of marines 
on the Miao Islands, north of the Shandong Peninsula, to blockade the Bo Hai Gulf 
and the northern ports and fortified Zhoushan and the Saddle Islands to blockade the 
Yangzi River. Meanwhile, the islands of the Tachens (Dachens), Matsu (Mazu—actually 
a group of thirty-six islets), Quemoy (Jinmen), and the Pescadores (Penghu) near Tai-
wan; Lema and Wanshan Islands near Guangzhou; and Hainan Island, fifteen miles off 
the southern coast—all were used after 1949 by the Nationalist government in Taiwan to 
conduct a naval blockade of the PRC. 
The Nationalist Blockade Strategy
The Nationalists had been forced to retreat but they were not defeated. Chiang simply 
shifted from a land-based offensive to a naval one, a blockade. The ROC had already 
agreed to purchase “all surplus property owned by the United States in China and on 
seventeen Pacific Islands and bases”;34 it was charged only $95,500,000 for equipment 
valued at $1,079,300,000.35 The Nationalists controlled a total of 824 vessels of various 
types. By 1947, the Nationalist navy had grown to almost forty thousand men and by 
October 31, 1948, to 40,859, including 8,062 officers.36 By late 1949, however, the Nation-
alist navy, though still comparatively large, had dropped to an estimated thirty thou-
sand men and 150 ships, and morale was low; the CIA considered it “possible that many 
units might defect.”37 Nevertheless, the Nationalists pursued their blockade against the 
PRC, working with a number of autonomous guerrilla movements on islands off China’s 
coast. Later, the U.S. Navy provided military assistance—especially aircraft—that made 
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air patrols of the blockade possible. The Nationalist blockade lasted from 1949 through 
1958.38
In 1947, its navy both equipped and manned, the Nationalists had attempted to halt 
Soviet shipments to the Chinese communists in Manchuria via Port Arthur (now 
Lüshun) and Dalian by naval blockade, albeit mainly a paper one. Because Manchuria’s 
ports were already closed to most foreign shippers, the blockade of Lüshun and Dalian 
elicited no complaints from the foreign powers. But on June 18, 1949, the National-
ists announced that any Chinese port not under their control would be closed to trade 
as of midnight on the 25th. The next month, however, the Admiralty’s Intelligence 
Division warned that if the Nationalists lost the Miao Islands and the entire Zhoushan 
area including Dinghai, as was then likely, the blockade would have no effect north of 
the Yangzi River, only a “limited and sporadic” one on trade entering and leaving the 
Yangzi River, in which case the “Nationalist blockade could only be effective south of 
Fuzhou.”39 
As the Nationalists retreated from their northern bases, therefore, the focus of the 
naval blockade moved southward. The Nationalist retreat to Taiwan was a major 
maritime undertaking, during which the Nationalist navy and other ships pressed into 
service transported approximately two million civilians and six hundred thousand 
soldiers across the strait. On August 6, 1948, the CIA argued that American bases on 
the Ryukyu (Okinawa) Islands would “give the US a position from which to operate 
in defense of an unarmed post-treaty Japan and US bases in the Philippines and other 
Pacific Islands.”40 Taiwan was a key part of the island chain running from the Aleutians 
through Hokkaido to Japan and Okinawa to the Philippines. If it fell, the PLA could use 
it as a base from which to invade other islands in the chain, as well as to interfere with 
international shipping. 
On March 14, 1949, the CIA suggested that supporting Taiwan might strengthen 
the “will to resist Communism in Japan, in Korea, in the Philippines and elsewhere 
throughout the Far East,” particularly if an American aid program “were developed 
in such a way as to secure local stability and contentment in Taiwan.”41 On October 
26, 1949, the NSC formally included Taiwan in what it called America’s “first line of 
strategic defense” in East Asia, arguing that this “minimum position will permit control 
of the main lines of communication necessary to United States strategic development of 
the important sections of the Asian area.”42 On November 21 the Department of State 
opined that “the resources of that island [Taiwan] appear adequate, if resolute steps are 
taken to utilize them effectively, to achieve our objective of denying the island to the 
Communists by political and economic means.” However, what Taiwan really needed 
was a “spiritual regeneration,” one that would produce new leaders able to “devote them-
selves with determination to their cause and which would revitalize their followers.”43 
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Gen. Omar N. Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vocally supported pro-
tecting Taiwan. On July 27, 1950, he forwarded to the secretary of defense a four-page 
“Memorandum on Formosa” that had been written by Douglas MacArthur on June 14. 
The paper urged the importance of the Pacific island chain: “Geographically and strate-
gically Formosa is an integral part of this offshore position which in the event of hostili-
ties can exercise a decisive degree of control of military operations along the periphery 
of Eastern Asia.” In particular, during times of conflict Taiwan’s position would give 
U.S. forces the “capability to interdict the limited means of communication available 
to the Communists and deny or materially reduce the ability of the USSR to exploit the 
natural resources of East and Southeast Asia.” Calling Taiwan an “unsinkable aircraft 
carrier and submarine tender,” MacArthur emphasized that the island was at “the very 
center of that portion of our [defensive] position now keyed to Japan, Okinawa, and the 
Philippines.”44 
During October 1949 a Communist attack on the Nationalist-held base on Jinmen, 
bitterly opposed by Nationalist troops, failed: “The [ROC] armored division, which 
is under the Generalissimo’s son [Chiang’s adopted son, Chiang Wei-kuo], is doing a 
splendid job, as was shown in the battle of Kingman [sic] [Jinmen] with a loss of approx-
imately 10,000 Communist soldiers and an additional 12,000 Communists captured.”45 
However, a number of strategic islands in the north were lost, effectively narrowing 
the blockade to central and southern China. During 1950, the PLA advanced toward 
the southern coastline, where, in spite of naval and air inferiority, it overwhelmed the 
Nationalist base on Hainan Island in February–May, the Zhoushan Archipelago in May, 
and Tatan Island in July. By the summer of 1950, therefore, the Nationalists had lost 
their crucial island bases in the Bo Hai Gulf, off the mouth of the Yangzi River, and on 
Hainan. These losses cut the Nationalist blockade’s reach by over half. 
Traditionally, offshore islands had acted as “stepping-stones” to Taiwan for invaders. 
Thus, Nationalist control of the offshore islands was critical to deter the Communists. 
By the spring of 1950, nevertheless, Communist forces seemed to be ready to invade. 
April and May were considered to be the best months to attack, since typhoons were un-
usual then.46 The PLA concentrated thousands of junks in the port cities along the Tai-
wan Strait in preparation for a massive amphibious invasion.47 The Communists could 
assemble “7,000 ships and craft” and “200 aircraft” to transport two hundred thousand 
troops across the strait.48 To foil such an attempt the Nationalists relied on their control 
over the large island bases of Jinmen and Mazu, right off the coast of Fujian Province, 
and over the Penghu Islands in the strait, halfway between the mainland and Taiwan. 
The Nationalists turned to “guerrillas” on islands along the southeastern two-thirds of 
China’s coastline to maintain the blockade.
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Nationalist-Supported Guerrilla Movements
Rather than fortifying all of these offshore islands themselves, the Nationalists worked 
with groups of anticommunist guerrillas. The degree to which the Nationalists interact-
ed with and controlled their guerrilla allies was intentionally left unclear. For example, 
in the Dachens, naval interdiction was carried out only by guerrillas, which allowed the 
Nationalists to avoid blame. To motivate the guerrillas, it was decided early on that their 
crews would share in the prize money from captured blockade-running ships. 
Not surprisingly, the Nationalist blockade in distant locations such as the Dachen 
Islands largely depended on guerrillas. The Nationalists portrayed them as anticommu-
nist fighters. But to many foreign shippers, the pro-Nationalist guerrillas appeared little 
better than modern-day pirates. As reported by one British official in 1952, “Indications 
are that most of the piracies are done by Nationalist guerrillas not under the effective 
control of Taipei. The border line is obscure. In 1948 it was respectable for bandits to 
masquerade as Communist Liberation forces; in 1952 it is respectable for pirates to mas-
querade as the Nationalist Navy.”49 Unlike regular Nationalist troops, these guerrillas 
were primarily interested in their own financial gain—from either taking bribes or con-
fiscating the foreign shipments. As the U.S. Navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) 
reported, “Actually, even though the Nationalists have the capability, they probably do 
not wish to suppress the guerrilla activities because it would undoubtedly lose them the 
guerrilla support in the coastal islands.”50
In mid-January 1951, following China’s intervention in the Korean War, the NSC 
recommended for the first time that the U.S. government “furnish now all practicable 
covert aid to effective anti-communist guerrilla forces in China.”51 American assistance 
to the Chinese guerrillas began that month. The NSC estimated that there were seven 
hundred thousand guerrillas in China, half of them owing allegiance to the National-
ists. To support bands in China’s interior would require airdrops, with a high likelihood 
that many supplies would be lost. Supplying bands along the coast, in contrast, was 
“relatively simple,” and the benefits of doing so were potentially great: “Successful guer-
rilla action should eliminate the physical aspects of communist support in Indochina, 
occupy the attention within China of the major part of the [Chinese communist forces, 
or PLA], and counter the myth of communist invincibility.” While the Nationalist 
troops on Taiwan were numerous, this report concluded, “the optimum use of the Na-
tionalist forces under present conditions appears to be in support of guerrilla operations 
on the mainland.”52 
On Lower Dachen Island, the CIA-sponsored Western Enterprises Incorporated (WEI) 
sent American advisers to train the guerrillas. The idea of a Military Assistance Advi-
sory Group (MAAG) in China dated from February 26, 1946;53 on July 16, Truman had 
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authorized the U.S. Navy to “detail not more than one hundred officers and two hun-
dred enlisted men of the United States Navy or Marine Corps to assist the Republic of 
China in naval matters.”54 By 1949, however, civil war had led to greater chaos in China, 
and the NSC warned that “units of the U.S. fleet should not now be stationed at or off 
Formosan ports in support of the political and economic measures” on Taiwan.55 
Because of that chaos, American plans to support the Nationalists did not go fully into 
effect on Taiwan until the early 1950s. Once the Nationalists lost the mainland, they 
asked Washington for permission to “employ as a matter of immediate urgency a small 
group of American advisers composed of civilian, economic, industrial, agricultural 
and military advisers.” This group of 130–50 would be used to build up defenses to 
save Formosa from invasion and thereby “greatly strengthen the resistance forces on 
the mainland [and] would give new courage to millions of Chinese who are opposed to 
communist domination and control.”56 
By 1951 the number of American advisers on Formosa totaled about 650, half with the 
MAAG, the other half with a variety of smaller organizations. One, WEI, appeared to be 
engaged in “guerrilla training and psychological warfare.”57 At any one time, about half 
the advisers—from 250 to three hundred—were assisting the Nationalist navy. Lon Red-
man, a WEI adviser, attempted to bulldoze an airstrip on the Dachens to handle C-46 
cargo planes, but this plan had to be abandoned once it became clear that he “could not 
clear a strip long enough to permit a C-46 to land unless he bulldozed down almost to 
sea level.”58
Contested Control over Offshore Islands
By 1953, the Nationalists controlled twenty-five offshore islands. On July 30, 1953, a U.S. 
Navy report, “Security of Offshore Islands Presently Held by the Nationalist Government 
of the Republic of China,” divided twenty of these into three categories. In Category I 
were four islands off Fuzhou, including Mazu, and four off Xiamen, including Jinmen, 
that “could be used to counter Chinese Communist invasion operations.”59 Retaining 
these eight islands was considered militarily desirable for defensive purposes; Xiamen 
and Fuzhou in particular were “natural harbors for the staging of a sea invasion of For-
mosa.” If these islands were seized by the PRC, however, their “function could largely be 
replaced by an increased use of naval craft which could blockade these two harbors.”60 
The Nationalists also hoped to use these two islands to return to the mainland. But the 
region of China opposite them was mountainous and had “few means of communica-
tion” with the interior of China, so a Nationalist invasion south of Xiamen or north of 
Fuzhou “would be more appropriate.”61 In any case, defending the Category I islands 
“minimizes rather than maximizes the usefulness of our [U.S.] sea strength,” whereas 
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American sea power would be “particularly effective in defending Taiwan” itself.62 Seen 
from the American perspective in strategic terms alone, even this most militarily useful 
category of islands was a net liability, especially for an already overextended U.S. Navy. 
Category II, comprising two islands in the Dachen group, was not considered important 
to the defense of Taiwan or the Penghu Islands. Category III’s ten smaller islands were 
mainly important in defending the ten islands in Categories I and II. As for the five 
other offshore islands under Nationalist domination, U.S. Navy planners noted that 
they “are not now being utilized for important operations and are not considered worth 
the effort necessary to defend them against a determined attack.” Still, as one U.S. Navy 
report was quick to point out, none of the offshore islands could be called “essential” 
to the defense of Taiwan and the Penghus in the sense of being “absolutely necessary” 
militarily. Their importance to the Nationalists was mainly for “psychological warfare 
purposes,” as well as for 
their “pre-invasion opera-
tions, commando raiding, 
intelligence gathering, 
maritime resistance develop-
ment, sabotage, escape and 
evasion” (see map 1).63 
China’s southern coast 
was especially tense dur-
ing the early 1950s. Both 
sides fiercely defended their 
offshore islands in the hope 
of changing the strategic 
balance. The legal status 
of the disputed islands was 
unclear. On March 19, 1955, 
Secretary of State John Fos-
ter Dulles argued that since 
Jinmen and Mazu were in-
disputably “parts of China,” 
and since the U.S. govern-
ment recognized the Nation-
alists as the “Government of 
China,” then the Nationalists 
had a “better title” to these 
offshore islands than did 
MAP 1
Nationalist-Controlled Offshore Islands
the PRC.64 According to Dulles, “for the United States, the offshore islands were of no 
intrinsic importance except in the context of an attack on Formosa”; they could be used 
as “stepping stones for such an attack.”65 Later, the NSC supported this view, suggest-
ing that the number one reason the PRC wanted Quemoy (Jinmen) and Mazu was to 
remove the Nationalists’ “stepping stones toward the mainland.”66
By the spring of 1950, then, the two Chinas faced each other across the Taiwan Strait. 
To many it appeared that the PLA was planning to replicate its successful invasion of 
Hainan Island with a massive maritime attack on Taiwan. The Truman administration’s 
disillusionment with Chiang Kai-shek and his exiled Nationalist government made it 
highly unlikely that the United States would intervene openly on the side of Taiwan. On 
October 6, 1949, the NSC reported that while the Nationalists had sufficient supplies to 
“hold out on Formosa for at least two years,” the biggest problem was the “transfer to the 
Island of the ills and malpractices that have characterized the Kuomintang [the Nation-
alist political party, led by Chiang since 1926] in China.”67 For his part, General Mar-
shall was convinced “that Chiang’s government is both hopelessly corrupt and Fascist in 
character.”68 Truman’s secretary of state, Acheson, described the Nationalist government 
as “corrupt and incompetent.”69 On October 26, 1949, Truman wrote to Senator Elbert 
D. Thomas of Chiang Kai-shek’s final failure: “Corruption and inefficiency caused 
that blow up.”70 Five months later Truman told Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg that the 
“unfortunate situation in the Far East . . . came about as a result of the corrupt Chinese 
Nationalist government.”71 Trying to defend the weak Nationalist regime, therefore, 
would be too costly.
Others disagreed. On November 25, 1945, Col. C. A. Seoane told Brig. Gen. Harry H. 
Vaughan: “Russia’s plans now clearly unfolding are to arm and organize this communist 
group [in China] with a view of having them come into possession of China proper in 
order that communism shall become definitely established there with its spreading thru 
Korea and even Japan, thus ousting us eventually from the Pacific, both as to position as 
well as influence.”72 On January 4, 1950, Hollington K. Tong warned Truman that “once 
the Communists get into Formosa, there would be no way to prevent Soviet Russia from 
basing its fleet and submarines in Formosan naval bases—among the best in the world.” 
Russian agents could then “stand at the gates of Japan and the Philippines.”73 Finally, 
Senator H. Alexander Smith told Truman on May 5, 1950, “My trip to the Far East last 
fall made it very clear to me that what has happened in China has been the conquest by 
Russia of that unfortunate country through the Russian method of infiltration and bor-
ing from within.”74 
Others had more-nuanced views. H. T. Goodier, a retired American consul who had 
served in Japan, wrote on January 2, 1950, to the White House that on one hand the 
U.S. government should not “give any kind of aid to Chiang, political, economic or 
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otherwise” but on the other it should “occupy Formosa, pending the conclusion of a 
peace treaty with Japan and the formation of an autonomous Formosan Chinese state.”75 
Many ethnic Taiwanese wanted an independent Formosa, with one group telling 
Truman: 
Formosa is neither the personal property of Chiang Kai-shek nor the colony of the Communists and 
inhabitants of Formosa should have a chance and right to determine their own destiny and form of 
govt; hope this [American] govt will support their demands for the U.N. to send its police forces to 
take up jurisdiction of Formosa until plebiscite is held for decision as to status of Formosa, and that 
Formosa remain a permanent, neutral, independent nation under the security of the U.N.76
All of this changed in June 1950, when the Korean War began and the political impor-
tance of Taiwan suddenly increased.
Conclusions
On January 5, 1950, President Harry S. Truman issued a press statement declaring 
that the “United States had no predatory designs on Formosa or on any other Chinese 
territory,” and that it would “not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on 
Formosa.”77 Meanwhile, the United States and its allies had “accepted the exercise of 
[Nationalist] Chinese authority over the island” of Taiwan, did not want to establish a 
base on Taiwan, and did not have “any intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere 
in the present situation.” Specifically, it would not become involved in the “civil conflict 
in China” and would not provide “military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa 
(Taiwan).” Secretary of State Acheson made clear later that same day that “in the un-
likely and unhappy event that our forces might be attacked in the Far East, the United 
States must be completely free to make whatever action in whatever area is necessary for 
its own security.”78 
Nonetheless, according to one firsthand report “American personnel”—most likely not 
directly associated with the U.S. Army—were helping the Nationalists repair and recon-
dition their American-made equipment.79 Between 1937 and November 1, 1949, the U.S. 
government had given China $3,523,000,000: $2,422,000,000 in grants, $1,101,000,000 
in credits.80 Much of this aid had been wasted, a matter of “giving aid without proper 
supervision.”81 But some of this American money had gone for weapons and ammuni-
tion, so the Nationalists on Taiwan had military supplies. 
Had the PLA in 1950 initiated a spring or summer cross-strait attack, Taiwan might 
have been incorporated into the PRC. But thanks to their naval dominance in the Tai-
wan Strait, the Nationalists remained able to carry out an offensive policy, to the extent 
of capturing cargoes destined for Chinese ports, using the offshore islands to mount 
raids against the mainland, and to collect valuable intelligence. On May 23, 1950, Sun 
Li-jen, commander in chief of the Chinese (i.e., Nationalist) army, urged to President 
Truman that “Taiwan must be held against the Communists at all costs [as] a beacon 
light to the suffering people on the mainland of China, who are being trampled upon by 
the Communists.”82 The Korean War broke out the next month, and suddenly, Taiwan’s 
continued existence was both politically and militarily important. The war could always 
spread south from Korea and produce a naval invasion of Taiwan. If the PRC did invade 
Taiwan, it could cut off a major sea line of communications by which United Nations 
troops and supplies were brought to the Korean theater. That two-prong military threat 
had to be avoided at all costs.
Notes 
1. Claire Lee Chennault [Maj. Gen.] to John R. 
Steelman, June 10, 1949, Harry S. Truman 
Papers [hereafter PHST], Official File, OF 
150, box 759, File O.F. 150 Misc. (1947–48) [2 
of 2], Harry S. Truman Presidential Library 
[hereafter HSTPL].
2. Senator Homer Ferguson to Harry S. Truman, 
December 13, 1949, PHST, Official File, OF 
150-G, box 761, Formosa, HSTPL.
3. Beginning in 1661, anti-Manchu forces used 
the various offshore islands to attack and take 
Taiwan from the Dutch. Two decades later, in 
1683, Qing forces used the offshore islands to 
defeat the Ming loyalists and retake Taiwan. 
Yang Zhiben [杨志本], ed., China Navy 
Encyclopedia [中国海军百科全书] (Beijing: 
Sea Tide Press [海潮出版社], 1998), vol. 2, 
pp. 1912–14.
4. Memorandum for the President, July 26, 1946, 
Top Secret, PHST, SMOF–Naval Aide, box 22, 
State Department Briefs File, HSTPL.
5. Ellis E. Patterson to Harry S. Truman, Novem-
ber 14, 1945, PHST, Official File, OF 148-A, 
box 757, File O.F. 150 (1945–46), HSTPL.
6. Harry S. Truman to Henry A. Wallace,  
December 18, 1945, PHST, Official File, OF 
148-A, box 757, File O.F. 150 (1945–46), 
HSTPL.
7. Maurice Votaw to Charles G. Ross, April 9, 
1947, PHST, Official File, OF 150, box 759, 
File O.F. 150 Misc. (1947–48) [1 of 2], HSTPL.
8. Summary of Telegrams, June 2, 1947, Top  
Secret, PHST, SMOF–Naval Aide, box 22, 
State Department Briefs File, HSTPL.
9. See Bruce A. Elleman, “Huai-Hai,” in The 
Seventy Great Battles of All Time, ed. Jeremy 
Black (London: Thames & Hudson, 2005), pp. 
279–81.
10. Memorandum for the President, November 4, 
1948, Top Secret, PHST, President’s Secretary’s 
File, box 189, P.S.F. Subject File, HSTPL.
11. Summary of Telegrams, November 8, 1948, 
Top Secret, PHST, SMOF–Naval Aide, box 23, 
State Department Briefs File, HSTPL.
12. Summary of Telegrams, November 9, 1948, 
Top Secret, PHST, SMOF–Naval Aide, box 23, 
State Department Briefs File, HSTPL.
13. Boston Mayor James M. Curley to Harry S. 
Truman, November 29, 1948, PHST, Official 
File, OF 150, box 759, File O.F. 150 Misc. 
(1947–48) [2 of 2], HSTPL.
14. Frederick C. McKee to Harry S. Truman, 
November 29, 1949, PHST, Official File, OF 
150, box 759, File O.F. 150 Misc. (1947–48) [1 
of 2], HSTPL.
15. Members of the National Assembly of the Re-
public of China to Harry S. Truman, January 
6, 1949, PHST, Official File, OF 150, box 758, 
File O.F. 150 (1947–49), HSTPL.
16. William C. Bullitt to Harry S. Truman, Febru-
ary 9, 1948, PHST, Official File, OF 150, box 
759, File O.F. 150 Misc. (1947–48) [1 of 2], 
HSTPL.
17. Ibid.
18. Chennault to Steelman, June 10, 1949.
19. Central Intelligence Agency, Prospects for a 
Negotiated Peace in China, August 3, 1948, 
Secret, PHST, President’s Secretary’s File, box 
216, P.S.F. Intelligence Reports, ORE 12-48, 
HSTPL.
14  the newport papers
taiwan’s offshore islands  15
Macintosh HD:Users:Ursula.Curran.ctr:Desktop:_NP_44_Taiwan_s Offshore Islands_PRINTER:NP_44 book Folder:NP_44_Chapter1.indd January 29, 2019 4:05 PM
20. Central Intelligence Agency, Possible Devel-
opments in China, November 19, 1948, Secret, 
PHST, President’s Secretary’s File, box 216, 
P.S.F. Intelligence File, ORE 27-48, HSTPL.
21. Summary of Telegrams, December 23, 1948, 
Top Secret, PHST, SMOF–Naval Aide, box 23, 
State Department Briefs File, HSTPL.
22. Irving Zuckerman to Clark Clifford, Novem-
ber 30, 1948, PHST, Official File, OF 150, box 
759, File O.F. 150 Misc. (1947–48) [2 of 2], 
HSTPL [emphasis original].
23. Summary of Telegrams, November 26, 1948, 
Top Secret, PHST, SMOF–Naval Aide, box 23, 
State Department Briefs File, HSTPL.
24. Central Intelligence Agency, Limitations of 
South China as an Anti-Communist Base, 
June 4, 1948, Secret, PHST, President’s Sec-
retary’s File, box 216, P.S.F. Intelligence File, 
ORE 30-48, HSTPL.
25. S. C. M. Paine, The Wars for Asia, 1911–1949 
(New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2014), p. 
269.
26. Summary of Telegrams, January 31, 1949, 
Top Secret, PHST, SMOF–Naval Aide, box 23, 
State Department Briefs File, HSTPL.
27. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Speech to 
the 35th National Security Council Meet-
ing, March 3, 1949, Secret, PHST, President’s 
Secretary’s File, box 179, P.S.F. Subject File, 
HSTPL.
28. See Bruce A. Elleman, “The Chongqing 
Mutiny and the Chinese Civil War, 1949,” in 
Naval Mutinies of the Twentieth Century: An 
International Perspective, ed. Christopher M. 
Bell and Bruce A. Elleman (London: Frank 
Cass, 2003), pp. 232–45.
29. Central Intelligence Agency, Survival Poten-
tial of Residual Non-Communist Regimes 
in China, October 19, 1949, Secret, PHST, 
President’s Secretary’s File, box 218, P.S.F. 
Intelligence File, ORE 76-49, HSTPL.
30. See Bruce A. Elleman and S. C. M. Paine, 
Modern China: Continuity and Change 1644 to 
the Present (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice 
Hall, 2010), pp. 343–44.
31. Supplemental Notes on Executive Session, 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 
12, 1949, PHST, President’s Secretary’s File, 
box 140, P.S.F. Subject File, HSTPL.
32. Memorandum for the President, December 
30, 1949, Top Secret, PHST, President’s Secre-
tary’s File, box 188, P.S.F. Subject File, HSTPL.
33. While December 7, 1941, is remembered in 
the United States, in Japan, across the interna-
tional date line, it was December 8. This tim-
ing perhaps emphasized to Western audiences 
that the Nationalist struggle against com-
munism was a continuation of the National-
ists’ alliance with the United States during the 
Pacific War. Tacit acknowledgment of this 
may have occurred a year later, on December 
8, 1950, when the United States imposed a full 
strategic embargo on the PRC.
34. Statement by the President, December 18, 
1946, PHST, Official File, OF 148-A, box 757, 
File O.F. 150 (1945–46), HSTPL.
35. Summary of United States Government 
Economic and Military Aid Authorized for 
China since 1937, n.d., PHST, Official File, OF 
150, box 758, File O.F. 150 (1950–53) [1 of 2], 
HSTPL.
36. “Intelligence Briefs: China,” ONI Review 
(January 1949), p. 39.
37. Central Intelligence Agency, Survival Poten-
tial of Residual Non-Communist Regimes in 
China.
38. See Bruce A. Elleman, “The Nationalists’ 
Blockade of the PRC, 1949–58,” in Naval 
Blockades and Seapower: Strategies and 
Counter-strategies, 1805–2005, ed. Bruce A. 
Elleman and S. C. M. Paine (London: Rout-
ledge, 2006), pp. 133–44.
39. “Appreciation of the Ability of the Chinese 
Nationalist Navy to Effect a Blockade of 
Communist Territorial Waters (Secret),” Intel-
ligence Division, Naval Staff, Admiralty, July 
9, 1949, FO 371 75902, The National Archives, 
Kew [hereafter TNA].
40. Central Intelligence Agency, The Ryukyu 
Islands and Their Significance, August 6, 
1948, Secret, PHST, President’s Secretary’s 
File, box 216, P.S.F. Intelligence File, ORE 
24-48, HSTPL.
41. Central Intelligence Agency, Probable Devel-
opments in Taiwan, March 14, 1949, Secret, 
PHST, President’s Secretary’s File, box 218, 
P.S.F. Intelligence File, ORE 39-49, HSTPL.
42. National Security Council [hereafter NSC], 
The Position of the United States with Respect 
to Asia, Draft for NSC Staff Consideration 
Only, October 25, 1949, Top Secret, PHST, 
President’s Secretary’s File, box 180, P.S.F. 
Subject File, HSTPL.
43. Summary of Telegrams, November 21, 1949, 
Top Secret, PHST, SMOF–Naval Aide, box 23, 
State Department Briefs File, HSTPL.
44. Omar N. Bradley [Gen.], Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum for the 
Secretary of Defense, July 27, 1950, Top 
Secret, PHST, President’s Secretary’s File, box 
181, P.S.F. Subject File, HSTPL.
45. Edward C. Spowart to Harry S. Truman, Janu-
ary 5, 1950, PHST, Official File, OF 150-G, 
box 761, Formosa, HSTPL.
46. National Intelligence Estimate, Chinese 
Communist Capabilities and Intentions with 
Respect to Taiwan, April 10, 1951, Secret, 
PHST, President’s Secretary’s File, box 215, 
P.S.F. Intelligence File, HSTPL.
47. He Di, “The Last Campaign to Unify China,” 
in Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience 
since 1949, ed. Mark A. Ryan, David M. Fin-
kelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt (Armonk, 
NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), pp. 73–90.
48. Edward J. Marolda, “Hostilities along the 
China Coast during the Korean War,” in New 
Interpretations in Naval History, ed. Robert W. 
Love Jr. et al. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 2001), p. 352.
49. D. F. Allen, “Report on Visit to Hong Kong, 
15–21 February, 1952 (Secret),” ADM 
1/23217, TNA.
50. “The Southeast China Coast Today,” ONI 
Review (February 1953), pp. 51–60.
51. NSC, U.S. Action to Counter Chinese Com-
munist Aggression, January 15, 1951, Top 
Secret, PHST, President’s Secretary’s File, box 
182, P.S.F. Subject File, HSTPL.
52. NSC, Statement of the Problem, January 17, 
1951, Top Secret, PHST, President’s Secretary’s 
File, box 182, P.S.F. Subject File, HSTPL.
53. James F. Byrnes to Harry S. Truman, February 
26, 1946, PHST, Official File, OF 148-A, box 
757, File O.F. 150 (1945–46), HSTPL.
54. Harry S. Truman, Executive Order, July 16, 
1946, PHST, Official File, OF 150, box 758, 
File O.F. 150 (1947–49), HSTPL.
55. NSC, Supplementary Measures with Respect 
to Formosa, March 1, 1949, Top Secret, PHST, 
President’s Secretary’s File, box 179, P.S.F. 
Subject File, HSTPL.
56. William D. Pawley to the Secretary of State, 
November 7, 1949, PHST, Official File, OF 
150, box 758, File O.F. 150 (1947–49), HSTPL.
57. Naval Liaison Office, British Consulate, 
Tamsui, “American Military Activity in 
Taiwan (Secret Guard),” October 5, 1951, FO 
371/92300, TNA.
58. Frank Holober, Raiders of the China Coast: 
CIA Covert Operations during the Korean War 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999), 
pp. 113–14.
59. Robert B. Carney [Adm.], CNO, memo-
randum to Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Security of 
the Offshore Islands Presently Held by the 
Nationalist Government of the Republic of 
China,” July 30, 1953, Top Secret, appendix, 
Strategic Plans Division, box 289, Naval 
History and Heritage Command Archives 
[hereafter NHHC].
60. Preliminary Draft of Possible Statement of Po-
sition for Communication to the Republic of 
China, April 7, 1955, p. 7, Secret, White House 
Memo [hereafter WHM], box 2, Offshore 
April–May 1955 (4), Dwight D. Eisenhower 
Presidential Library [hereafter DDEPL].
61. John Foster Dulles, Draft “Formosa” Paper to 
Eisenhower, April 8, 1955, p. 9, Secret, WHM, 
box 2, Offshore April–May 1955 (3), DDEPL.
62. Ibid., p. 7.
63. Carney to Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 30, 1953.
64. John Foster Dulles to Lew Douglas, Personal, 
March 19, 1955, DDE Ad. Series 12, Douglas, 
Lewis W. (3), DDEPL.
65. U.K. Embassy, Washington, DC, telegram 
to Foreign Office (Secret), February 9, 1955, 
PREM 11/867, TNA.
66. U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited 
Military Operations to 1 July 1961, May 29, 
1958, p. C3, Top Secret, WH Office, OSANSA, 
Records 1952–61, NSC Series, Policy Paper 
Subseries, box 22, A6 NSC 5724–Gaither 
Report (1), DDEPL.
67. NSC, The Position of the United States with 
Respect to Formosa, October 6, 1949, Top 
Secret, PHST, President’s Secretary’s File, box 
180, P.S.F. Subject File, HSTPL.
68. Senator Glen H. Taylor to Harry S. Truman, 
March 5, 1948, PHST, Official File, OF 150, 
box 759, File O.F. 150 Misc. (1947–48) [1 of 
2], HSTPL.
69. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Current 
Position of the U.S. with Respect to Formosa, 
August 5, 1949, Top Secret, PHST, President’s 
Secretary’s File, box 180, P.S.F. Subject File, 
HSTPL.
16  the newport papers
taiwan’s offshore islands  17
Macintosh HD:Users:Ursula.Curran.ctr:Desktop:_NP_44_Taiwan_s Offshore Islands_PRINTER:NP_44 book Folder:NP_44_Chapter1.indd January 29, 2019 4:05 PM
70. Harry S. Truman to Elbert D. Thomas, 
October 26, 1949, PHST, Official File, OF 
150, box 758 (copy in box 826), File O.F. 150 
(1947–49), HSTPL.
71. Harry S. Truman to Senator Arthur H. Van-
denberg, March 27, 1950, PHST, Official File, 
OF 150, box 758, File O.F. 150 (1950–53) [2 of 
2], HSTPL.
72. C. A. Seoane [Col.] to Harry H. Vaughan 
[Brig. Gen.], November 25, 1945, PHST,  
Official File, OF 150, box 758, File O.F. 150 
Misc. (1945–46) [1 of 2], HSTPL.
73. Hollington K. Tong to Harry S. Truman, 
January 4, 1950, PHST, Official File, OF 150, 
box 759, File O.F. 150 Misc. (1947–48) [1 of 
2], HSTPL.
74. Senator H. Alexander Smith to Harry S. 
Truman, May 5, 1950, PHST, Official File, OF 
150, box 758, File O.F. 150 (1950–53) [1 of 2], 
HSTPL.
75. H. T. Goodier to Harry S. Truman, January 2, 
1950, PHST, Official File, OF 150-G, box 761, 
Formosa, HSTPL [emphasis original].
76. Thomas W. Liao, President, and Frank S. 
Sins, Chief of Political Affairs, Formosan 
Democratic Independence Party, to Harry S. 
Truman, August 9, 1950, PHST, Official File, 
OF 150-G, box 761, Formosa, HSTPL.
77. Harry S. Truman, statement, January 5, 1950, 
PHST, Official File, OF 150, box 758 (copy in 
box 761), File O.F. 150 (1947–49), HSTPL. 
78. “Commitments and Problems of the United 
States to the Republic of China, Including 
Any Divergencies between the Two Govern-
ments, and Chinese Problems with Other 
Asian Nations (Other Than Military),” n.d. 
[probably summer 1954], pp. 2–3, Top Secret, 
WH Office, OSANSA, Special Assistant 
Series, President Subseries, box 2, Presidential 
Papers, 1954 (13), DDEPL.
79. Spowart to Truman, January 5, 1950.
80. Summary of United States Government Eco-
nomic and Military Aid Authorized for China 
since 1937.
81. Chennault to Steelman, June 10, 1949.
82. Sun Li-jen, Commander in Chief, Chinese 
Army, to Harry S. Truman, May 23, 1950, 
PHST, Official File, OF 150, box 758 (sum-
mary copy in box 826), O.F. 150 (1950–53) [1 
of 2], HSTPL.
C
H
A
PT
ER
 T
W
O
President Harry S. Truman’s Decision to  
Protect Taiwan
[Once] a guard closes a gate, [even] ten thousand [enemy] soldiers  
cannot open it. (一夫當關, 萬夫莫開.)
With the beginning of the Korean War in June 1950, the U.S. Navy was tasked to create 
the Taiwan Strait Patrol to neutralize the strait and protect Taiwan from a PRC at-
tack. On August 27, 1950, President Truman emphasized to UN Ambassador Warren 
R. Austin that “the action of the United States was an impartial neutralizing action 
addressed both to the forces on Formosa and to those on the mainland. It was an ac-
tion designed to keep the peace and was, therefore, in full accord with the spirit of the 
Charter of the United Nations.” As President Truman solemnly declared, “We have no 
designs on Formosa, and our action was not inspired by any desire to acquire a special 
position for the United States.” Furthermore, as a result of this American policy “For-
mosa is now at peace and will remain so until someone resorts to force.”1
On September 21, 1950, Secretary of State Acheson explained to the secretary-general 
of the United Nations the U.S. government’s policy toward Taiwan and certain offshore 
islands, such as the Penghus. He began by citing the statement of the December 1, 1943, 
Cairo Declaration that Formosa would be returned to “the Republic of China.”2 The July 
1945 Potsdam Declaration confirmed Cairo’s terms, and the Joint Chiefs’ General Order 
No. 1 directed the Japanese forces on Formosa to surrender to “Generalissimo Chiang 
Kai-shek.” From 1945 onward, the Republic of China retained administrative control 
over Formosa and the Penghus, plus a number of other offshore islands. On April 28, 
1952, Japan signed a peace treaty renouncing its claim to Formosa and the Penghus, 
although “in whose favor Japan was renouncing was not stipulated.” Thereafter, Japan 
and the ROC signed their own peace treaty, effective August 5, 1952, wherein Japan 
repeated this renunciation of rights, again without stating to whom.3
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The ROC had occupied both Formosa and the Penghus continuously since 1945: “There 
is no question that the Republic of China is today and at all times since the effective date 
of the Japanese Peace Treaty, has been in effective possession of and exercising admin-
istrative control over Formosa and the Pescadores.”4 Nevertheless, its formal title was 
vague and, as Dulles cautioned Lew Douglas, not 100 percent binding: “I am not quite 
clear as to why, from a legal standpoint, we are on strong ground as regards Formosa, 
where the title of the Republic of China is incomplete, than in relation to Quemoy and 
Matsu where the legal title is complete.” Counterintuitively, Dulles argued that if the 
PRC were to be recognized as the “lawful government of China,” then “the legal position 
of the Chinese Nationalists becomes better in relation to Formosa than in relation to 
Quemoy and Matsu.”5 As for the PRC taking the islands by force, Dulles told the UN 
General Assembly: “Also I do not ignore the fact that the Offshore Islands are physically 
close to Mainland China. But we can scarcely accept the view that nations are entitled to 
seize territory by force just because it is near at hand.” An attempt to take territory that 
“has long been under the authority of another government . . . is a use of force which 
endangers world order.”6 This issue became particularly important once the Korean War 
expanded to include China.
The Korean War
Immediately after the outbreak of the Korean War, President Truman decided that 
Communist occupation of Taiwan would directly threaten the security of the entire 
Pacific region. On June 27, 1950, Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet, on the one hand, to 
intervene to prevent any attack on Taiwan and, on the other, to ensure that the Nation-
alists “cease all air and sea operations against the mainland.” On July 19 Truman told 
Congress, “The present military neutralization of Formosa is without prejudice to politi-
cal questions affecting that island. Our desire is that Formosa not become embroiled in 
hostilities disturbing to the peace of the Pacific and that all questions affecting Formosa 
be settled by peaceful means as envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations.”7 Tru-
man’s attitude toward China and Taiwan was called, accordingly, the “neutralization 
policy.” 
The Taiwanese government wanted to solidify relations with the United States and now 
apparently saw an opportunity. One CIA report had concluded that the Nationalists 
would use Taiwan as a “bargaining point”: “Aware of US interest in that island, they will 
present themselves as a means and perhaps the sole means of preventing its communi-
zation, and will offer various inducements and assurances in return for US aid and US 
moral support for a regional Chinese regime. They will also argue the legality of such a 
Chinese administration despite the fact that Taiwan’s status has not been formalized [in 
1949] by conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan.”8 
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Taipei had strong opinions on the neutralization policy. While there were no secret 
agreements per se, the Nationalist government made its own cooperation with it contin-
gent on four conditions: 
First, pending the conclusion of the treaty of peace on Japan, the Government of the United States of 
America may share with the Government of the Republic of China the responsibility for the defense 
of Taiwan.
Secondly, that Taiwan is a part of the territory of China is generally acknowledged by all concerned 
Powers. The proposals of the United States of America as contained in the above mentioned aide 
memoire should in no way alter the status of Formosa as envisaged in the Cairo Declaration, nor 
should it in any way affect China’s authority over Formosa.
Thirdly, the aforesaid proposals and the policies outlined in President Truman’s statement dated 
June 27 are emergency measures adopted to cope with the critical situation as existing on the 
mainland and in the Pacific region where a number of states have been threatened by or become the 
victims of aggressive International Communism. The Chinese Government may succeed in the sup-
pression of the aggression of International Communism within a reasonably short time, but should 
these measures prove to be inadequate, the Chinese Government, in conjunction with other govern-
ments concerned, will have to seek for more effective measures in resisting such aggression.
Fourthly, in accepting the American proposals, the Government of the Republic of China does not 
intend to depart from its dual policy of resistance against the aggression of International Commu-
nism and the maintenance of the territorial integrity of China.9
The U.S. Navy assigned a number of ships to form the Taiwan Patrol Force. At any one 
time, one or more warships patrolled the strait to ensure that the PRC did not attempt to 
invade. From 1950 through early 1953, the Truman administration ordered the Tai-
wan Patrol Force to stop attacks from either side of the strait; it was intended to play a 
neutral role and act as a buffer between the PRC and Taiwan. The neutralization order, 
however, specifically did not include the many offshore islands controlled by the Na-
tionalists. On October 7, 1950, it was made clear to the forces involved that they would 
not participate in the “defense of any coastal islands held by the Nationalist Chinese nor 
will they interfere with Nationalist Chinese operations from the coastal islands.”10
Shortly after Dwight D. Eisenhower won the 1952 presidential election, the focus of the 
Taiwan Patrol Force began to change. Eisenhower heeded hard-liners’ calls to “unleash 
Chiang Kai-shek.”11 A nationwide Gallup poll early in 1953 showed that 61 percent of 
Americans supported “the United States supplying more warships to Free China for 
use in blockading the China mainland coast and more airplanes for use in bombing 
the China mainland.”12 On February 2, 1953, Eisenhower announced in his State of the 
Union address that there is “no longer any logic or sense in a condition that required the 
United States Navy to assume defensive responsibilities on behalf of the Chinese Com-
munists.” As for the offshore islands, John Moore Allison, Assistant Secretary of State 
for Far Eastern Affairs, explained that they were not included in the original order “or 
in the contemplated amendment of the order.”13 
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This policy change opened a new peripheral theater in the south, meant to pressure 
Beijing to sign a peace treaty ending the Korean War.14 As early as April 5, 1951, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff had concluded that “preparations should be made immediately for action 
by naval and air forces against the mainland of China.”15 On July 31 Senator Harry P. 
Cain had urged Truman to support Nationalist attacks in the south as a “potentially 
powerful means of strengthening our own hand in the truce negotiations and [one that] 
may, if adequately supported, force some Communist withdrawals from the Korean 
front.”16 In 1954, a top-secret State Department study acknowledged that this new policy 
“represented the then need for diversionary threats.”17 Dulles would revert to this diver-
sionary strategy, suggesting “that it might be preferable to slow up the Chinese Commu-
nists in Southeast Asia by harassing tactics from Formosa and along the seacoast which 
would be more readily within our natural facilities than actually fighting in Indochina.” 
The transcript of the conversation records that “the President indicated his concurrence 
with this general attitude.”18
After the Chinese communists intervened in the Korean War in October 1950, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff recommended to the secretary of defense a stronger Taiwan policy: 
a. Maintain the security of the off-shore defense line: Japan—Ryukyus—Philippines. 
b.  Deny Formosa to the Communists.19 
Three days later, a top-secret NSC report went a step farther: “Send a military training 
mission and increase [Mutual Defense Assistance Program] to the Chinese on Formosa.”20 
By March 22, 1952, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had developed five points in support of 
Taiwan:
a.  Take such measures as may be necessary to deny Formosa to any Chinese regime aligned with or 
dominated by the USSR;
b.  In its own interests, take unilateral action if necessary, to insure the continued availability of 
Formosa as a base for possible United States military operations;
c.  Continue that part of the mission presently assigned to the 7th Fleet relative to the protection 
of Formosa until such time as conditions in the Far East permit the Chinese Nationalists on 
Formosa to assume the burden of the defense of that island;
d.  Support a friendly Chinese regime on Formosa, to the end that it will be firmly aligned with the 
United States; and
e. Develop and maintain the military potential of that Chinese regime on Formosa. 
The primary goal of these five points was “the denial of Formosa to communism,” 
which was “of major importance to United States security interests, and . . . of vital 
importance to the long-term United States position in the Far East.”21 
On February 2, 1953, Eisenhower lifted the U.S. Navy’s previous orders to restrain 
Nationalist forces. In his State of the Union address, as noted, Eisenhower characterized 
the neutralization policy as helping the Communists, as telling them, “in effect, that the 
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United States Navy was required to serve as a defensive arm of Communist China.”22 
But the U.S. Seventh Fleet would “no longer be employed as a shield for the mainland 
of China.”23 Nevertheless, as the attorney general later made clear, the new order to the 
Navy was not “evidence of any understanding that the President’s announcement meant 
that the United States would defend the off-shore islands controlled by the Nationalists 
in addition to defending Formosa and the Pescadores.”24
One immediate result of this policy change was that the Commander, Seventh Fleet 
was ordered no longer to require the Taiwan Patrol Force to prevent the use of Taiwan 
and the Penghu Islands as Nationalist bases for operations against the mainland.25 This 
change led to the revision of previous orders to the force itself. In particular, a formal 
“pen-and-ink change” to Operation Order 20-52, “Special Patrol Instructions,” directed 
deletion of “Large forces moving from Formosa toward the mainland will be reported to 
[Commander, Task Group] 72.0.”26 Most congressmen agreed with this change of policy, 
but Senator John Sparkman (D-AL) pointed out that because the previous policy had 
never “prevented ‘pin-prick’ raids from Quemoy or the off-shore islands,” the new order 
could be seen as a “medium for enlarging the war.”27
In April 1953, talks were held in Taipei between Adlai Stevenson and Chiang Kai-shek. 
Chiang promised Stevenson that given continued American military support, his forces 
would be ready to return to the mainland within “three years at the latest” and that once 
there they would gain a significant domestic following within “three to six months.”28 
The U.S. government agreed to support this plan. One reason later given by Dulles to 
the British ambassador was the “peripheral” view, that it would “make a diversionary 
threat at a time when fighting was going on in Korea so as to cause the Chinese Com-
munists to transfer forces away from Korea towards Formosa.”29 
The Nationalists seemed eager to begin. The first raid mounted directly from Taiwan 
was against Dongshan Island, which had been taken from the Nationalists on May 11, 
1950, by an assault of over ten thousand PLA troops. In mid-July 1953, the Nationalists 
tried to retake it with approximately 6,500 guerrillas, marines, and paratroopers. The 
attempt failed, but it forced the PRC to relocate troops south. Such results of Eisen-
hower’s decision to open a peripheral campaign played an important role in the PRC’s 
willingness to open talks in Korea. After the armistice was signed on July 27, 1953, the 
PRC immediately began to move additional troops south and station them across from 
Taiwan. This would lead to escalation on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. 
America’s Pacific Allies and Great Britain
Spurred on by war on the Korean Peninsula, the U.S. Navy’s patrols “neutralized” the 
Taiwan Strait. They also initially discouraged the Nationalists from mounting a major 
attack on the Chinese mainland. The goal, as noted, was to limit the possibility of the 
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Korean conflict spreading farther to the south and possible escalation into a world war 
between the United States and the USSR. Later, also as noted, tensions were increased 
along the strait as a diversion; as Dulles told a New Zealand delegation, “unleashing 
Chiang” would “encourage the Chinese [Communists] to retain substantial forces op-
posite Formosa.”30 
Great Britain opposed this policy, but America’s Pacific allies generally supported it. 
The U.S. government had to be concerned about its Pacific allies. As Dulles warned in 
March 1955, “If Formosa were lost, that would almost surely involve such a major breach 
of the offshore island chain that the whole position would be lost and the Pacific defense 
of this continent would be forced back close to our own Pacific Shores.” Should that 
happen, the “situation in Australia and New Zealand would become virtually unten-
able.”31 Later that month, Eisenhower wrote to Churchill that “the loss of Formosa would 
doom the Philippines and eventually the remainder of the region,” and that in Ameri-
can “contacts with New Zealand and Australia, we have the feeling that we encounter a 
concern no less acute than ours.”32 For all of these reasons, keeping Taiwan out of com-
munist hands was considered vital.33 
Australia and New Zealand were usually counted as parts of the anticommunist defense 
line in the Pacific, from the Aleutians to “Japan–Ryukyus–Philippines–Australia and 
New Zealand.”34 In 1955 the Australian prime minister, Robert Menzies, put it succinct-
ly: “From the point of view of Australia and, indeed, Malaya, it would be fatal to have 
an enemy installed in the island chain so that by a process of island hopping Indonesia 
might be reached and Malaya and Australia to that extent exposed to serious damage 
either in the rear or on the flank.”35 A year later the Japanese foreign minister, Mamoru 
Shigemitsu, told the American ambassador that “Japan would consider the fall of Tai-
wan to the Communists as a threat to its interests and therefore supports the U.S. policy 
of preventing such an eventuality.”36 
The United Kingdom was more difficult. The United States and Britain were fight-
ing side by side in Korea, but the Americans were selectively embargoing the PRC (as 
discussed in detail below) while the British were trading with it. In early 1951, largely in 
response to China’s armed intervention in the Korean War but also with due consider-
ation for the Nationalist blockade, London considered limiting trade with the PRC but 
decided that British workers would “undoubtedly suffer severely from any stoppage and 
would have difficulty in finding alternative employment.” Not only could an embargo 
lead to the permanent loss of shipping companies’ holdings in the PRC, but British ships 
in Chinese ports, if not given sufficient advanced warning (a minimum of five days, 
preferably ten), might be trapped there and at risk of seizure. At any one time there 
could be as much as 120,000 tons of British-owned shipping in Chinese ports, a factor 
that “reinforces the absolute need for notice if British tonnage is to be saved from falling 
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into Chinese hands.”37 Another consideration for Britain was the long-term future of its 
trade with China. A complete embargo of China would also devastate Hong Kong, since 
approximately 45 percent of all of Hong Kong’s exports went to China. According to the 
governor of Hong Kong, without this trade the “thriving, trading, financial and insur-
ance entrepôt of the Colony” would quickly become “an economic desert.”38 
Considering all this and their large share in the China market, British shippers felt com-
pelled to maintain trading. But that meant British ships had to challenge the Nationalist 
navy’s blockade. The Nationalists staged attacks from offshore islands against the main-
land ports, Communist-held islands, and convoys escorted by PRC junks armed with 
small artillery pieces, mortars, and automatic weapons. Whenever possible, Nationalist 
ships would attack and, when they could, surround and sink the convoys. The economic 
impact (aside from that of the U.S. embargo on strategic goods) was significant: the 
blockade intercepted a high percentage of China’s international trade. Between 1950 and 
1952 the Nationalists halted and searched some ninety ships heading for Communist 
ports, two-thirds of them British-flagged ships registered in Hong Kong. The British 
government protested vehemently the seizure of cargo, arguing that its ships were com-
plying with American limits on strategic goods and so were carrying “only nonstrategic 
cargoes.”39 
During the late 1940s and early 1950s the United States and the United Kingdom 
discussed almost continuously what to do about China and Taiwan. On February 10 
and March 22, 1949, American and British officials met regarding controls on foreign 
exports to China.40 On August 1, 1949, the U.S. embassy in London was instructed to 
tell the British government that “we feel that the failure to demonstrate effective western 
control over exports of key importance to China’s economy would represent abandon-
ment of the most important single instrument available for the defense of western 
interests in the Far East.” The embassy was to urge London to back restrictions on both 
restricted and prohibited lists (referred to below as “1A” and “1B”), “since the mutual 
security interests of the west must be considered as much in terms of political and eco-
nomic strategy as in terms of direct military factors.”41 
In November 1949, a report commissioned by Secretary of State Acheson stated, “We 
have been reluctant thus far to impose unilaterally new controls over exports to China 
because of the possibility that such action would handicap our negotiations with the 
British.” After it had been pointed out to them “that such controls would represent 
the most important single instrument available for use vis-à-vis the Chinese Com-
munists,” the British had finally agreed to control “1A list exports to China,” provided 
that the other major powers also did so; to limit petroleum sales; and to “observe and to 
exchange information with the United States . . . on the movement of 1B goods to China 
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with a view to joint consultation regarding corrective measures if it appeared that the 
flow was excessive or injurious to our common interests.”42 
To avoid undermining Anglo-American relations, it was eventually decided mutually 
to leave the embargo of strategic goods largely to the United States, with help from the 
Nationalist navy. With tacit American support, the Nationalist forces tightened the 
blockade throughout 1949 and into 1950. After the outbreak of the Korean War and par-
ticularly the PRC intervention, the U.S. government considered a total naval blockade 
of its own against mainland China. Of course, the British were concerned about Hong 
Kong; at any point, the PRC could take it by force. Hong Kong’s vulnerability led the 
British to recognize the PRC on January 6, 1950, and to adopt a more liberal trade policy 
with it. But by 1958 the British foreign secretary, then Selwyn Lloyd, would reaffirm 
that the United Kingdom and United States shared the view that there was a “Commu-
nist menace in the Far East,” and that the “containing line” had to include Japan, South 
Korea, Okinawa, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Vietnam, and Malaya.43 
American-Led Strategic Embargo of the PRC 
A full naval blockade of the PRC was politically infeasible, owing to the possible retali-
ation of the USSR, on the one hand, and to Hong Kong’s sensitive strategic position, on 
the other. Beginning in December 1950, the U.S. government instead began to impose 
an embargo on strategic goods to the PRC. On December 16, 1950, it announced the is-
suance of “regulations to prohibit ships of United States registry from calling at Chinese 
Communist ports until further notice,” as part of an ongoing effort to halt all exports 
“to Communist China from the United States without validated export licenses.”44 Presi-
dent Truman signed an executive order implementing the Export Control Act of 1949, 
which had in effect reoriented 1940 restrictions aimed at Japan toward the Soviet bloc. 
This policy was subsumed under the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export 
Controls (COCOM), a trade-control regime adopted in January 1950. 
Americans largely supported this embargo. On December 1, 1950, a telegram from an 
ordinary citizen in San Francisco arrived at the White House addressed to Maj. Gen. 
Harry H. Vaughan: 
Thirty-one cases automobile ignition parts on pier thirty-one in San Francisco consigned to Com-
munist China will move by Pacific Transport Lines ship China Bear about December 3. Handled by 
Hawaiian freight forwarders. This shipment is valuable as war material. Customs authorities claim 
they cannot stop. As a former member of 129 field artillery and supporter of President Truman I ur-
gently request Presidential Order to hold this shipment or do you suggest another Boston tea party. 
Six days later, Major General Vaughan wrote to thank the sender and to report, “Imme-
diately upon receipt, we contacted the Commerce Department; and today we have been 
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advised that they were successful in stopping the shipment of the parts you described in 
your telegram.”45
On May 18, 1951, the United Nations adopted a selective embargo prohibiting the sale 
of “arms, ammunition and implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, 
transportation materials of strategic value, and items useful in production of arms, am-
munition and implements of war.” With that action, in conjunction with all the other 
unilateral and international restrictions, there had been “instituted and maintained 
controls on strategic trade with Communist China that are much more severe and 
sweeping than the system applicable to Soviet Russia and the rest of the Soviet bloc.”46 
Although the strategic embargo was less effective than a full naval blockade would be, 
the U.S. government worked closely with the Nationalists to enforce it.
The fifteen-country COCOM group was composed of the United States, all the NATO 
countries (minus Iceland), and then also Japan. To convince other countries to conform 
to these proscriptions against China, Congress adopted the Mutual Defense Assistance 
Control Act of 1951. Commonly called the “Battle Act,” after its sponsor Congress-
man Laurie C. Battle, this legislation would terminate economic and military aid to 
“countries which fail to cooperate in the control program.”47 After China intervened 
in the Korean War, the restrictions became even tougher. During the fall of 1952, the 
China Committee (CHINCOM) instituted even tighter controls, embargoing industrial 
machinery, steel-mill products, and metal of all types. Meanwhile, the U.S. embargo was 
taken up by more countries in COCOM and CHINCOM, such as Greece and Turkey 
in 1953, and bolstered by pledges of “cooperation from important neutral countries, 
notably Sweden and Switzerland.”48 The United States shouldered the lion’s share of the 
financial burden of enforcing sanctions, however, including an estimated $1.7 billion 
every year to various East Asian countries in outright aid “designed to secure our own 
vital defense arc in the Far East stretching from the Aleutians to Southeast Asia.”49
On January 12, 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to “continue and intensify now an 
economic blockade of trade with China.”50 They also advised the secretary of defense 
“that the neutralization of Formosa would not meet United States military strategic 
needs since it would improve the strategic position of the Communists by releasing their 
forces for build-up, and would reduce the strategic position of the United States and 
restrict freedom of action in the event the military situation required an armed attack 
against the Chinese Communists on the Mainland.”51 Gen. Walter B. Smith, Director of 
Central Intelligence, told Truman on September 24, 1952, that “building up a Chinese 
Nationalist force on Formosa was perfectly safe because they will be unable to go any-
where unless we release the trigger in the form of air and naval support.”52 
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An early study of the sanctions program pointed out that what the USSR wanted from 
the West were “items having a high skilled labor content.” While it would be too costly 
to cut all trade in such goods to Russia, the situation in China was different, because 
“China’s trade is so vulnerable to the disruption of its sea communications.” That in 
turn meant, “Because of the nature of China and the advance state of military activities 
in that area, our program of economic warfare should be more extensive than in Europe 
[and] we should be less reluctant to take necessary all-out measures. An important ob-
jective would be the attainment of multilateral agreement among the Western Nations 
on a complete quarantine of China from the technology of the West.” In devising such 
a quarantine, “careful consideration should be given to an informal merchant shipping 
embargo of Chinese ports.”53 
There was an important second side of this coin: even while limiting the Soviet bloc 
countries’ imports, the United States needed to assist the economic growth of Western-
aligned countries. On April 26, 1951, new language was added to the NSC 48/3 report. 
Below point 5(d), on helping East Asian countries with their security concerns and eco-
nomic relations, a new subparagraph appeared: “h. In accordance with 5(d) above, take 
such current and continuing action as may be practicable to maximize the availability of 
the material resources of the Asian area to the United States and the free world gener-
ally, and thereby correspondingly deny these resources to the communist world.”54 
A CIA report later assessed that free-world “controls have somewhat retarded the devel-
opment of China’s economic potential.” After discussing the possibility of a full naval 
blockade to cut China’s sea lines of communications or air attacks on crucial inland 
lines, this report warned that the former might result in conflict with the USSR over 
its access to Port Arthur and Dalian. There was also a chance that China might retali-
ate, by “seizing Hong Kong and Macao.”55 Instead of either plan, the strategic embargo 
had to be tightened by broadening its reach. One report even suggested: “Encourage the 
countries of Southeast Asia to restore and expand their commerce with each other and 
with the rest of the free world, and stimulate the flow of the raw material resources of 
the area to the free world.”56 
Although, as a confidential 1955 U.S. Navy report admitted, the strategic embargo 
was “not complete” and “China [was] actually obtain[ing] differential goods through 
triangular deals and transshipments,” the overall success of the embargo was evident in 
the facts that “Chinese procurement has been hampered and the total amount of goods 
purchased is reduced as a result of higher costs.”57 A 1955 report to Eisenhower persua-
sively argued for keeping “the Chinese Communist regime under economic (and other) 
pressures. . . . Such pressures add to the strains which can ultimately lead to disintegra-
tion.” This was particularly true with regard to the PRC’s foreign commitments to its 
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allies, since failure to grow at a rapid pace would mean Beijing could not fund these 
commitments: “This kind of dilemma tends to lead to a breakdown.”58
Impact of the American-Led Embargo
The embargo could be effective only if Washington convinced most of the other 
Western trading nations to join it. By and large, in fact, America’s allies backed the 
strategic embargo, at least in part. For example, the British China Association reported 
to the Foreign Office in February 1951 that the American sanctions program was quite 
effective and had produced a “great shock to [the mainland] Chinese economy.”59 The 
Swedish ambassador to China likewise confirmed during June 1951 that the strategic 
embargo was having the desired effect, since international “shipping was the Achilles’ 
heel of China,” on which “a very effective squeeze could be placed.”60
Nevertheless, estimating the effectiveness of the strategic embargo was difficult. How 
were the various costs the program imposed on China, some of them—such as politi-
cal and psychological stress—not measurable in dollars, to be calculated? In late 1956, 
an estimate put the costs to China of the U.S. part of the embargo at $100–$150 million 
per year in trade losses, plus $100 million in frozen financial assets. With regard to the 
other CHINCOM members, the estimate was between $115 and $154 million. Together, 
this meant estimated losses in the $215–$304 million range, which represented a 13–18 
percent reduction in China’s strategic imports. A large percentage of these added costs, 
perhaps as much as a third, was due to increased expense of transportation, now mainly 
via the Trans-Siberian Railway, which stressed the PRC’s diplomatic relations with the 
USSR.61
In addition to financial costs, sanctions had other effects that benefited Western 
interests. For example, the sanction program cut off the PRC from convertible foreign 
currencies, imposed “serious and costly delays in Communist Chinese economic plan-
ning and implementation,” and put a heavy strain on China’s “existing equipment and 
facilities,” in particular those related to transportation. Finally, that the sanctions on 
the PRC were above and beyond those on the rest of the communist bloc made China a 
“pariah” state, which added even more “political, psychological, and prestige ‘costs’ to 
Communist China.”62
The obverse was that reducing completely, or perhaps even partially, the economic and 
trade sanctions on China would have a number of foreseeable hidden costs for the West. 
First, it would mean an “enormous loss of prestige” (read: face) to the United States, 
especially in East Asia. Second, many neutral countries might move closer to the PRC. 
Third, it might stimulate even greater “Communist subversive activities throughout 
Asia.” Fourth, it might lead to the loss of important U.S. bases in the region. Fifth, it 
might result in the PRC’s admission to the United Nations, perhaps even “displacing 
Free China on the Security Council.” Sixth, it might reduce the chance for “securing the 
release of Americans imprisoned in Communist China.” Seventh, it would mean the 
“loss without adequate recompense of an important bargaining weapon in the cold war 
in the Pacific.” Eighth, it would entail a “fundamental undermining of our moral posi-
tion against aggression and oppression.” In short: “Removal of the China trade differen-
tial would therefore relieve Communist China of a very onerous and costly burden.”63
The effectiveness of the embargo, however, had a negative impact on British trade with 
China, which led to a sharp increase in Anglo-American tension. During bilateral talks, 
the British disagreed with the Americans on what should be considered strategic trade. 
Accordingly, by late 1956 “the British [had] seriously suggested to us, at responsible lev-
els, that the only ‘defensible’ criterion for classifying exports to Red China as ‘strategic,’ 
is whether or not they could contribute directly to thermo-nuclear warfare.” Meanwhile, 
other CHINCOM partners decried the use of a “stick” alone and sought to offer China 
“carrots” as well: “There are important government officials and elements of public 
opinion among them who believe that the closer the Free World countries can get to the 
Red Chinese, the better the chance of converting them from their [aggressive] designs 
on Asia.”64
In October 1952, the British government was considering changes to its own export-
control policies. In 1953, as a direct response to the Nationalist blockade, the Royal 
Navy was ordered to form its own “Formosa Straits Patrol” to protect British commer-
cial ships. There were some contradictory voices. On June 18, 1953, for example, Roger 
Makins told John Foster Dulles that the British government would agree to maintain 
economic pressure on the PRC, in particular because it offered “trading ground at a 
[future] Korean political conference.”65 One major difference, therefore, was over the 
political objectives of each country vis-à-vis Beijing. 
The number of Nationalist attacks gradually decreased following the creation of the 
Royal Navy’s Formosa Straits Patrol. During 1953–54, the Nationalist blockade gradu-
ally shifted away from patrol vessels toward airpower, mainly provided by the United 
States. In April 1953, Taipei also adopted more-stringent shipping regulations, which, 
largely in line with those already promulgated by the U.S. Maritime Shipping Associa-
tion, would “prohibit any government-chartered foreign vessel from proceeding to any 
country behind the Iron Curtain within a 60-day period after it had discharged its cargo 
at ports in Free China.”66 Chiang Kai-shek wrote to President Eisenhower on April 15, 
1953, that it was time to “gradually take away the political and military initiative from 
the Communist world.”67 
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During late July 1954, the PRC shot down a Cathay Pacific Airways airliner. When 
Eisenhower was told that the British (the airline was based in Hong Kong) were playing 
it down and accepting Chinese protestations that it had been an accident, he replied, 
“I wonder if old John Bull will take that.”68 The U.S. Navy sent two aircraft carriers to 
the scene. Initially, their pilots were told not to invade Chinese airspace, even in “hot 
pursuit.” At Dulles’s urging, Eisenhower changed this policy. U.S. Navy ships and planes 
could now take “all necessary measures to protect themselves,” including pursuing an 
enemy ship or plane into Chinese sovereign waters.69 On July 26, Dulles informed Eisen-
hower that two American search planes had been shot down near Hainan; the president’s 
reaction was, “Well, it didn’t take long for that to happen.” Coordinating with the British 
government official protests to the PRC was all-important: “If we adopt a stiff one [i.e., 
posture] and the British not, it will cause more friction between our countries.”70 
Such concerns were well-founded. In September of that year the State Department 
told Eisenhower that Sam Watson, a member of the British Labour Party delegation to 
Moscow, was warning that a Chinese attack on Taiwan would have the “single stra-
tegical aim of splitting West,” specifically to shatter “US–United Kingdom–French 
cooperation.” Furthermore, Zhou Enlai (then both premier and foreign minister of the 
PRC) had told Watson that liberating Taiwan was his government’s “most important 
problem,” equal to if not greater in criticality than “feeding, clothing, and housing their 
millions” of citizens.71 Its urgency was reflected in the fact that in 1954 the Nationalist 
air force attacked British shipping on thirty-two occasions.72 
Conclusions
In 1951, a full American blockade of the PRC was discussed by U.S. Navy planners, 
but fear of undermining the Anglo-American alliance both in Europe and in Korea 
overshadowed any possible benefits. During late 1953 and early 1954, therefore, the 
U.S. government provided the Nationalists better equipment with which to enforce 
the blockade from the air. But that upset the British, their colony in Hong Kong being 
a major reason. But as Eisenhower reminded Churchill, the United States had, on the 
one hand, no colonies to worry about but, on the other, an anticolonialist position to 
reinforce: “We have no possessions in that immediate area. Consequently, we cannot be 
accused of any support of colonialism or of imperialistic designs.”73 This echoed a June 
13, 1946, letter from Truman to no less a figure than the American author Pearl Buck, 
assuring her that after the war in Asia “we have asked for no territory and we have asked 
for no reparations.”74 The Chinese people were being “deceived into serving the ends of 
the Russian colonial policy in Asia.”75 
In fact, Eisenhower had tried, and failed, to convince Churchill that “colonialism was 
ended” and that the British colonies should be given a chance to stay or leave the British 
Empire.76 If conflict over the offshore islands ever broke out, it would be “primarily a 
fight between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists, and not a fight 
between the ‘white’ Western and the ‘yellow’ Chinese” worlds; it would “not take on 
the appearance of a struggle between races.”77 But Whitehall feared that too strict an 
embargo might spark that war.78 Because Great Britain had recognized the PRC, the 
“British people as a whole look on the offshore islands as belonging to Red China, and 
consider that we are foolish to be supporting Chiang even indirectly in possession of 
those areas.”79 
An even greater British concern was that increasing Anglo-American friction “might 
prejudice world-wide defence cooperation between the United Kingdom and United 
States, with possibly serious consequences to the security of Western Europe, the United 
Kingdom and, ultimately, the United States.”80 There was always a chance that China 
would reject monolithic communism. As long as the PRC could expect to obtain certain 
supplies from the West, “she would not be completely dependent on the Soviet Union 
and the East European satellites to meet her needs.”81 Indeed, in 1954–55, during the 
“first” Taiwan Strait crisis, one of the PRC’s most important objectives was to force the 
Nationalists to end their blockade of the Chinese coast.
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The First Taiwan Strait Crisis, 1954–1955 
Before sending troops [to battle], first plan a path of retreat.  
(未曾出兵先筹败路.) 
By 1953 the Korean conflict had deadlocked, and negotiations to end it had stale-
mated. Stalin’s death on March 5, 1953, helped break the negotiating logjam. A Korean 
armistice was finally signed on July 27, 1953. Military pressure from the south, exerted 
by Taiwan through the offshore islands, had been crucial in bringing it about. Soon 
afterward, however, the PRC began to redeploy troops from north to south, where ten-
sion gradually grew, particularly in the Taiwan Strait region. Two major crises would 
result, after the first of which Secretary of State Dulles would describe the situation as 
equivalent to “living over a volcano.”1 
On August 11, 1954, Zhou Enlai declared that the PRC must liberate Taiwan. On Sep-
tember 3, PLA forces began to bombard the offshore islands of Jinmen and Mazu. This 
renewed attempt to reclaim the islands by force showed Mao Zedong’s independence 
from Moscow, but another important PRC goal was to interrupt the Nationalist block-
ade. In November PRC leaders argued to Jawaharlal Nehru, the visiting Indian prime 
minister, that the Nationalists had been conducting “nuisance raids and interference 
with shipping” from their offshore bases. Upon his return, Nehru warned the British 
high commissioner in India that China was “determined not to tolerate this situation 
any longer.”2
The shelling of Jinmen and Mazu was used as a cover to attack other Nationalist-
controlled islands as well, in particular the most northerly of them, the Dachens. In 
this overcharged political climate, the U.S. government would sign a security pact with 
Taiwan and later, in January 1955, proclaim the Formosa Resolution. Ultimately the 
Americans would convince Chiang Kai-shek to evacuate the Dachens, and the U.S. 
Navy would provide the ships, training, and protection to do it. Thereafter the Nationalist-
controlled offshore islands would encompass a much smaller area, from Jinmen in the 
south to Mazu in the north.
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The Beginning of the 1954–1955 Taiwan Strait Crisis
Tension over the offshore islands led to a crisis during the fall of 1954. In August,  
Chiang Kai-shek ordered reinforcements to Jinmen and Mazu. The action had the out-
ward appearance of preparation for a Nationalist invasion of mainland China. The PRC 
leaders were sufficiently concerned to authorize PLA attacks against the Nationalist-held 
offshore islands, and in particular the northernmost, Yijiang and the Dachens. Since 
late 1953 the Nationalists’ position on the offshore islands had been more vulnerable 
than the year before; they now held only twenty-five, down from thirty-two.3 
On May 22, 1954, a lengthy meeting was held between Eisenhower and his top advis-
ers, including John Foster Dulles and his brother Allen W. Dulles (Director of Central 
Intelligence), plus Rear Adm. George W. Anderson Jr. (then Special Assistant to the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), Adm. Arthur W. Radford (the chairman), and 
Robert Cutler (the national security adviser). The main topic was what attitude to take 
toward the offshore islands. In June 1950, the U.S. government had promised to defend 
Formosa, plus the Penghu Islands. However, no such guarantees had been extended to 
Jinmen Island. Asked by the New York Times on July 25 whether Jinmen was included, 
the State Department press officer, Michael J. McDermott, said no. A day later, the Na-
tionalist ambassador, Wellington Koo, met with Dean Rusk (Second Assistant Secretary 
of State for Far Eastern Affairs) and Dulles and confirmed that the United States “would 
not help to fight off Communist attacks on the ‘Quemoy islands.’”4
However, Admiral Radford “pointed out that it might not be necessary to report . . . an 
attack” by the Communists. U.S. airplanes, he acknowledged, were “quite frequently at-
tacked . . . yet neither side had reported these events.” After the meeting was over, it was 
clear exactly what the policy of air control would entail:
If our Fleet on a patrolling mission, such as has been described, or if engaged in defending outlying 
islands against attack, was drawn into conflict with the Chinese enemy attacking such islands, our 
planes would not be justified in striking at targets on the Chinese Mainland. If, however, the Chi-
nese Reds made an attack from the mainland on our carrier fleet, perhaps 100 or more miles at sea, 
then our security would permit us to follow such an attack in hot pursuit to the mainland bases. 
Per the president’s orders, however, U.S. forces would not “offensively attack the main-
land of China in defending Formosa and the outlying islands, unless the security of our 
forces should require such an attack.”5
Between June and September 1954, a series of top-secret reports by James A. Van Fleet 
(a recently retired general who had commanded the Eighth Army and UN forces in Ko-
rea, 1951–53) went to President Eisenhower. Van Fleet’s assignment was to visit the East 
Asian countries allied with the United States to assess their political, economic, and 
military readiness to fight communism. On June 3 he sent his “preliminary” findings. 
This thirteen-page document examined the current American policies in the Far East; 
taiwan’s offshore islands  39
Macintosh HD:Users:Ursula.Curran.ctr:Desktop:_NP_44_Taiwan_s Offshore Islands_PRINTER:NP_44 book Folder:NP_44_Chapter3.indd January 29, 2019 4:05 PM
offered assessments of Japan, Korea, Okinawa, and Formosa; made some brief observa-
tions; and laid out a plan for future work. According to Van Fleet, at the heart of the 
American national security policy in the Far East was the protection of “South Korea 
and the offshore island chain (Japan, the Ryukyus, Formosa, Philippines, Australia and 
New Zealand) from attack by communist forces.” This did not include “offensive action 
forcibly to overthrow the Chinese Communist regime or to unite Korea,” although, he 
noted, Washington did indirectly support “raids against the mainland and seaborne 
commerce of Communist China.”6
Nationalist China’s policy goals, Van Fleet reported, involved the “reconquest of all 
territories it formerly held or claimed (including ultimately Tibet, Sinkiang and Outer 
Mongolia) through the maximum mobilization of Chinese manpower on the island, 
with U.S. air, naval and logistic support.” The Nationalists expected that although their 
own strength was inadequate, they could obtain a foothold on the mainland, at which 
point “wholesale defections of Communist troops” would allow them to return to 
power. Strategically, one of Taiwan’s strongest assets, and the one Van Fleet mentioned 
first, was the array of offshore islands, collectively “a vital link in the chain of offshore 
island bases. Offensively, [it was] the single most important springboard for the launch-
ing of all manner of operations against the mainland of China.” Were the Nationalist 
forces to be trained for such an operation, Van Fleet estimated, “about two years” would 
be required for the full development of their “military potential.”7
Beijing was fearful of that prospect. On September 3, 1954, having relocated hundreds 
of thousands of troops from north to south following the reduction of tension in Korea, 
the PRC began to shell Jinmen Island. Two American military personnel were killed dur-
ing the barrage, and another fourteen had to be evacuated. Acting Secretary of Defense 
Robert B. Anderson reported by top-secret message to President Eisenhower, who was at 
the summer White House in Denver, Colorado, that the advice of the JCS was split. The 
chairman and the service chiefs of the Air Force and Navy recommended that “National 
Policy should be changed to permit U.S. Naval and Air Forces to assist in the defense 
of 10 selected off-shore islands. Quemoy is included among the 10.” The rest of the JCS, 
however, felt that “the Nationalist held off-shore islands near the mainland are impor-
tant but not essential to the defense of Formosa from a military standpoint.” Anderson 
warned that if the situation escalated and the Navy and Air Force were asked to assist 
the Nationalists to retain the offshore islands, doing so would, “in all probability, require 
some action by U.S. Forces against selected military targets on the Chinese mainland.” 
As a short-term measure, the “CINCPAC [or CinCPac, the Commander in Chief, U.S. 
Pacific Command] has been alerted and directed to move carrier forces into a position 
from which support could be rendered, or a rescue mission undertaken, if directed.”8 
40  the newport papers
Macintosh HD:Users:Ursula.Curran.ctr:Desktop:_NP_44_Taiwan_s Offshore Islands_PRINTER:NP_44 book Folder:NP_44_Chapter3.indd January 29, 2019 4:05 PM 
The Communist attacks on Jinmen also led to a series of discussions on whether the 
offshore islands could be held: Radford said yes; Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Chief of 
Staff of the Army, said no. What made intervention difficult was that Jinmen was in 
easy artillery range from the shore, so close that it would be “impossible for our vessels 
to maneuver between island and mainland.” Intervention of any kind implied therefore 
a substantial U.S. commitment, which meant, as Eisenhower acknowledged, that Ameri-
can “prestige [would be] at stake. We should not go in unless we can defend it [Jinmen].” 
The president’s “hunch [was] that once we get tied up in any one of these things our 
prestige [read: “face”] is so completely involved.”9 Anderson assured the president that 
his orders to the U.S. forces approaching the area were clear: as soon as they arrived they 
were to “get into position for reconnaissance and not to be aggressive.” Eisenhower, in a 
relieved tone, replied, “We are not at war now.”10
On September 8, the CIA produced a thirty-three-page, top-secret assessment of the 
situation, “The Chinese Offshore Islands.” It described how in just five hours on Sep-
tember 3, approximately six thousand 120 and 155 mm artillery shells had been fired 
at Jinmen, Little Jinmen, and Nationalist ships at anchor. Accuracy was high, owing, 
according to unsubstantiated reports, to spotting by “Communist agents on Quemoy.” 
The U.S. and ROC reaction was rapid, and by the morning of September 5 there were 
“three carriers, a cruiser and three destroyer divisions of the Seventh Fleet . . . patrolling 
the waters in the Formosa Straits at a distance of several miles from Quemoy.” National-
ist naval and air counterattacks against mainland China during September 6–7, 1954, 
reportedly destroyed five out of the fourteen guns being used by the Communists.11 
The CIA study listed Nationalist troop strength (thirty-four thousand on Jinmen and 
another 4,500 on the neighboring island of Little Jinmen) and detailed its disposition: 
troops, artillery, and mortars, plus air, naval, and logistical support. The National-
ists’ naval assets were particularly important, to protect future resupply convoys. Of 
the Nationalist navy’s total of “56 major vessels,” the CIA estimated what it could task 
to defend Jinmen as “2 destroyers, 3 destroyer-escorts, 2 patrol gunboats, 2 smaller 
patrol vessels, and about 10 armored junks.” Taiwan had about 850 aircraft, of which 
415 were combat aircraft; most were “obsolete World War II” planes that could only be 
used in daylight: the Nationalist air force’s “capacity for night interception and strategi-
cal bombing is nil.” The CIA estimated that fifteen days’ supplies were already on the 
islands and that Taiwan could provide another forty-five days’ worth if required.12 All in 
all, the CIA report had described a dire situation of crisis proportions. A series of NSC 
discussions on how best to respond to it soon followed.
The National Security Council Discussions
On September 12, 1954, the NSC submitted a top-secret paper, divided into three sec-
tions: prowar considerations, antiwar factors, and recommendations. On the prowar 
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side it argued that “Quemoy cannot be held indefinitely without a general war with Red 
China in which the Communists are defeated.” The PRC might grant Taiwan its inde-
pendence but would never allow the “alienation of the off-shore islands like Quemoy.” 
Therefore, if Eisenhower wanted a war with China, “Quemoy can be made to provide 
the issue.” However, Congress would almost certainly oppose any such action, in 
particular since “for four years” the various offshore islands “have not been included in 
the area the [Seventh] Fleet is ordered to defend.” Also, war with China would “alienate 
world opinion and gravely strain our alliances, both in Europe and with Anzus.”13
As for the no-war option, the NSC predicted—quite accurately, as it would turn out—
that “it does not seem that any all-out Chicom [Chinese Communist] assault [of the 
offshore islands] is likely in the near future because of (a) early adverse weather condi-
tions; and (b) uncertainty as to US reaction.” The longer the United States aided the Na-
tionalists, however, the greater would be “the loss of US prestige”—again, just another 
word for “face”—“if the Island is later lost while the US stands by.” Therefore, the basic 
problem, “if we want to avoid all-out war with China, is to do so [i.e., aid the National-
ists] on terms that will avoid a serious loss of Chinat [Chinese Nationalist] morale and 
US prestige.”14 Later, the Department of State’s Policy Planning Staff specifically warned 
Dulles that Washington was “drifting by degrees into a situation in which our prestige 
will be committed to the retention of the islands.”15 
On April 5, 1955, Eisenhower warned Dulles against committing “United States military 
prestige to a campaign under conditions favorable to the attacker.”16 Dulles agreed with 
Eisenhower on the problems of “losing face” in the defense of the islands:
It is in the interest of the Republic of China, as well as in our own, that the Republic of China not 
commit its prestige to the defense of these perhaps indefensible positions so deeply that, if they 
should be lost, all future possibilities now represented by the Republic of China would also be lost. 
The lesson of Dien Bien Phu [in Vietnam, lost by the French to the Viet Minh after a three-month 
defense in 1954] should not be forgotten. Originally conceived to be an outpost of transitory value, 
it gradually became converted into a symbol, so that when it fell, all else fell with it. The same 
mistake should not be repeated in regard to Quemoy and Matsu, islands which without American 
aid are probably indefensible, and even with it may not be defensible except by means which would 
defeat the large common purpose.
Eisenhower concluded from all this that “militarily and politically we and the Chinese 
Nationalists would be much better off if our national prestige were not even remotely 
committed to the defense of the coastal islands.”17 One way to shield American prestige 
was to turn to the United Nations.
Requesting United Nations Intervention
An upshot of the NSC discussions was a decision to “explore the possibility of a US ap-
peal to the [UN] Security Council.” The purpose would be to “charge the Chinese Com-
munists with aggression against Quemoy and threatened aggression against Formosa,” 
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which would be a breach of article 39 of the United Nations Charter. As the NSC 
pointed out, “action against Quemoy is avowedly part of a program to take Formosa by 
force,” making the situation “not purely domestic, civil war.”18 With UN support, a de-
mand could be sent to the Chinese communists to “refrain, for a stipulated period, from 
military action directed against areas which have been held by the Republic of China 
since the close of the Second World War.” But if no action were taken, the Nationalists 
might have to withdraw from the offshore islands, which would be a “serious blow to the 
morale of the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa and to the prestige of the United States 
in the Far East, and it would raise the question as to whether the US was really prepared 
to stand anywhere in the East.”19 
Attempts by Washington to get the United Nations involved had in fact begun imme-
diately after the shelling of Jinmen. For example, Dulles met in London with Anthony 
Eden, then foreign minister, and the New Zealand high commissioner to see whether 
the Security Council could meet and, under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, order the 
PRC to suspend its attacks on the offshore islands. New Zealand was a member of the 
Security Council, and its being an Asian country gave “it a legitimate interest in the 
situation.” These plans were being carried out with the “utmost secrecy.”20 
One major consideration in working through the UN was hope of undermining Rus-
sian support for China. Asking for a vote under article 40 might split apart the USSR 
and PRC, since if the Soviets vetoed the move, they would impair their ongoing “peace 
offensive.” But if the “Soviets did not veto, the Chicoms could react adversely,” perhaps 
even defying the UN and becoming an “international outcast.”21
In addition to giving the United States leverage over China, turning to the UN might 
have other subsidiary effects, some negative but others potentially quite positive for 
Washington. First, if the Communists were restrained in their attacks on the offshore 
islands, the Nationalist attacks on the mainland might also end. Second, less favor-
ably, UN action “might end the embargo on Red China to the extent that it exceeds the 
restrictions against strategic goods to the Soviet Union.” Third, however, if the Commu-
nists rejected a UN demand, the moral “sanction” of the “free world against the Com-
munist world would be reinstated,” whereas if they accepted it one “probable ultimate 
outcome of UN intervention, if the Soviet Union permitted it, would be independence of 
Formosa and the Pescadores [Penghus].”22
On September 29, 1954, Walter Bedell Smith (a retired general, “Ike’s” chief of staff 
through much of World War II, now under secretary of state) called the president to tell 
him that the State Department backed the proposal that New Zealand should present 
the case under Chapter VI, and the “President agreed.”23 On October 5, 1954, Eisen-
hower told Dulles to be careful not to discuss it with “anyone who might allow it to leak 
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to the public,” that only just before the UN meeting should they “notify Senator [Wil-
liam F.] Knowland [R-CA, the Senate majority leader] of our position.”24 On October 12, 
1954, Dulles could report to the president: “After difficult negotiations, we have a very 
complete and definite understanding with the United Kingdom and New Zealand.”25 
Taiwanese support would be crucial if the UN intervention was to succeed. On Decem-
ber 18, Eisenhower met with the Taiwanese foreign minister, Dr. George C. Yeh. As 
anticipated, Yeh asked for a continuation of American logistical support for “the defense 
of the off-shore islands.” In response, Eisenhower referred to a recent NSC decision to 
“for the present, seek to preserve, through United Nations action, the status quo of the 
Nationalist-held off-shore islands; and, without committing forces except as militarily 
desirable in the event of Chinese Communist attack on Formosa and the Pescadores, 
provide to the Chinese Nationalist forces military equipment and training to assist them 
to defend such off-shore islands, using Formosa as a base.”26
New Zealand duly made the desired proposal to the UN, and the PRC flatly rejected it. 
Zhou Enlai even objected that “if the New Zealand idea was to discuss these islands, 
then that constituted intervention in China’s internal affairs.” The British chargé 
d’affaires in Beijing, Humphrey Trevelyan, tried in a two-and-a-half-hour interview to 
persuade Zhou to let the Security Council discuss the dispute, assuring him that the 
“New Zealand proposal would be merely that the Security Council should discuss the 
serious situation existing in the area of the islands, since this was the immediate point of 
danger.” Eisenhower promised that the “Chinese Government should be present at the 
discussion.” Zhou turned all of these offers down, reaffirming that the disputed islands 
“were Chinese, and the Chinese would liberate them.”27
In late February 1955, Eisenhower warned Dulles that if the UN did not sponsor a cease-
fire soon, it might be difficult to stop Chiang Kai-shek from taking action. At Dulles’s 
suggestion, Eisenhower decided it was best to tell the British government that time was 
running short:
I agree that it would be wise to inform Eden that unless we soon arrive at a cease fire, we cannot 
much longer insist that the present policy be observed which permits major Communist build 
up or attacks without Chiang reaction. I believe that you should tell him that we do not intend to 
blackmail Chiang to compel his evacuation of Quemoy and the Matsus as long as he deems their 
possession vital to the spirit and morale of the Formosan garrison and population. On the contrary 
we expect to continue our logistic support of Chiang’s forces as long as there is no mutually agreed 
upon or tacit cease fire. Finally, if we are convinced that any attack against those islands is in fact an 
attack against Formosa, we should not hesitate to help defeat it. Possibly you should tell him too that 
because of the continuing build-up of Chicom forces, we cannot tell when any of these emergencies 
might arise. 
But Eisenhower made clear that the authority to order American troops to assist Chiang 
was his and his alone: “Any offensive military participation on our part will be only by 
order of the President.”28
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On February 25, 1955, Dulles reported that Eden had convinced him it was best not 
to continue to press for a cease-fire in the UN. Rather, Eden would try to convince the 
PRC to agree not to “seek a violent solution of Formosa matter.” Eden’s draft message to 
Beijing read:
I, therefore, wish to inquire whether the Chinese Government would state, privately or publicly, 
that, while maintaining their claims, they do not intend to prosecute them by force. If they were pre-
pared [to] give such assurance, we would be ready so to inform the US Government and approach 
them with, we believe, a good hope of finding basis for a peaceful settlement of the situation in the 
coastal islands. 
To this Dulles had replied “that we would agree to suspend for a further brief period 
[our] request for a cease-fire resolution so as to permit this other initiative of his to have 
[the] best chance of success.”29 Washington did not expect Taipei to support a cease-fire 
resolution. Accordingly, in discussions in Taiwan in early March with Chiang Kai-shek, 
Dulles urged, “I must, however, request with the greatest possible strength and earnest-
ness that if such a resolution came to a vote he [Chiang] would not veto it but would let 
the Soviets veto it.” Chiang laughed and agreed that “actually he would prefer to let the 
Soviets veto it.”30
Soon thereafter, during a trip to Canada, Dulles told the cabinet in Ottawa that Wash-
ington had convinced Chiang Kai-shek to accept the following four points:
1. Limited our Treaty to Formosa and the Pescadores.
2. Secured his agreement not to attack the Mainland from any position without our prior agreement.
3. Secured his evacuation of the Tachens and Pishan.
4. Sought a cease-fire for the Formosa Straits which he felt would be a death blow to his hopes. 
Asked by the Canadians what further concessions Chiang could be asked to make, 
Dulles warned, as he reported later, “I did not know whether we could make him take 
any more bitter medicine at this time without disastrous consequences.”31
It was not only in the United Nations that Washington was attempting to negotiate 
a cease-fire in the Taiwan Strait. In April 1955, Dulles also worked with a number 
of African and Asian countries, most of them newly independent, attending a major 
conference in Bandung, Indonesia. These delegations duly pressured Zhou Enlai, push-
ing him, according to Dulles, to “follow a pacific rather than belligerent course.” In 
late April Dulles told a number of American senators, including Knowland, Bourke B. 
Hickenlooper (R-IA, strongly conservative), and Margaret Chase Smith (R-ME), that 
“we should be prepared to talk with the Chinese Communists merely to the extent of 
ascertaining whether they would make a ‘cease-fire.’” Were the opportunity to arise at 
Bandung, “a complete turn-down by the United States would alienate our Asian non-
Communist friends and allies.” To this, Senator Knowland responded that “we could 
not trust a cease-fire agreement and that the Armistices in Korea and Indochina were 
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already being broken.”32 At about the same time, Dulles suggested to the Soviet foreign 
minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, that a six-power conference be convened to discuss the 
Taiwan Strait, so as to create “a situation where as in Germany, Korea and Vietnam, it 
was agreed that unification would not be sought by force.”33 
During the late spring, the PRC sent to the United States, by means of Pakistan, India, 
and others, offers to negotiate. For example, in early May a Pakistani, Mir Khan, told 
Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., then ambassador to the United Nations, that in his opinion “the 
Chinese Communists want to climb down, that they are willing to acknowledge the 
present status quo in the Formosa area for ten or twenty years.” On this view, Beijing 
was now willing to release eleven American airmen it was holding—and, importantly, 
not as a tit for tat for any side agreement to allow the PRC into the United Nations.34 In 
June 1955, U Nu, prime minister of Burma, relayed a message that the Chinese commu-
nists were ready to “sit down directly and negotiate a cease-fire.”35
In addition, Zhou Enlai told India’s ambassador to the UN, Krishna Menon, that the 
PRC could not agree to a formal cease-fire with Taiwan until there “was evidence of sub-
stantial withdrawals” of Nationalist troops from Jinmen and Mazu but that once there 
was, “there need be no particular time limit for the standstill in hostilities.” The Nation-
alists would not need to “surrender” the islands to the Communists, only not pursue 
there a “scorched earth policy such as had been carried out in the Tachens.”36 By mid-
July, Menon had visited Eisenhower two times to ask whether talks could be established 
with the PRC. In return for talks, Menon was sure, captured American airmen in China 
would be released; nevertheless the president held firmly that “the American people will 
not consider using the lives and freedom of their own citizens as a bargaining” chip, 
that Washington would not be willing to deal with Beijing “in good faith until after they 
have released these prisoners.”37 On July 18, 1955, John Foster Dulles sent to Eisenhower 
a list of the thirty-eight American civilians and eleven airmen being held by China.38
Hearing signals from at least three sources, leaders in Washington “agreed this is a 
typical Chinese trick—they [i.e., the Chinese] will take whoever has the most to offer—
which[ever] negotiator is most successful.”39 However, as lengthy (extending throughout 
March and April) and largely unproductive negotiations with him had shown, Chiang 
Kai-shek was determined not to withdraw from the two offshore islands in question 
under any circumstances. The U.S. government now saw itself obliged to increase its 
military aid to Chiang, and largely on his terms.
Discussions on New U.S.-ROC Security Arrangements
The immediate political impact in Washington of the Communist attack on Jinmen, 
then, was not what Beijing expected. Rather than push the United States and Taiwan 
farther apart, this crisis resulted in renewed movement toward a new security treaty. 
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As early as June 7, 1953, Chiang Kai-shek had mentioned to President Eisenhower the 
possibility of “bilateral or multilateral security pacts” between the United States and 
East Asian countries aside from Taiwan, notably South Korea, Thailand, and those of 
Indochina.40 As for a U.S.-ROC pact, however, all previous discussions had ended in 
failure. To this point, U.S. Navy operation orders had specified that the term “enemy 
forces” meant those attacking Taiwan or the Penghus, not other offshore islands held by 
the Nationalists.41
Washington had to tread softly. Public opinion in the United Kingdom opposed war 
with China. Churchill had privately warned Eisenhower that “a war to keep the coastal 
islands for China would not be defensible here.”42 The British ambassador, for his part, 
emphasized to his interlocutors that the United Kingdom had formally recognized the 
PRC and “that these [offshore] islands were part of China.” This made it highly un-
likely that Britain could support the United States in any fight over the offshore islands; 
should war break out, “the Western alliance might be split. . . . Were these islands,” the 
ambassador asked, “really worth it?”43
Taking into consideration the differing views of its allies, Washington adopted an in-
tentionally ambiguous policy toward the pact negotiations, one that, while reaffirming 
the pledges of Truman and Eisenhower to defend Taiwan and the Penghus, would keep 
the Communists unsure about the true defense status of the offshore islands.44 A pact on 
these lines would give the president maximum flexibility, laying down “no uncondition-
al Presidential decision to defend the coastal positions.”45 According to one press report, 
“The pact will be deliberately vague about how the United States might react if the Reds 
were to invade any of the other Nationalist-held islands off the China coast. The U.S. 
doesn’t want the Reds to know which it will defend, and which it will simply write off. It 
prefers to keep them guessing.”46 
After lengthy negotiations, the two sides agreed to very specific draft language: that the 
American security guarantee to the Republic of China was also “applicable to such other 
territories as may be determined by mutual agreement.”47 This wording deferred any 
decision on whether the offshore islands would be included in the treaty. Meanwhile, a 
top-secret State Department report argued that a mutual-security treaty should cover 
“Formosa and the Pescadores, but not the offshore islands.” The treaty should be “de-
fensive in nature,” similar to the German renunciation of “force to unite Germany” or 
to the pact with South Korea, where the U.S. government opposed “the use by [President 
Syngman] Rhee of force to unite Korea.”48
The U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty was signed on December 2, 1954, with this am-
biguous wording. Interestingly, prior to China’s attacks the U.S. government had hesi-
tated to finalize this treaty, because of the “inherent difficulty of concluding a purely 
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defensive pact with a country engaged in actual hostilities,” especially since Washington 
hoped to “avoid direct United States involvement.”49 
Eisenhower, however, insisted on an exchange of separate notes on veto power over any 
Nationalist attack. Washington did not want Chiang calling the shots, having the power 
to declare war. A secret agreement was signed to make sure this would not happen. As 
Dulles explained on December 22, 1954, to the White House press secretary, “there is an 
exchange of notes which more or less gives us the power to control any offensive opera-
tions from Formosa, etc.”50 Two months later, Eisenhower told Churchill that in this 
secret agreement Chiang had promised he would not “conduct any offensive operations 
against the mainland either from Formosa or from his coastal positions, except in agree-
ment with us.” In addition, by the agreement the Nationalists were limited in “their 
right to take away from Formosa military elements, material or human, to which we had 
contributed if this would weaken the defense of Formosa itself.”51 
Chiang Kai-shek confirmed this promise in a March 4, 1955, discussion with Dulles: “Now 
that the Mutual Security Treaty was in force,” Dulles later recorded, “he wished to assure 
me that he would take no independent action insofar as the use of force was concerned, 
and would undertake no large-scale military operations against the Mainland without 
full consultation with the US.”52 
Further, as Eisenhower explained 
to Churchill, the secret agreement 
would allow Washington to stop 
Chiang from using his offshore 
bases to continue the “sporadic war 
against the mainland” or to sup-
port an “invasion of the mainland 
of China.” Eisenhower felt that 
the secret agreement with Chiang 
showed that Washington had “done 
much more than seems gener-
ally realized.”53 One thing it had 
accomplished, and one of the most 
important concessions Eisenhower 
convinced Chiang to make, was the 
evacuation of the Dachen Islands. 
The Evacuation of the Dachens
The Dachens (or Tachens) were 
Nationalist-controlled islands 
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to the far north, in Zhejiang 
Province. Beginning in mid-May 
1954, the Communists occupied 
six small islands near the group. 
A PRC invasion appeared to be 
planned, so the Seventh Fleet 
was sent there in early June and 
again in August in shows of force. 
Nevertheless, as the CIA warned 
in September 1954, there were at 
least three Chinese armies within 
150 miles of the Dachen Islands, 
any one of which was capable of 
taking the islands if it could coor-
dinate naval and air support. 
The Dachen Islands were over two 
hundred miles from Taiwan, a 
distance that gave the PRC a clear 
strategic advantage: “The Tachens 
are particularly vulnerable to 
air attacks by large numbers 
of aircraft of all types” that were based at a number of mainland airfields in Ningbo, 
Hangzhou, and Shanghai.54 The distance also meant, however, that the PLA threat to 
them was more symbolic than strategic: to stage an invasion of Taiwan from the northern 
offshore islands did not make any military sense—they were simply too far away. Rear 
Adm. Samuel Frankel of the Office of Naval Intelligence argued that “from the viewpoint 
of protecting Taiwan, I think that these islands have no significance at all.”55 As early as 
July 15, 1953, Adm. Arthur W. Radford, at the time “dual hatted” as the Commander in 
Chief, U.S. Pacific Command and Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, having warned 
Chiang Kai-shek to “bolster the sagging defense” of the northern islands, reported back to 
Washington that Chiang was “reluctant to deploy adequate forces.” Radford’s concern was 
that the Dachens were psychologically important to Taiwan’s defense and also strategically 
important for gathering intelligence on the PRC. For a time, Radford even considered pro-
posing that these islands be put within the “U.S. defense perimeter.”56 On July 15, 1953, the 
Eisenhower administration concluded that “although the importance of these islands to 
Taiwan’s defense is generally recognized here, the prevailing view is that the responsibility 
for their defense must remain with the Government of China.”57 
During November 1954, Prime Minister Nehru was told by Chinese leaders that the 
Nationalist blockade was a major problem, that they were “faced with continuous 
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pin-pricks and irritations of cumulative effect and he had the definite impression that 
they were determined not to tolerate this situation longer.”58 In fact, on November 1 
PRC planes had already begun to bomb and strafe the Dachen Islands. In early 1955 
the PLA focused its attention on Yijiangshan (North and South Yijiang Islands), eight 
miles north of the Dachens. On January 18, 1955, over fifty PLA Air Force (PLAAF) 
planes attacked the islands, which finally fell on the 20th. On January 18, Dulles told the 
president that Yijiangshan was “at such a distance and is of such little importance, that 
we could not view this with any great concern.” Dulles argued that losing these islands 
would “not affect vital interests of Formosa or ourselves.” Eisenhower agreed, and they 
decided to call it “a skirmish of no significance whatsoever.”59 However, on January 19 
the PLAAF began to attack the Dachen Islands as well, with seventy aircraft.60 
These islands were closer to Taiwan and considered to have at least symbolic impor-
tance. This new attack required an American decision either to order the U.S. Navy to 
defend the Dachens or to convince the Nationalists to abandon them. The Nationalists 
requested that the Seventh Fleet be moved closer to the Dachens to expedite logistics. 
Later that month, they also asked for Navy air support. The American ambassador to 
Taiwan backed both requests, to avoid “undermining confidence in our strength and 
determination.”61 But defending the Dachen Islands permanently would be difficult, 
requiring two full-time aircraft carriers plus their supporting ships. Instead, Dulles 
affirmed the earlier view that the Dachens “were too far from Formosa, too vulnerable, 
and insufficiently important from the strategic point of view to justify an American 
commitment to defend them.”62 
On January 19, 1955, Secretary Dulles told the president and Admiral Radford over 
lunch that “doubt [in Asia] as to our intentions was having a bad effect on our prestige.” 
He recommended that the Nationalists be encouraged to evacuate the Dachen Islands, 
in return for a public agreement to defend Jinmen Island. The American stance toward 
the Mazus, collectively, would be left unclear. Radford and the president agreed, after 
which Dulles drafted an aide-mémoire: 
1.  [It had been decided to] encourage the CHINATS to evacuate Tachen and the other offshore 
islands exclusive of Quemoy. 
2. The United States would provide sea and air protection so as to permit of an orderly evacuation.
3.  Contemporaneously, the United States would state that in view of the aggressive actions of the 
Chinese Communists and their proclaimed intention to seize Formosa, the United States will 
assist the CHINATS to hold Quemoy Island which, under existing circumstances, is deemed 
important for the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. 
In order to enact this decision, it was agreed, Dulles would contact the Chinese minister, 
then the British ambassador, and third the congressional leadership. Of that last group, 
Dulles wanted in particular to “ascertain whether Congress will extend the necessary 
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authority to carry out the above course of action, which should be broad enough to 
permit of attacking the mainland about Quemoy, if that was deemed essential to prevent 
a buildup which would dangerously threaten Quemoy.”63
On the 21st the president met again with Dulles and Radford, and this time the rest of 
the Joint Chiefs as well. Adm. Robert B. Carney, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), 
acting as the chiefs’ spokesman, immediately pointed out the difficulty of evacuating 
thirty thousand people from the Dachens. Supported by Radford, Carney warned “the 
evacuation would be much more arduous than their [i.e., the Dachen Islands’] defense 
or reinforcement.” However, the Joint Chiefs all agreed that the Chinese Nationalists 
“cannot defend Tachen,” so in Dulles’s view the choices were really between evacuation 
and surrender: “The issue is clear, you must try to get them out or let them surrender.”64
On January 23, the U.S. government for the first time recommended to Chiang Kai-shek 
that the Dachens be evacuated. Chiang agreed to withdraw, but reluctantly, in particular 
because giving up such a strong position without a fight would “gravely affect troop and 
civilian morale.” To avoid the impression that he was backing down generally, Chiang 
refused to enter into a cease-fire with the PRC of any kind.  
On January 28, Admiral Radford visited President Eisenhower at the White House to 
talk about the Dachen situation. The most important issue was the operational order the 
Chief of Naval Operations would need to send to the commander in chief in the Pacific, 
Adm. Felix Stump. The CNO operation order was to have four points:65
a.  It was agreed that if called upon by the Chinese Nationals, the American forces would assist in 
the evacuation of the Tachens.
b.  It was further agreed that if any attack was made against this operation, that the American 
forces were, of course, fully authorized to defend themselves as necessary.
c.  It was agreed that there would be no attack on Chinese bases unless this was essential to the 
success of the operation. It was further agreed that if such attacks became necessary, they would 
be carried out only against air fields positively identified as contributing forces to the attack 
against us.
d.  Finally, it was agreed that the Commander in the area would authorize no attacks against the 
Chinese mainland on any initial sortie by the ChiComs. It would first be determined by the 
Tactical Commander that the purpose of the ChiComs was to continue the attacks before 
this type of action would be undertaken. However, it was to be clearly understood that if the 
ChiComs undertook a consistent and persistent air attack against the operation, that the United 
States forces would be authorized within the limits of the above stated to take such action as was 
essential to protect themselves and to assure the success of the operation. 
The wording of this guidance to the CNO, especially the fourth point, suggested that 
strikes against a variety of targets on the Chinese mainland might be delivered in 
response to a Chinese attack. On January 29, Radford made clear to CinCPac, Adm. 
Felix Stump, that U.S. attacks on mainland China could be authorized even if not “es-
sential to success . . . if [they proved] necessary in defense of own forces engaged in the 
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operation.”66 Two days later, however, the permissible targets in such situations were lim-
ited to airfields: “It was finally agreed that the United States Commander could attack 
the airfields from which the Chinese Communists air forces were operating if necessary 
in defense of his own forces engaged in the operation.”67 
At the same time as this order to CinCPac, duly forwarded by him, Commander in 
Chief, Pacific Fleet issued an operations plan for the defense of the evacuation. Ships 
were not to sail within three miles of China’s coastline and were if “possible [to] avoid 
shooting incidents.” But the “commanders and pilots should be instructed not [to] 
accept positions of tactical disadvantage in interest [of] avoiding” shooting incidents. 
If the PLA attacked the Nationalists, U.S. forces could “provide naval air and gunfire 
support.” Finally, if combat broke out, “hot pursuit into mainland air space or territorial 
waters is authorized for purpose of successful conclusion of engagement.”68
The evacuation of the Dachens was a massive undertaking. Between February 7 and 11, 
1955, the U.S. Navy used a total of 132 ships and four hundred aircraft to evacuate 14,500 
civilians, ten thousand Nationalist troops, and approximately four thousand guerrilla 
fighters, along with over forty thousand tons of military equipment and supplies. To 
protect the evacuation, the Seventh Fleet assembled a “backbone” of six aircraft carriers. 
China was warned not to interfere, that U.S. Navy forces had “instructions not to pro-
voke incidents but they also have instructions not to accept any tactical disadvantages.” 
Or, put another way, “American airmen were not to get ‘altruistically shot down.’”69 
The international reaction was mixed. The Australians compared the loss of the 
Dachens (which the PLA occupied on the 13th) to the 1938–39 fall of Czechoslovakia 
and the PRC threat to invade Taiwan to the 1939 invasion of Poland. In a February 1955 
Gallup poll, 66 percent of Australians “declared themselves in favour of Australia join-
ing the United States in any war which might result from United States efforts to prevent 
Chinese Communists from invading Formosa.” In April Prime Minister Menzies 
argued the “desirability of giving Formosa military and political strength to ensure the 
future will be decided peacefully and not as a result of Communist policies of force.”70 
The decision to evacuate the Dachens gravely undermined Nationalist morale. In Febru-
ary 1955, Admiral Stump and Dulles emphasized during American-British talks the 
importance of that factor:
Admiral Stump explained to Eden defense relationship between offshore islands and Taiwan. They 
block launching attack on Taiwan, provide advance warning and are closer to hostile area in case 
of fighting. Field Marshal [John] Harding [Chief of the Imperial General Staff] interjected to differ 
with Stump. Comparing situation to Allied assault in Operation Overlord [the 1944 Normandy 
landings], Harding expressed opinion critical question is not launching or lodging initial attack 
across water but in being able afterward sustain assault forces. He thought Chinese Communists 
military leaders would advise against attack on Taiwan as long as Seventh Fleet commanded sea and 
air. Hence he did not (repeat not) believe possession offshore islands would have much to do with 
whether Chinese Communists would or would not attack Taiwan.71 
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During a July 17 meeting between Eisenhower and Eden, Ike emphasized the symbolic 
value to Chiang of the offshore islands. He warned that “another single backward step 
in the region would have the gravest effects on all of our Chinese friends,” and after the 
meeting was able to report that Eden “had no trouble understanding the importance of 
morale in Chiang’s army on Formosa.”72
After the evacuation, the flag of the Republic of China was lowered in the Dachen 
Islands by Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek’s son. The ROC’s provincial govern-
ment apparatus for Zhejiang (in which the Dachens lay) was abolished; this meant that 
Nationalist forces now held disputed territory only in Fujian Province. Rather than 
pushing the United States and Taiwan farther apart, however, as Beijing had undoubt-
edly hoped would happen, greater cooperation leading up to the evacuation of the 
Dachens led to closer relations between Washington and Taipei. The possible use of 
force to protect the other offshore islands had by that time been detailed in the “For-
mosa Resolution.”
Negotiating the Formosa Resolution
PRC attacks on the Dachen Islands during January 1955 had convinced Eisenhower to 
request from Congress special powers to defend Taiwan. It was decided to sign a second 
document, to extend certain American defensive guarantees concerning Taiwan to the 
offshore islands. This idea was perhaps first proposed by the Nationalist foreign min-
ister in a December 20, 1954, meeting with President Eisenhower. During this meeting, 
Dr. Yeh quoted Chiang Kai-shek: “With respect to the off-shore islands, the Generalis-
simo recognized that the Treaty did not cover these, but felt that it would be a good 
psychological warfare move for the United States to give some form of assurance that 
it would provide logistic support for Chinese forces engaged in their defense.” In reply, 
Eisenhower said that while Washington was not “indifferent as to these islands,” it would 
be better to handle the offshore islands on a “case by case” basis, “each on its merits.”73
On January 20, 1955, Secretary of State Dulles met with six senators, six congress-
men, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to discuss what he called “a sounder 
defensive concept” to handle tensions in the offshore islands.74 Dulles explained that the 
president preferred evacuation of the Dachen Islands but thought the administration 
should have “some authority from Congress to use the armed forces of the United States 
in the area for the protection and security of Formosa and the Pescadores.”75 Dulles 
argued that if “the [i.e., a new] Formosan treaty were ratified, and the President were 
given these powers, there will be a realization that we have reached the point that we are 
not going to retreat more and it possibly will have a stabilizing effect.” Not to take this 
action would, in his mind, make the “risk of war” greater.76 
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However, the important thing, as Eisenhower and Dulles agreed in a telephone con-
versation, was that the resolution should allow for possible “enlargement of the area 
described in the treaty.”77 On January 25, 1955, Eisenhower wrote a top-secret letter to 
Churchill responding to the British concern that the United States might get drawn into 
a “Chinese war”:
It is probably difficult for you, in your geographical position, to understand how concerned this 
country is with the solidarity of the Island Barrier in the Western Pacific. Moreover, we are con-
vinced that the psychological effect in the Far East of deserting our friends on Formosa would risk  
a collapse of Asiatic resistance to the Communists. Such possibilities cannot be lightly dismissed;  
in our view they are almost as important, in the long term, to you as they are to us.
After reassuring Churchill that he was working for the “preservation and strengthening 
of the peace,” Eisenhower added, “But I am positive that the free world is surely building 
trouble for itself unless it is united in basic purpose, is clear and emphatic in its declared 
determination to resist all forceful Communist advance, and keeps itself ready to act on 
a moment’s notice, if necessary.”78 
In the January 28, 1955, meeting cited above between Humphrey Trevelyan and Zhou 
Enlai, the Chinese views became clear. A concise transcript organized them in six 
points. First, Zhou accused the president of sending a “war message” to Congress; 
second, he denounced Washington for using the UN as a cover “for aggression against 
China”; third, he asserted that the UN had no right to discuss the offshore islands, since 
they were a matter of “internal sovereignty”; fourth, he argued that the offshore islands 
dispute could not be separated from Taiwan’s status; fifth, the PRC would never cut a 
“deal” on the offshore islands but planned to “liberate” them; and finally, the Chinese 
were “not afraid of war threats and would resist if war was thrust on them.” Trevelyan 
described Zhou’s attitude during their lengthy meeting as “tense and absolutely 
uncompromising.”79 
On the 29th the Formosa Resolution was passed by Congress.80 It stated that only the 
president could judge whether a PRC attack on the offshore islands was part of a more 
general assault on Taiwan. This vague wording worried Chiang Kai-shek; that same day, 
Ambassador Karl L. Rankin telegrammed to Washington to report that a very “nervous” 
Chiang, presumably having seen the text approved by the House of Representatives on 
the 25th, had expressed hope for a specific statement of American intent to help defend 
Jinmen and Mazu. Rankin had replied that while he did not know the details, perhaps 
a vague resolution, without “mentioning them [the islands] by name,” would have the 
“advantage of not implying all other islands being written off.”81
Dulles had met with Yeh on the 28th. Yeh requested that a “joint announcement [on] 
Quemoy and Matsu” be issued publicly. The secretary informed the foreign minister 
that under the present circumstances, the United States indeed considered Jinmen 
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and Mazu important to the defense of Formosa—but he did so only “orally and 
confidentially”:
Secretary said any formal Chinese statement should avoid implication of agreement or commitment 
between United States and Chinese Governments. United States responsibilities as to “related area” 
were unilateral. There was no agreement as to related area, and United States might have to deny 
any implications to contrary. Chinese unofficial sources could speculate, but there should be no 
official statement on either side as to understanding re defense of related area. Secretary felt impos-
sible to draw absolute geographical line or to specify which islands were important to defense of 
Formosa and which were not important. Relative defensive importance of islands could change. Any 
significant Communist buildup in area would be regarded by United States with concern.82
It was best to be ambiguous, then, and not state this publicly, argued Dulles, since by 
the terms of the Formosa Resolution it was up to the president to decide what the term 
“related area” actually meant. 
On the 30th, the day after the Formosa Resolution was signed, Ambassador Rankin 
warned of an extremely “difficult situation” with regard to Chiang Kai-shek. In what 
appeared to be an ultimatum, which was one of his standard negotiating tactics, Chiang 
had informed Rankin that “his government would not request assistance in withdraw-
ing from Tachens [which was to happen the next month] until US position re Kinmen 
[Jinmen] and Matsu clarified. Failure to insist on this would betray China.” Chiang’s 
understanding of events told him that three things should now happen: 
1.  After approval of resolution by Congress, two governments would issue simultaneous and 
complementary statements on offshore islands.
2. Above statements would provide for US assistance in evacuation of Tachens.
3. At same time, it would be made clear US was extending protection to Kinmen and Matsu.  
Chiang considered this a matter of “honor” and was willing to lose everything not 
to “lose face”: “He said Tachen and forces there might be lost, that Formosa where he 
and his people were prepared to die might also be lost, but that if China’s honor were 
preserved for posterity it would be worthwhile.” Chiang reminded Washington that “in 
relation with his government . . . it was not dealing with children.”83
In early March 1955, Dulles flew to Taiwan and met with Chiang Kai-shek. He started 
by apologizing for any confusion about the status of Jinmen and Mazu and acknowl-
edged that he “was prepared to take full responsibility.” However, Dulles went on, “the 
matter had developed in the US in such a way that the authority to use the Armed 
Forces of the US outside of the treaty area had to be left to the future judgment of the 
president of the US and that therefore there could not be any actual present commitment” 
to Jinmen and Mazu.84 From this point on, the policy of “strategic ambiguity” was to be 
applied to the status of the offshore islands.
This policy had been chosen with not just China in mind: there was a very real threat 
that Washington dynamics could expand a small conflict in the Taiwan Strait into a 
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world war. For example, Senator Karl E. Mundt (R-SD), who had been as a congressman 
a longtime member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, urged Eisenhower on May 
12, 1955, that if a Communist attack appeared “beyond the capacity of the Nationalists 
to repel” the United States should use its “air and sea power” against the PRC itself; “in 
72 hours we could bring great destruction on the Mainland.” After this “fierce  
attack,” the senator suggested, leaflets could be dropped over the mainland “stating 
[that] the war—started by Communists—was over unless they attacked again.”85 It was 
just this kind of no-win scenario that Eisenhower was actively seeking to avoid.
Conclusions
In a show of force, the PRC initiated the first Taiwan Strait crisis during early September 
1954. Scholars have argued that the PRC’s primary motivation was to test “American 
resolve.”86 On April 26, 1955, William C. Bullitt, former ambassador to the USSR, sup-
plied evidence for this view, writing to Eisenhower: “From Japan to Germany, the most 
serious men—even our devoted friends—have begun to doubt that we will have the 
intelligence and moral character to resist the Communist threat in time. The drift away 
from us is world-wide. If you defend Matsu and Quemoy, you will stop the rot in our 
world position. If you let them go, you will accelerate our decline and fall.”87
Communist forces overran the Yijiang Islands and attacked the Dachen Islands. 
Washington repeatedly urged Taipei to withdraw from all the offshore islands, but 
Chiang Kai-shek refused. Not only would complete abandonment incur a loss of face 
for Chiang, but so long as the Nationalists held these islands right off China’s coast 
the Communists could not proclaim total victory, that they had seized the entire 
mainland. In addition, Chiang argued, Chinese history showed that the National-
ists could someday invade the mainland from their offshore bases, using the disputed 
islands as stepping-stones to retake control of China. 
From a strategic viewpoint, the PRC’s attacks backfired. In December 1954, Taiwan 
and the United States signed a mutual-security pact affirming that the United States 
would defend Taiwan and the Penghu Islands. In a secret, supplementary pact, Chiang 
Kai-shek promised that no offensive operations were to take place against the mainland 
“without American agreement.” Recounting this discussion four years later, Dulles was 
to recall that Chiang “had maintained that limitation and honourably maintained it.”88 
Chiang had also agreed to evacuate, with American assistance, the Dachen Islands. 
Finally, the Formosa Resolution left it intentionally unclear which of the offshore islands 
Washington would choose to defend and which to evacuate. This ambiguity allowed 
tension in the Taiwan Strait to die down, at least temporarily.
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The Growing Militarization of the  
Offshore Islands
A boat can’t always sail with the wind; an army can’t always win battles.  
(风无常顺, 兵无常胜.)
As discussed above, Washington used economic and military tools. A strategic embargo 
was adopted by the U.S. government to put additional pressure on China. On February 
10 and March 22, 1949, meetings were held between American and British officials re-
garding putting controls on foreign exports to China. In November 1949, a report com-
missioned by Dean Acheson, the American secretary of state, declared, “We have been 
reluctant thus far to impose unilaterally new controls over exports to China because of 
the possibility that such action would handicap our negotiations with the British.” After 
it had been pointed out to them “that such controls would represent the most impor-
tant single instrument available for use vis-à-vis the Chinese Communists” the Brit-
ish finally agreed to control “1A list exports to China,” provided that the other major 
powers also agreed to do so; to put limits on petroleum sales; and, as mentioned above, 
to “observe and to exchange information with the United States . . . on the movement of 
1B goods to China with a view to joint consultation regarding corrective measures if it 
appeared that the flow was excessive or injurious to our common interests.”1
Throughout the early 1950s, the British and the Americans closely watched the develop-
ment of the Nationalist navy and the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). In No-
vember 1949, the British listed the Nationalist naval assets as “7 destroyers, 21 destroyer 
escorts and 22 gunboats,” backed by a 300,000-man army and a 230-plane air force 
composed of “145 Fighter bombers, 60 medium bombers and 25 Heavy bombers.” From 
these numbers the British Chiefs of Staff concluded that a “direct invasion of the island 
[Taiwan] is, however, improbable for several months provided the Nationalist Naval and 
Air Forces remain loyal, since the Communists have inadequate naval and air forces to 
support the passage of troops and transports.”2
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A prime U.S. goal was to keep the Nationalist navy roughly equivalent to the PLAN but 
not greatly superior, so as to avoid the possibility of a major Nationalist attack on the 
mainland. In July 1951, the PLAN was still being described by the ONI as a “pick-up” 
fleet, the “youngest and weakest component of Red China’s armed forces.” In particu-
lar, it was “still handicapped by the lack of equipment and trained personnel.” But the 
Communist ships’ firepower—even discounting the still-unserviceable former British 
cruiser Chongqing—comprised thirty-nine guns over three inches in caliber, compared 
with the Nationalists’ twelve. Furthermore, the majority of China’s largest and best ships 
were based at the East China Military District Naval Headquarters in Shanghai, which 
faced Taiwan.3 Politically too there was an obstacle to carrying out this plan of limited 
support, one arising from the generally poor relations between Eisenhower and Chiang.
Dwight D. Eisenhower and Chiang Kai-shek
U.S.-Taiwanese relations were not always easy, and they were often quite tense. During 
this entire period, the Nationalists conducted a blockade against mainland China. The 
Taiwanese government was eager to solidify relations with the United States. But one 
CIA report even warned that “aware of US interest in that island, they [the Nationalists] 
will present themselves as a means and perhaps the sole means of preventing its com-
munization, and will offer various inducements and assurances in return for US aid and 
US moral support for a regional Chinese regime.”4
Chiang would not stand for being treated as an inferior. Many leaders in America and 
in Europe, however, considered Chiang Kai-shek to be acting like a child—which his 
injured telegram of January 1955 (chapter 3) suggests that he suspected. They doubted 
his judgment, his words, and his goals. At a NATO meeting in May 1955, when future 
secretary general Paul-Henri Spaak criticized Chiang, Dulles defended him by “jok-
ingly” replying that “while greater perfection could doubtless be found in Europe, it was 
not readily found in Asia.”5 One American officer criticized the Nationalists’ “highly 
centralized control,” and was convinced that it was the “awe in which they hold their 
President [that] conspired to keep him ill informed of the military situation and stifles 
initiative and daring of his subordinates all the way down.”6 At the height of the 1958 
crisis, Eisenhower told Gen. Nathan F. Twining, USAF, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, that “something must be done to make Chiang more flexible in his approach.”7
Some critics of Chiang were even less generous. In January 1951 a Mr. Smith bluntly told 
Truman “that an effort be made to find a leader to replace Chiang Kai-shek.”8 Although 
many supported this idea, the American policy had been firmly established since De-
cember 31, 1948, when Ambassador Stuart told a Chinese political leader trying to oust 
Chiang that assisting him would be tantamount to intervention: “The question of bring-
ing about Chiang’s resignation or setting up a successor government is, in our opinion, 
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a matter for Chinese decision and the US government could, under no circumstances, 
place itself in the position of dictating or suggesting the resignation of the head of a 
friendly government.”9 
But just because leaders in Washington did not agree to overthrow Chiang did not mean 
they liked him. Gen. Alfred Gruenther (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) referred 
to Chiang in early February 1955 as a “palooka.”10 The deputy director of the U.S. Infor-
mation Agency (USIA), Abbott Washburn, told Eisenhower that the “8 million Taiwan-
ese would be happier without either Chiang or Mao.”11 As to Chiang’s determination to 
defend the offshore islands at all costs, Dulles complained, “He is gambling his whole 
position in Taiwan and his future as a useful agent in helping to drive communism from 
China against a local and possibly temporary success in a precarious defense of two 
island groups which are militarily weak.”12
Negotiating with Chiang was particularly challenging and tedious. He often threw temper 
tantrums and made ultimatums to get his way; he had done so, for example, during World 
War II with the American commander of the China Burma India Theater, Gen. Joseph 
Stilwell (who called him “Peanut”). On February 21, 1955, Eisenhower telegraphed Dulles 
a list of suggestions with which to approach Chiang but added, “As you and I have agreed, 
any approach to Chiang along this line would have to be so skillfully conducted as to 
make him ostensibly the originator of the idea.”13 Later, the point came up again: “The 
crux of the negotiations must be that ‘Chiang must sell himself on the validity and value 
of the suggested program.’”14 If successful, the “worldwide political advantages of such an 
arrangement would be incalculable,” but to be avoided at any cost was a “public belief that 
the alterations came about through American intervention or coercion.”15 
In fact, Chiang’s frequent ultimatums culminated in a threat, if the Americans refused 
to help defend the islands, to expose his own Nationalist forces to destruction attempt-
ing to do so alone, just to spite the United States. It was truly a “cut off your nose to spite 
your face” threat. Eisenhower simply would not buy it. The U.S. government, after all, 
had put its own forces at risk assisting the Nationalists to evacuate the Dachen Islands. 
He had no intention of putting even more American troops at risk by militarizing the 
offshore islands. On February 1, 1955, Eisenhower told Radford that it was out of the 
question: “I have no intention of putting American foot soldiers on Quemoy. A division 
of soldiers would not make any difference.”16 
Eisenhower was firm that in any fight with the Communists over these islands, it would 
be up to Chiang to supply all of the troops: 
It is the Chinese Nationalists, not the Americans, who are contenders for the support of the Chinese 
people. It is the discipline, loyalty, and will to fight of the Chinese Nationalists which has been 
consistently disparaged by Communist propaganda. A battle which they won, on their own, or even 
a battle which they lost under conditions which would reflect high honor on the vanquished in the 
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face of overwhelming odds, would be far more advantageous to the Chinese Nationalists than a 
defense which could be sustained only by United States might, particularly if that was expressed in 
atomic terms.17
Eisenhower flatly dismissed Chiang’s claim that the offshore islands were absolutely 
critical to Taiwan’s defense, telling Dulles, “If this is so, his own headquarters should be 
on the offshore islands,” so as to show his determination to hold them.18 
On February 1, 1955, Eisenhower wrote a six-page, top-secret letter to General Gruenther 
at his NATO headquarters. One of its goals was to explain why the Formosa Resolution’s 
“wording, as to areas outside Formosa and the Pescadores, is vague.” Eisenhower had to 
balance the expectations of four parties: Taiwan, China, Europe, and America. In mili-
tary terms as well as political, the defense of Taiwan and the Penghus, only about thirty 
miles west of Taiwan, was very different from defending the offshore islands, close to 
the mainland:
Any military man can easily make clear distinction between the defense of Formosa and the defense 
of the so-called offshore islands. Not only are two different military problems presented, but in 
the one case we are talking about territories the control of which has passed from nation to nation 
through the years—and in the other case, about territories that have always been a part of the Chi-
nese mainland both politically and, in effect, geographically. So the political differences are almost 
as plain as the military differences when we talk about the defense of these two territories.  
Considering even military factors alone, then “we would permit no advance by the 
Communists beyond the offshore islands, but . . . in any struggle involving only the 
territory of those islands, we would see no reason for American intervention.”19 While 
Europeans and Americans would be pleased with this solution should it become public, 
Eisenhower foresaw, the PRC and the ROC would both be infuriated, since the former 
wanted to retake Taiwan and the latter wanted to retake mainland China. However, if 
the U.S. government stated clearly that it planned to defend Jinmen and Mazu, the Na-
tionalists would be pleased, the PRC would be even more infuriated, and the Europeans 
would be frightened. There really wasn’t any single solution that satisfied all parties.
Aside from being drawn into China’s civil war, the president could see that defending 
these offshore islands would require huge military resources:
By announcing this as a policy we would be compelled to maintain in the area, at great cost, 
forces that could assure the defense of islands that are almost within wading distance of the 
mainland. This defensive problem could be extremely difficult over the long term, and I think 
that the world in general, including some of our friends, would believe us unreasonable and 
practically goading the Chinese Communists into a fight. We could get badly tied down by any 
such inf lexible public attitude. 
The only possible solution was to be ambivalent about the status of the offshore islands, 
thus allowing the president the power to make a distinction “between an attack that 
has only as its objective the capture of an offshore island and one that is primarily a 
preliminary movement to an all-out attack on Formosa.” The whole problem was a “can 
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of worms,” Eisenhower admitted, but “whatever is now to happen, I know that nothing 
could be worse than global war.”20 
On February 9, 1955, the Senate accepted the U.S.-Taiwan pact, and it was ratified on 
March 3, 1955. This rapid ratification reflected acceptance of Dulles’s argument that in 
part the PRC’s offshore attacks were an attempt to “scare us out of ratifying the treaty.” 
He predicted that with “ratification an accepted fact, it might take some of the heat out 
of the situation,” and so it proved.21 Even before, Dulles told Eisenhower on February 16, 
Chiang had been convinced to accept four important points: to agree to the Formosa 
treaty; to “agree to use of no [American] equipment or people we have trained outside 
Formosa & the Pescadores”; “to acquiesce on the UN move for cease-fire”; and “to 
evacuate the Tachens.”22 
Dulles, like Eisenhower, was concerned that a major war over the offshore islands could 
lead to disaster: “If conflict in that region should spread to global proportions, we 
would be entering a life and death struggle under very great handicaps.”23 But he also 
warned that “we cannot at this time squeeze any more out of him [Chiang].” A carrot, 
he thought, might be more effective than a stick—perhaps a promise that American aid 
would be increased. Chiang was to be told that “we’re working like dogs in an attempt to 
keep 75 F-86’s up to snuff, & keep training program going along so that they always have 
75 pilots to man them.”24 On February 19, 1955, Eisenhower told Admiral Radford that 
“he would like to see Chiang make proposals on his own initiative which would ease 
the situation concerning the off-shore islands and improve the U.S. security position in 
the Formosa area.” Only then would Eisenhower “be inclined to provide reserves, and 
would seriously consider maintaining U.S. forces of the order of a battalion of Marines 
and a squadron of F-86’s on the island.”25 
Two days later, on February 21, 1955, Eisenhower elaborated to Dulles: “You will recall 
also that you and I talked about certain other things we might do to convince him 
[Chiang] that his best course of action lay in solidifying his union with us, so as to 
insure preservation of Formosa and the Pescadores without risking too much of his 
force in the forward positions. I refer to our readiness to speed up his air development 
and possibly strengthen both naval and air units above presently contemplated levels.”26 
But convincing Chiang to reduce troop levels on, or even abandon, the offshore islands 
would prove a major challenge.
Discussions on Abandoning the Offshore Islands
The true problem for American military and political leaders in the first Taiwan Strait 
crisis was to convince Chiang Kai-shek to settle the dispute peacefully, preferably by 
abandoning the offshore islands completely, and without undermining the international 
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perception of U.S. support for Taiwan. If the PRC took the islands by force, Chiang 
would lose prestige.27 As Eisenhower reminded Churchill on January 25, 1955, the 
United States had to be concerned with the “solidarity of the Island Barrier in the West-
ern Pacific”; for Washington to desert Taipei might “risk a collapse of Asiatic resistance 
to the Communists.”28 That, in turn, would weaken the global U.S. containment policy 
against communism. A month later, he told Churchill that the United States “does not 
have decisive power in respect of the offshore islands” and that since it “must not lose 
Chiang’s army and we must maintain its strength, efficiency and morale,” attempts to 
coerce him might easily backfire.29 
There were potent historical arguments that the offshore islands might serve as stepping-
stones across the Taiwan Strait. But in March 1955, President Eisenhower, perhaps 
the world’s greatest expert at that time on amphibious landings, disputed that line of 
reasoning in a personal letter to a longtime friend, Lew Douglas: “Those particular off-
shore islands have no value whatsoever as stepping stones in any possible future attempt 
of Chiang to go back to the mainland. You do not conduct an amphibious operation 
against a hostile coast by first going onto some tiny islands and then launching a second 
amphibious attack.”30 In any case, Eisenhower pointed out to Lew (whose side of the 
conversation is unavailable), “you do not tell me what to do if we lose Formosa.” While 
the offshore islands were useless for attack (in either direction), they still had military 
value: “Defensively they practically block almost any Communist attempt to use the 
two available harbors immediately west of Formosa for the initiating of amphibious 
operations.” So, “What I am asking you is this: If you became convinced that the capture 
of these two places by International Communism would inevitably result in the later 
loss of Formosa to the free world, what would you do? Beyond question the opinion in 
Southeast Asia is that the loss of Formosa would be catastrophic; the Philippines and 
Indonesia would rapidly be lost to us.”31 
Two weeks later, Eisenhower wrote Lew of the 750,000 Nationalist Chinese who wanted 
to return to China, to whom he argued the offshore islands “rightly or wrongly” 
symbolize doing so: “It happens that I believe they [the islands] should not mean this. 
They have no value as stepping stones to the mainland. (I repeat that they do have 
some defensive value for Formosa.) The problem becomes how do we induce the seven 
hundred and fifty thousand Chinese in Formosa to maintain their morale, their spirit, 
their hopes, when we ask them to give up two areas that have been for them the symbol 
of their deepest aspirations.” If Washington did not keep Nationalist morale high, 
“Internal disillusionment, despair and the unquenchable hope of going back home will 
establish the Communist regime” on Taiwan.32
If the United States had few choices in the present situation, Dulles pointed out, the 
range of possible reactions to a PRC attack in the Taiwan Strait was huge: “It is important 
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to recognize the intrinsically great strategic strength of the U.S. position in the Formo-
san crisis and the great freedom of choice we possess.” For example, Washington could 
adopt a business-as-usual approach, or exercise deterrence, or “egg on” the PRC to attack 
at a place and time of America’s choosing, or try to reach some kind of diplomatic settle-
ment. If deterrence were adopted, the implied threat could be widened to the northward 
by abrogating the Korean armistice so as to create a potential second front. Or to the 
south: increased fighting in Indochina (that is, by the South Vietnamese forces of then–
prime minister Ngo Dinh Diem against the communist Vietcong) could divert China’s 
attention away from Taiwan. Short of actual war, then, a wide selection of military 
avenues could be used to “persuade the Chinese Communists that we not only have the 
means to stop them but we will use these means to defeat them if they challenge us.”33 
However, as matters then stood, if Chiang withdrew from the offshore islands of his 
own volition, he could not possibly “lose face.” Neither would he if the PRC took the is-
lands by force: “such loss would occur only after the defending forces had exacted a fear-
ful toll from the attackers, and Chiang’s prestige and standing in Southeast Asia would 
be increased rather than decreased as a result of a gallant, prolonged and bitter defense 
conducted under these circumstances.” Nationalist losses in such a defense would be 
“inconsequential both in personnel and in material” terms, but the PRC’s “should be 
very great indeed.”34 
By the end of February 1955, it looked more and more likely that war would break out 
over the Taiwan Strait. Dulles told Eden on February 25 that “whereas up to [a] few 
weeks ago we had believed Chinese Communists were not seriously intending [to] take 
Taiwan by force, we now believe they intend to do so. So in fact we are in a battle for Tai-
wan.” To cede Taiwan to the Communists could negatively impact all of Asia: “Further 
retreat could swing Asia. Trends in Japan are already disturbing. Further retreat or loss 
of Formosa would convince Japan [that] communism [was] wave of future. Consequent 
effect on Okinawa and other parts of Asia obvious. Overseas Chinese would turn to 
Peking.”35 Even the loss of just the offshore islands, if attributable to American “timid-
ity,” might “create doubts in Japan and concern among our friends in Asia, particularly 
in Thailand, the Philippines and Korea.”36 Eisenhower could not cut Chiang loose, 
therefore; there was little choice but to support him.
Eisenhower Offers Greater Aid to Chiang 
Even while attempting to reduce military tensions in the Taiwan Strait, Eisenhower had 
to be aware of how a Nationalist retreat might look to the rest of East Asia. The percep-
tions of overseas Chinese were critical, for example, particularly in the Philippines, In-
donesia, Malaya, and Hong Kong. If the Nationalist alternative to the PRC disappeared, 
Eisenhower told Churchill, “these émigré Chinese will certainly deem themselves 
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subjects of the Chinese Communist Government and they will quickly add to the dif-
ficulties of their adopted countries.” Eisenhower then warned that the overseas Chinese  
influence might become so strong that no amount of foreign pressure could “prevent these 
regions from going completely Communist. Do not such possibilities concern you?”37
During spring 1955, Eisenhower tried on several occasions to convince Chiang to give 
up Jinmen and Mazu Islands, but Chiang refused.38 In early April, Eisenhower offered 
Chiang “up to a division” of U.S. troops plus “an air wing” if “Quemoy and Matsu were 
made outposts rather than strongholds,” which would lessen their importance, and so 
vulnerability, as “symbols of prestige.”39 Eisenhower presented five goals:
(1). To regard the offshore islands as outposts and consequently to be garrisoned in accordance with 
the requirements of outpost positions. This involves vigilant reconnaissance and a maximum 
of protective works and with properly sited automatic weapons and light artillery, together with 
effective obstacles, defensive mine systems, and so on. All this should be reinforced by adequate 
stores of ammunition, of food and medical supplies, all thoroughly protected and available to 
the garrison as needed. Excess personnel (except such civilians as might decline to leave) should 
be removed from the islands.
(2). The Nationalist forces on Formosa should assist these garrisons by aerial and sea reconnais-
sance and fighting support. Plans for defense should be fully coordinated between the forward 
units and the mobile elements in Formosa.
(3). Adequate plans should be made for determined and persistent defense, and evacuation should 
take place (if this finally becomes necessary) only after defensive forces had inflicted upon the 
attackers heavy and bloody losses.
(4). The process of concentrating, equipping and training of troops on Formosa itself should be 
expedited. The United States could and would help in this process so as to give to Chiang the 
greatest possible strength in support of his outpost troops on Quemoy and the Matsus, and in 
preparing and sustaining the bulk of his forces as a weapon of opportunity, ready to take advan-
tage of any political, military or economic circumstance on the mainland that would give to an 
invasion a reasonable chance of success.
(5). To protect the prestige of Chiang and the morale of his forces, any alteration in military and 
political planning should obviously be developed under his leadership; above all, there must 
be no basis for public belief that the alterations came about through American intervention or 
coercion.40
Discussions of a retreat from Jinmen and Mazu were under way in Washington. In 
return for Chiang’s acquiescence, it was proposed, Eisenhower would promise to create 
a joint U.S.-Taiwan “defense zone” from Shantou to Wenzhou “in which the movement 
of all seaborne traffic of a contraband or war-making character would be interdicted.” 
In particular, the U.S. Navy would lay minefields that “would force coastwise junk 
traffic to come out where it also could be intercepted and controlled.”41 According to an 
early draft, this plan would serve a triple purpose: “It would replace Quemoy and Matsu 
as defensive blocks to the staging of a seaborne attack on Formosa from Amoy and 
Foochow harbors; it would materially curtail the present seaborne movement of POL 
[petroleum, oil, and lubricants] and like supplies into the Fukian airfield area—an area 
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which cannot be easily supplied by land; it would demonstrate that the United States is 
prepared to take strong measures in the defense of Formosa.”42
In April 1955 Admiral Radford, then newly appointed as chairman of the JCS, and 
Walter Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, flew to Taiwan to 
discuss this proposal with Chiang. They promised that the United States would supply 
better naval equipment to patrol the Nationalist blockade if Chiang would give up the 
disputed offshore islands. Chiang asked Robertson to confirm that “President Eisen-
hower’s proposal was to give up Quemoy-Matsu and substitute there for interdiction [of 
a] limited area [of the] China coast.” Robertson did so, “emphasizing that under present 
circumstances attack on communist build-up would involve us striking first blow 
whereas interdiction would put communists into position of striking first blow.”43
According to one recollection of this meeting, Chiang asked for a minute to consider the 
president’s offer and left the room, supposedly to pray in the garden. He returned and 
reportedly said, “I just want to tell you that I have prayerfully concluded that I cannot 
accept such a proposal because I do not have the faith in your government to sustain 
it.”44 The transcripts have Chiang declaring that he would “defend Quemoy-Matsu 
with or without US help.”45 Primarily, Chiang vetoed the proposal for reasons of “face”: 
relinquishing control over additional offshore islands would make his government look 
weak. Later explaining the situation to Anthony Eden, Eisenhower said the offshore 
islands “should be considered as an outpost, but Chiang has said that abandonment 
of the islands would result in loss of face and of any hold over Chinese in Malaya and 
elsewhere in the Far East.”46 British recognition of the PRC was also a factor for Chiang: 
once he gave up Jinmen and Mazu, the United States might soon halt any “effective 
shipping interdiction scheme in the face of strong and inevitable opposition by the Brit-
ish and others.”47 
In any case, Chiang’s refusal left the U.S. government with few options: it had either 
to support Chiang on his terms or risk losing him as a dependable ally in the midst of 
the Cold War. Eisenhower’s sense of “the situation was simply that if we tried to press 
Chiang too hard to give up the islands, Formosa might be lost and the whole position in 
the Far East might crumble.”48
Eisenhower was not surprised when he heard that Generalissimo (or “Gimo”) Chiang 
had not agreed to Washington’s proposal: 
I had hoped that the Gimo himself might have seen the wisdom of trimming the garrison on the 
offshore islands down to the leanest fighting weight possible, organizing them highly, and in the 
meantime making the necessary public statements that would clearly set forth his determination 
to fight for the islands’ positions, but not to make them the sine qua non of the ChiNats’ existence. 
I had thought also that while he was doing this, if he could be assured of our reinforcing Formosa 
with air, some marines and logistics, that he would have been in better position both politically and 
militarily than he now is. Certainly this would have been better for us. 
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Eisenhower admitted, however, that Chiang’s response was “not only what I predicted 
but what I think I would have made had I been in his place.” This was partly due to the 
complexity of the situation; in any case, since “it is clear that as long as Radford and 
Robertson themselves could not grasp the concept [i.e., Eisenhower’s viewpoint], we 
simply were not going to get anywhere.”49
Back in Washington, Radford and Robertson on May 3 explained to the president that 
while Chiang would not agree to withdraw in return for the “imposition of some kind of 
interdiction of the Formosa Strait sea area,” he did agree that the offshore islands should 
be defended only by Nationalist forces. To that end, Admiral Stump would visit Taiwan 
and “advise Chiang as to ways in which defense preparations in the offshore islands can 
be improved.” President Eisenhower fully backed a general policy of beefing up de-
fenses, and the State Department agreed to pass through the American ambassadors in 
the region the “President’s assurances of our willingness to provide logistic support for 
the build-up of the offshore island defense.”50 The new support would include providing 
more “automatic weapons,” constructing “undersea obstacles,” “laying antipersonnel 
mine fields on the beaches,” “increasing barbed wire defenses,” and providing “hard 
rock drills” with which to expand the underground bunkers.51
In mid-1955, the combined intelligence staff of CinCPac and his subordinate Commander 
in Chief, Pacific Fleet produced an estimate of the offshore islands that was supposed to 
be relevant through mid-1956. It assessed that
the greatest importance of the offshore islands at present is political and psychological. Any further 
gains in these islands by the CHICOMS will give the CHICOMS a further boost in morale and 
add to the string of Communist victories in Asia, i.e. mainland China, Korea, Indochina and the 
Tachens. Conversely, any further loss or yielding of these islands will be a serious blow to CHINAT 
morale and regarded by the remaining anti-Communist nations in Asia as a further disastrous re-
treat by the U.S., since at present, the U.S. is so closely identified with the Chinese Nationalists that 
any CHINAT reverse will be viewed as a U.S. loss.52
The Chinese communists’ most probable course of action would be to keep trying to 
seize the “smaller, more weakly defended” offshore islands but not either Formosa or the 
Penghus, especially if “the U.S. is firmly committed to defense of these islands.” Mean-
while, the “Chinese Nationalists will attempt to retain all of the territory they now hold, 
putting pressure on the U.S. for assistance. They will not willingly make any further 
withdrawals.”53 Retention of the islands was, as has been noted, particularly important 
to their morale.
The Problem of Nationalist Morale
Eisenhower had to be concerned with not only things military but also Nationalist 
morale and possible accusations against his and Truman’s administrations of retreating 
in the face of aggression. As we have seen, the U.S. government felt obliged to support 
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Chiang Kai-shek’s control over a number of offshore islands, even though, for example, 
in 1954 the Seventh Fleet had been unable to focus entirely on Taiwan. As Eisenhower 
assured Albert C. Wedemeyer (a retired general with strongly anticommunist and pro-
Nationalist views), keeping up the Nationalist morale was critical: “if an all-out attack 
should ever develop, they are the ones who must do the land fighting.”54 American naval 
demonstrations, designed to warn the PRC not to attempt an invasion, were particularly 
important means of doing so (see chapter 5). 
The issue was very important throughout the policy establishment. A report that 
examined only military factors angered Dulles, for instance: its “analysis neglected criti-
cal factor of effect on morale of loss of offshore islands. . . . Very considerable factor in 
situation now is possibility of deteriorating morale at Taiwan. Withdrawal from islands 
might have critical effect on ability [of] Chinese Nationalists [to] hold islands if morale 
disintegrated and groups there made deals with Communists.”55 If the PRC attacked the 
islands, Eisenhower was sure, U.S. failure to assist “would dismay the ChiNats, whose 
morale and military efficiency are essential to the defense of Formosa—and the security 
of Formosa is essential to the best interests of the United States and the Western world.” 
Further, to persuade Chiang now to give them up “would result in a collapse of morale on 
Formosa and the loss to the free world of that bastion of strength.” In fact, “the principal 
military reason for holding these two groups of islands is the estimated effect of their 
loss upon morale in Formosa.”56 
The president’s last point was the crux of the entire question of defending the offshore 
islands or not—that is, it rested on Nationalist morale. The American embassy in Taipei 
had an important role to play in morale building. Throughout the 1950s there was 
well-founded concern that the morale of average people on Taiwan was weakening; after 
all, they were a small island nation facing alone an enormous continental power. As 
Ambassador Rankin explained to a British visitor in 1953, “the Chinese Nationalists on 
Formosa represented the only case where a sizeable element of a communist dominated 
country had escaped from behind the iron curtain and was conducting his affairs as 
an independent government.” Taiwan’s success or failure could have a dramatic effect 
on “the whole anti-communist problem[,] . . . in the ultimate show-down.” Taiwan’s 
“unique position” required “great vision and foresight in framing our future policy to-
ward communism as a whole, and in particular, towards the situation in the Far East.”57 
The result was a delicate balancing act, keeping the Nationalists happy but not giving 
them too much leeway. In a February 10, 1955, top-secret letter for Churchill’s eyes only, 
Eisenhower described the basic problem:
To defend Formosa the United States has been engaged in a long and costly program of arming and 
sustaining the Nationalist troops on the island. Those troops, however, and Chiang himself, are not 
content, now, to accept irrevocably and permanently the status of “prisoners” on the island. They 
are held together by a conviction that some day they will go back to the mainland.
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As a consequence, their attitude toward Quemoy and the Matsus, which they deem the stepping 
stones between the two hostile regions, is that the surrender of those islands would destroy the 
reason for the existence of the Nationalist forces on Formosa. This, then, would mean the almost 
immediate conversion of that asset into a deadly danger, because the Communists would immedi-
ately take it over. 
The Formosa Resolution, as passed by the Congress, is our publicly stated position; the problem now 
is how to make it work. The morale of the Chinese Nationalists is important to us, so for the mo-
ment, and under existing conditions, we feel they must have certain assurances with respect to the 
offshore islands. But these must be less binding on us than the terms of the Chino-American Treaty, 
which was overwhelmingly passed yesterday by the Senate. We must remain ready, until some better 
solution can be found, to move promptly against any Communist force that is manifestly preparing 
to attack Formosa. And we must make a distinction—(this is a difficult one)—between an attack 
that has only as its objective the capture of an offshore island and one that is primarily a preliminary 
movement to an all-out attack on Formosa. 
Whatever now is to happen, I know that nothing could be worse than global war [which must have 
been much on Ike’s mind just then; he had used the same phrase to General Gruenther ten days be-
fore]. . . . I devoutly hope that history’s inflexible yardstick will show that we have done everything 
in our power, and everything that is right, to prevent the awful catastrophe of another major war.58 
As Eisenhower emphasized in a later letter to Churchill, in some ways the U.S. govern-
ment had gained much less than it wanted in negotiations with Taipei, since it had been 
careful not to coerce Chiang Kai-shek lest it “undermine the morale and the loyalty of 
the non-Communist forces on Formosa.”59 
One major problem was that the Americans had to show that they supported Taiwan 
while not giving an open-ended promise to help defend Jinmen and Mazu. During June 
1955, for example, Chiang Kai-shek informed Washington that he wanted to reinforce 
the offshore islands with an additional division but that he wanted first to learn what 
the American view was, since “should the public and military learn that we [Americans] 
oppose reinforcement of the island garrisons, they might deduce that we are thinking of 
urging another Tachen-like withdrawal.”60 Clearly, any discussion of troop movements 
had to take into account how they would impact morale within the Nationalist military.
Increased U.S. Military Aid to Taiwan
Both to strengthen the Nationalists’ military position and to prop up their morale, the 
U.S. government increased military aid. In December 1954, Eisenhower told Foreign 
Minister Yeh that Washington would allocate an additional $106,225,000 to “(1) Train 
and maintain 63,000 additional officers and men ‘at one time,’ exclusive of current 
reserve training (30,000 every four months); (2) stockpile clothing and equipage for 
341,700 men against an emergency; (3) fill 20,700 vacancies to bring nine army divisions 
up to full strength.”61As Arleigh Burke saw it: “So we gave them lots of training and we 
gave them lots of [dock landing ships] and ships, boats, to supply the thing.” With U.S. 
training and equipment the Nationalists duly “reinforced their garrisons and put their 
supplies in caves.”62 
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The Nationalist navy depended on the U.S. Navy for equipment and for training in 
how to use it. Public Law 188, signed on August 5, 1953, authorized the United States 
to lend or give naval ships to “friendly nations in the Far Eastern area.” To assist the 
Nationalists in defending the offshore islands, the JCS allocated ten patrol-type craft, 
two landing craft repair ships, and about a hundred small landing craft (LCMs and 
LCVPs).63 The Department of Defense agreed to consider a Taiwanese request for four 
destroyers, six destroyer escorts, thirty landing ships, and six minesweepers;64 however, 
the destroyers were questioned. One footnote in the CNO’s (Carney’s) memorandum 
to the JCS declared that “delivery of any additional destroyers . . . beyond the two now 
planned for [fiscal year] 1954, will be affected [sic] only upon the clearly demonstrated 
capability of the [Nationalist Government of the Republic of China] to man and operate 
them.”65
On January 15, 1955, the NSC issued a top-secret “statement of policy” for the Taiwan 
Strait. An annex summarizing the direct military support and economic assistance 
being given to Taiwan in 1951–56 listed economic aid as $636,100,000, out of an overall 
total of almost $1.181 billion from 1950 to 1956.66 The NSC specified six ways to sup-
port Taiwan’s economic growth: provide technical and economic assistance, encour-
age Taiwan to join noncommunist Asian economic groups, encourage greater trade 
with noncommunist nations, urge Taiwan to make productive use of its own natural 
resources, help Taipei adopt better fiscal procedures, and stimulate both Chinese and 
private capital investment to develop Taiwan’s economy. Finally, by using Taiwan as an 
example of the “soundness of U.S. policy,” the United States could attempt “to convince 
other Free World countries . . . of the advisability of their adopting similar policies.”67
Washington’s most important goal was to preserve, with UN support, the “status quo” 
of the disputed offshore islands while providing the Nationalists sufficient military 
equipment and training to defend them. Direct American support for Taiwan’s military 
was also important. The total U.S. military aid to the ROC between 1950 and 1956 was 
$1,181,100,000, spent to create a Taiwanese navy of three destroyers, six destroyer escorts, 
and eighty-two smaller combatant vessels, supported by an air force of eight and a third 
air wings. The goal was to build a force able to defend not only Taiwan and the Penghus 
but the offshore islands as well, and also assume responsibility for “conducting limited 
coastal patrols, anti-shipping, and commando operations.” However, these military assets 
were, by design, insufficient either to “defend its [Taiwan’s] territory successfully against 
full-scale Chinese Communist attack” or “to initiate large-scale amphibious operations 
against the mainland of China” without “U.S. air, naval and logistic support.”68
By the mid-1950s the U.S. Navy had also given Taiwan two old diesel submarines. As 
Vice Adm. Philip Beshany, Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command from 1972 
to 1974, later recalled, the handpicked Nationalist crews were trained at the U.S. Naval 
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Submarine School, in New London, Connecticut. They were “obviously top caliber” 
and as students “absolutely excelled.” The instructors later claimed that the Nationalist 
officers took to submarine operations “like ducks to water.” Because the two submarines 
were meant only to help train the Nationalist navy in antisubmarine warfare, the United 
States did not provide torpedoes; still, Beshany thoughtfully concluded, “I often wonder 
if they didn’t somehow get some torpedoes from some other country.”69 
New airplanes were also crucial to Taiwan’s defense. Of the $132 million in total equip-
ment deliveries between 1951 and 1954, fully two-thirds were in the form of “aircraft 
and aircraft spares,” while another 18 percent were “bombs, rockets and ammunition.” 
In 1954 alone, the United States shipped $48.3 million in equipment to Taiwan. By 
December 1954, 456 of the 657 aircraft promised to Taiwan had been delivered, 131 of 
them during that year. These included “seventy-two F-84G’s, twenty-five F-86F’s, six-
teen T-33’s and five RT-33’s.”70 By December 1956, U.S. military assistance had created 
on Taiwan “21 regular infantry divisions, eight air wings, a small but efficient navy and 
marine corps, plus various special combat and support units.”71 Airpower was to play a 
particularly important role in future Taiwan Strait crises.
Conclusions
Supporting the Nationalists’ military and morale was a major American goal. The 
delivery of high-tech equipment and training in its use proved invaluable. Between 1950 
and 1969, American military aid to Taiwan reached $3.19 billion.72 With equipment 
and training from the U.S. Navy, the Nationalist navy gradually improved. Eisenhower 
was careful, however, not to underestimate the PRC’s military capabilities. As he told 
Churchill, “Because the ChiComs have no great fleet and cannot now attack across the 
seas, it is natural to underestimate their potential strength. . . . So I believe it critically 
important that we make a sober estimate of what we are up against.”73 In addition to giv-
ing Taiwan new offensive weapons, therefore, American advisers in Taiwan helped build 
airfields and provided better radar equipment, all to allow the Nationalists to achieve a 
measure of air control should the PRC attack the offshore islands again.74
Economic success was also a priority. As early as April 11, 1949, the well-known Nation-
alist financier and minister T. V. Soong (at that point in the United States) had warned 
that Taiwan’s economy “must not be dragged down to the mainland level, and that the 
standard of living of the people on the island must be kept higher than any the Commu-
nists can offer.”75 But Soong was cautioned that American troops would never be sent to 
Taiwan and that “their own efforts will be the determining factor in Formosa and that 
failure to make this point clearly will inevitably result in eventual failure of our efforts 
to prevent Communist domination of the island.”76 
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There was no fixed time limit to solving the Taiwan problem; Washington’s commit-
ment to Taipei was open-ended. As one planning document from December 1956 
forecast, “Until the communists stop being communists and come back into the family 
of nations, a continuation of substantial United States aid to Free China will be neces-
sary.”77 Aside from the transfer of high-tech naval equipment, the U.S. decision to train 
better pilots for the ROC air force and to provide it Sidewinder air-to-air missiles would 
turn out to be, probably, the single most important addition to the Nationalist military’s 
capabilities. In any case, the Nationalists were well prepared when the second Taiwan 
Strait crisis broke out in 1958.
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The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, 1958  
An oppressed army fighting with desperate courage is sure to win.  
(哀兵必胜.)
Tensions between the PRC and Taiwan remained high after the first Taiwan Strait crisis, 
in 1954–55. The Nationalist blockade of the PRC continued, albeit at a reduced level 
after the Dachens were evacuated. The blockade halted a lower percentage of the PRC’s 
international shipping, since its operation was more strictly limited to southeast China. 
However, the combined effects of the blockade and of the U.S.-sponsored strategic em-
bargo, which was to last until 1971, were significant. 
To make up for the loss of international seaborne commerce, the PRC was at first forced to 
turn to the Soviet Union, conducting an ever larger share of trade via the Trans-Siberian 
Railway. By the late 1950s, however, it found itself overreliant on the USSR. China’s 
debts to the USSR were well over a billion U.S. dollars—by one estimate 1.5 billion 
rubles (almost two billion 1962 dollars).1 At about the same time, there was increasing 
opposition from the British, Japanese, Germans, Canadians, and French to the China 
sanctions. In early May 1957, the British argued that the “China differential should be 
completely abolished.”2 Dulles wrote to Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, offering to try 
to meet Britain halfway but insisting that “in our opinion, this differential has a real 
significance in retarding the buildup of Communist China’s vast military potential.”3 
A similar message from Eisenhower to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan warned “that 
many of the items which you would take off the China list will in fact appreciably help 
the Chinese Communists to build up the military potential which threatens us in this 
area and which we have the primary responsibility to resist.”4 
In the midst of all this, the Nationalists were retightening the blockade. The second 
Taiwan Strait crisis, during 1958, arose from the PRC’s goal of halting the blockade once 
and for all and thereby freeing itself to diversify its overseas trade away from the USSR.
These international economic initiatives were matched by domestic ones, intended to 
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catch up with the West. Some of these policies were unsound, such as Mao Zedong’s 
1958 “Great Leap Forward,” which eventually produced a nationwide famine that killed 
millions. To these ends Beijing renewed attacks on Jinmen—the Nationalists’ main 
blockade base—and so put extreme pressure on Taipei.
The Gradual Decline of the Nationalist Blockade
During the early 1950s, the U.S. government supported the Nationalist blockade, in par-
ticular when its enforcement strengthened its own strategic embargo of the PRC. Over 
a year and a half, from early 1954 to mid-1955, there were thirty-five reported incidents 
against British shipping; the number of serious Nationalist attacks dropped to a total of 
fourteen, however—nine from the sea, two from the land, and three from the air—with 
no reported deaths or other casualties.5 The British government, which announced in 
1957 that it was planning to increase trade with China, continued to oppose the block-
ade with its own Formosa Straits Patrol, though that force operated more sporadically 
than its American counterpart during the mid-1950s. Usually one Royal Navy ship was 
on station at a time, and each patrol only lasted two or three days. During a five-month 
period in late 1954, for example, only seven ships patrolled the Taiwan Strait, each for 
two or three days, which meant that Royal Navy ships were present on only twenty-four 
out of about 150 days, or about 16 percent of this period.6 
Unlike the U.S. Navy, whose Taiwan Patrol Force had complex duties that included 
patrolling, training, and morale building, the Royal Navy sought simply to protect Brit-
ish shipping from interference by the Nationalists and their guerrilla allies. One sure 
sign of the British patrol’s impact, despite its light “footprint,” appeared on September 
8, 1955, when the Nationalist government’s department of defense ordered that “attacks 
on shipping off the coast of China must in future be confined to Communist vessels, 
and that no (repeat no) neutral ships are to be molested unless this is ‘unavoidable in the 
inherent right of self-defence.’” This sole exception, “self-defence,” would appear to have 
envisioned a hypothetical situation where a neutral vessel “happened to be in the way of 
a bona fide attack on a Communist vessel.”7 
That spring Washington tried its best to de-escalate matters. Dulles told Eisenhower 
after a March 1956 visit to Taiwan that he had not found “any feeling that an all-out 
Chicom assault was likely in the early future. . . . From my talks with the US Country 
Team [the ambassador’s key subordinates] I think there is a somewhat excessive ten-
dency on the part of the Chinats to aggravate the situation by minor plane and artillery 
initiatives, and I think we should try to bring this under closer control.”8 Although 
British-flagged vessels continued to be stopped and searched from time to time, during 
July 1956 the British consulate in Taiwan reported that so far that year no British ship 
had “sustained damage or casualties as a result of Nationalist air and naval action or by 
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shore batteries from coastal islands.”9 Almost a year after that, in May 1957, it was fur-
ther reported that since December 1955 “no British ships have been damaged and there 
have been no casualties.”10 
Nevertheless, and despite numerous U.S.-U.K. talks over several years, there was 
no agreement on how to adjust the trade-restriction regime against China. On May 
24, 1957, Eisenhower sent a final plea to Macmillan not to change the Chinese trade 
differential:
As an individual I agree with you that there is very little of profit in the matter either for your 
country or for any other. Commercially, it affects this nation not at all, for the simple reason that 
we have a total embargo on Chinese trade. However, many of our people think that the free nations 
could make a terrific psychological blunder in this matter and possibly even lose all the areas of the 
Southeast [Asia] that have strong Chinese minorities.
We understand your predicament and even though we may be compelled, in the final result, to dif-
fer sharply in our official positions, I think that each of our Governments should strive to prevent 
the possible popular conclusion in its own country that we are committed to going “separate ways.”11
Macmillan nonetheless announced that Britain would diversify its trade with China, 
shipping a wider range of goods. In response, the Nationalist government intensified its 
blockade. On June 7, 1957, the Nationalist minister for foreign affairs pledged that his 
“Government would stand firm on its mainland port closure order whether or not Brit-
ain used warships to escort merchant ships sailing into Communist ports.”12 On June 15 
the U.S. government cautioned Taiwan: as a White House staff member minuted, “We 
are advising the GRC [Government of the Republic of China] that while we recognize 
the importance to them of preventing the shipment of strategic materials to Communist 
China, their own interest calls for caution in intercepting foreign commercial shipping, 
particularly British, in the Taiwan Strait. We shall point out that a serious incident 
involving a free world ship could seriously hurt the Nationalists.”13
Beginning in early 1958, both the total size of the Sino-British trade and the number 
of items traded began to increase dramatically. The U.S. embassy in Taipei had already 
warned, during summer 1957, that “the Chinese Communists may wish to neutralize it 
[Jinmen] in order to facilitate a greater use of the harbor following the British action on 
trade controls.”14 The PRC did indeed attempt to “neutralize” Jinmen, and the result was 
the second Taiwan Strait crisis. 
The Chinese Shell Jinmen 
As the U.S. embassy had predicted, one of the PRC’s top priorities in 1958 was to 
increase its trade with Britain. The key to making this new policy effective was to un-
dermine the effectiveness of the Nationalist base on Jinmen. Since the mid-1950s an es-
timated 750,000 PLA troops had been permanently stationed along the mainland coast 
opposite the offshore islands. This deployment was a constant drain and “definitely 
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slowed down military probing that Communists might otherwise have been inclined to 
do.”15 That August, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the president of the Council of Ministers 
of Cambodia, visited China to meet with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. As he explained 
in mid-September to Walter S. Robertson, assistant secretary to the U.S. mission to the 
UN, the PRC leaders were “concerned by the fact that the offshore islands are being used 
to mount Commando attacks on the mainland and to impose a blockade.”16 Accord-
ingly, and although the British decision to liberalize trade with China was an important 
contributing factor, the PRC’s “first objective” during the second Taiwan Strait crisis 
“was to deter the Nationalists from using the offshore islands for harassment of the 
mainland, or as a base for a future invasion of the mainland.”17
On August 23, 1958, Communist forces began shelling Jinmen, firing an estimated 
forty thousand shells during the first attack. Dulles told Eisenhower that even an early 
estimate of twenty-five thousand rounds seemed “exaggerated” but that even “if it was 
only half that it would still be serious.”18 The Nationalists immediately requested full 
U.S. military support. But Eisenhower rejected the notion that the United States had 
no choice but to defend the offshore islands: “The President said there is no military 
reason for the Chinese Nationalists to hold the offshore islands, just as there is no 
military advantage that the Chinese Communists would gain from an attack on Taiwan. 
However, we have to take our decision not on the basis of our military evaluation, but 
on an evaluation of the moral[e] factor.”19 Dulles agreed with this view, pointing out 
the contrast with the criticality of holding Jinmen and Mazu; if those two islands “were 
lost, the Chinese Nationalists do not consider that they could hold Formosa. Morale 
would crumble and Chiang’s control would be lost. . . . The loss of Formosa would in his 
opinion be a mortal blow to our position in the Far East.”20 There was also great fear that 
the Soviets would become involved: “The President said we should not be drawn into 
spreading out the area of conflict, and thereby probably bringing the USSR in to render 
support to its principal ally, thus leading to general war. We must try to define fixed 
limits to the action.”21
On August 27, 1958, Chiang Kai-shek sent Eisenhower a long letter describing the PRC 
attack on Jinmen: the shelling, strafing by MiG fighters, and the “sinking and damag-
ing of two vessels” that had been evacuating wounded. He specifically asked for three 
actions: an American declaration invoking the Formosa Resolution; assignment of the 
U.S. Navy to convoy vessels from Taiwan to Jinmen and Mazu; and delegation to the 
local MAAG of “appropriate authority to make decisions when the United States and 
Chinese Governments hold consultations on military operation in pursuance of the 
exchange of notes following the signing of the mutual defense treaty.” He also reminded 
the president that he had upheld his own part of the 1954 secret exchange of notes: “I 
am sure that Your Excellency is aware of the fact that we have never once made any 
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provocative move against the Communists in the Taiwan straits during the past three 
years because of the Sino-American mutual defense treaty relationship.”22
Nevertheless, Eisenhower was determined not to escalate the incident. Of Chiang’s 
claims that the Nationalists were too weak, it was “suggested” among the president’s 
advisers “that Chiang may be using this line to gain leverage on us.”23 As for invoking 
the Formosa Resolution, on August 29, 1958, President Eisenhower told Under Secretary 
of State (and recent governor of Massachusetts) Christian Herter that “he did not wish 
to put ourselves on the line with a full commitment. The Orientals can be very devious; 
they would then call the tune.”24 Vice Adm. Roland N. Smoot, the commander of the 
U.S. Taiwan Defense Command from 1958 to 1962, had no choice therefore but to tell 
Chiang that in accordance with the U.S.-ROC defense treaty “we would not be directly 
involved in this affair.”25 
The PRC attack on Jinmen did eventually draw in the Seventh Fleet, but only in a sup-
porting role. A USIA foreign-public-opinion poll determined that “Nationalist China 
would greatly increase its world stature if it were able to handle the [PRC] threat itself.”26 
Gen. Maxwell Taylor and Admiral Burke reported to Eisenhower that Chiang had 
already allocated “one-third of the effective Chinese Nationalist forces” to the offshore 
islands and that the Nationalists, “given the will[,] . . . could hold out against interdic-
tion.” Artillery alone could not push the Nationalist troops off the islands: “No amount 
of artillery fire nor of bombing would by themselves occupy the Islands for the Com-
munists; therefore a major element in the defensibility of the Islands is the ability and 
especially the willingness of the 80,000-odd Chinese Nationalist forces on them to con-
tinue their defense.” The U.S. Navy could support the Nationalists, but its commander’s 
“authority did not include operations inside the three mile limit off the China coast.”27 
From the Nationalist point of view, a three-mile limit left a sizable area of China’s lit-
torals unprotected—warships could shell targets ashore from beyond it. The United 
States and China disagreed on how far out China’s sovereignty extended: the Americans 
insisted on three miles, but Beijing declared a twelve-mile limit. CinCPac, then Adm. 
Harry D. Felt, wanted to make “occasional, purposeful intrusions so as to indicate our 
nonacceptance of this limit.” Secretary Dulles and General Twining, however, disagreed 
and “pointed out that our position in the Warsaw conference makes our attitude clear 
and there is no need to demonstrate our attitude by overt acts at this time.”28 This was 
the policy being carried out at the time with regard to the Soviet Union; the only excep-
tion was a “certain discretion given to Admiral Smoot to meet unpredictable emergen-
cies.” General Twining assured the president that “he did not conceive an emergency 
that could occur that would not, in fact, permit prior consultation with Washington, but 
he still thought some discretion was appropriate.”29 
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Indirect American Support for Taiwan
Though U.S. naval forces were ordered not to operate within three miles of the Chinese 
coast, the American military did assist Taiwan in other ways—for example, with naval 
“demonstrations.” But even these nominally noncombatant operations could be costly in 
terms of aircraft and pilots. In September 1958, for example, carrier air “group command-
ers were a little too enthusiastic,” and the “Navy paid a price for the show of force put on 
by the combat air patrol over the Taiwan Strait, losing four planes and three pilots in ac-
cidents.”30 In the event, “We could and did take over military defense of Taiwan itself, thus 
releasing his [Chiang’s] military forces to defend and resupply the offshore islands.”31 
The secretary of state’s September 4, 1958, assessment was that the PRC attack on the 
offshore islands was just the first step of a larger campaign that Beijing had been prepar-
ing “for over the past 3 years . . . with Soviet backing”:
The program has been begun by intense pressure on the weakest and most vulnerable of such posi-
tions, namely, the Chinat-held offshore islands of Jinmen and Mazu. It seems that the operation is 
designed to produce a cumulating rollback effect, first on the offshore islands, and then on Taiwan, 
the “liberation” of which is the announced purpose of the present phase. The “liberation,” if it oc-
curred, would have serious repercussions on the Philippines, Japan, and other friendly countries of 
the Far East and Southeast Asia. 
The offensive against the offshore islands was to be “primarily military,” but the follow-
up “might be primarily subversive,” although “armed Chicom attack against Taiwan is 
not to be excluded.”32
To make sure the PRC could not successfully attack Taiwan militarily, by mid-September 
1958 the U.S. Navy had positioned five carriers and their escorts near Taiwan, and two 
more were on their way. Additionally, a clear message was sent to the PRC with the 
revelation on October 1 that a number of eight-inch howitzers capable of firing nuclear 
shells had been delivered to Jinmen Island.33 As a top priority the Americans were 
“concentrating on getting the F-86s on the islands into operational status quickly.”34 
They were also providing Taiwan with high-tech equipment by means of cargo planes. 
On September 8, 1958, the first of twelve F-104 Starfighters (supersonic interceptors) left 
Hamilton Air Force Base in Novato, California, on a C-124 cargo plane. According to 
Admiral Felt, it was the “first time it had ever been done, I guess. They took the little old 
stub wings off of them and flew them out to Taiwan, unloaded them, stuck the wings 
on, and there we had an F-104 squadron!”35 
The F-104 held world records for both altitude (over ninety thousand feet) and speed 
(1,220 knots), and it was expected that “this deployment will be a real test of its combat 
capability.”36 (Eventually Taiwan acquired 247 of them, mainly from the United States 
but also secondhand from Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, and Japan.) One of 
the F-104’s primary missions was to patrol the Taiwan Strait, engaging PRC fighters, 
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primarily MiG-15s. On September 30, 1958, a Navy situation report estimated that MiG 
losses since August 14 totaled twenty-five destroyed, five probably destroyed, and eleven 
either damaged or “possibly destroyed.” Meanwhile, the Nationalists had only lost one 
F-86, and that was “due to mechanical difficulty while returning to home base.”37
The U.S. Navy trained Nationalist crews on board their ships and Nationalist pilots at 
the Naval Ordnance Test Station at China Lake, California (in the use of the Sidewinder 
missile in combat). The Air Force too assigned experts to train Nationalist pilots. Ac-
cording to Admiral Felt,
We had an Air Force section of the MAAG down there, the Military Assistance Group, which 
trained our Chinese friends and they were well trained, every bit as good tactically as the U.S. Air 
Force or Naval Air fighters. They’d go out on these patrols, out over the straits, and just loiter at 
their best fighting altitude, more or less presenting themselves as bait. The Chinese would come 
out at higher altitudes and finally couldn’t resist the temptation to come down, and when they 
came down they got took. Also it was the first combat introduction of the Sidewinder, which had 
been given to the Chinese. I can’t remember the numbers, but I think it was something like 21 of 
the Communist planes shot down and success for the Sidewinders, not 100 percent but a very fine 
performance. 
In one air battle, on September 24, 1958, Nationalist F-86s shot down an impressive ten 
MiGs, with two other “probable” hits, without sustaining a single loss.38 These were the 
first-ever “kills” by Sidewinders;39 in fact, the engagement marked “the first use of any 
American air-to-air guided missile in actual armed engagement,” and a total of 360 
Sidewinders were allocated for the Chinese Nationalist air force.40 As a result of superior 
U.S. equipment and training, the Nationalist pilots established air control so effectively 
that the “Red Chinese weren’t much interested in challenging in the air.”41 Very soon, 
American assistance also gave the Nationalists equally potent sea control.
Keeping the Sea-Lanes Open
Getting supplies to Jinmen was the top military priority, and the U.S. Navy’s most 
important contribution to it was helping protect the sea-lanes. The Nationalists were 
expected to take the supplies all the way to the island, but through late August they 
did a poor job. For example, if fired on by the Communists many Nationalist resupply 
ships turned around and headed back to Taiwan rather than “waiting over [the] horizon 
awhile and then trying again.” The Navy was limited by orders from Washington to 
convincing the Nationalists “that [the] U.S. is willing to help them but cannot be expect-
ed to assume further responsibility for getting supplies all the way ashore on the islands 
unless GRC has first demonstrated that they themselves have the real determination to 
see the action through to the finish, despite the hazards involved, including artillery fire 
at the beaches.”42 In September the head of the MAAG complained to Chiang “that to 
date the Chinese Navy has made no effort to even try” to break the Communist block-
ade of Jinmen but that if Chiang could just “give me one Chinese admiral with a can do 
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spirit then let us use a little imagination and a little guts and some tenacity” it would be 
possible to “stabilize this situation and thumb our noses at the Communists.”43 
The Nationalists’ behavior led to speculation that they were trying to pull U.S. forces 
deeper into the conflict: “There is a possibility that GRC is being deliberately inept in 
order to draw U.S. inextricably into conflict with CHICOMs.”44 In a meeting with the 
president in early September the Joint Chiefs requested authority to “approve U.S. air 
support” for the Nationalists. Eisenhower’s reply reflected his concern that the United 
States not be drawn unwillingly into Chiang’s fight: he recalled that the chiefs had 
estimated such American air support would not be required unless Chinese communist 
air forces attacked en masse in support of land operations, and that there would be time 
for his decision in such cases. Accordingly, he prescribed that U.S. air attack against 
mainland targets could be ordered only upon his approval.45
Also in early September, the Taiwan Patrol Force was ordered to provide landing ships 
and craft, escorts, and support forces to protect the Nationalist resupply vessels. They 
were warned to stay in international waters—that is, “beyond the three-mile limit.” Ad-
ditional equipment was being rushed to the scene, including eight medium landing craft 
(LCMs) and twenty-eight vehicle and personnel landing craft (LCVPs), a squadron of 
Sidewinder-equipped F-100 Super Sabre fighters, and twelve nuclear-capable eight-inch 
howitzers plus ammunition.46 On September 6, the first U.S.-escorted Nationalist con-
voy, code-named Lightning, reached Jinmen with crucial supplies. By September 19 
nine convoys had been conducted, each of the final four landing, on average, 151 tons. 
By mid-September Nationalist supply ships had, with U.S. Navy assistance, overcome 
what was being called a PRC “artillery blockade” of the island. By the end of September 
1958, Jinmen had at least thirty-one days’ worth of food and thirty-two of ammunition 
on hand. Its endurance in other categories—such as spare parts—was twice that; the 
average had increased from fifty days to fifty-five during the past two weeks alone.47 The 
Joint Chiefs reported to the president that the supply crisis on the offshore islands was 
now “broken.”48
To safeguard the supply ships’ arrival and withdrawal from the contested area, U.S. 
aircraft flew antisubmarine patrols and surface reconnaissance out to twenty-five miles 
from Jinmen, staying at least twenty miles off the Chinese coastline. U.S. warships were 
ordered to remain at least three miles from shore and were particularly warned not 
to “shoot at the mainland.”49 However, a special “rule of engagement” authorized “US 
Commanders . . . to engage hostile surface vessels in territorial or international waters if 
they are attacking the [Republic of China Navy] forces.”50 Meanwhile, American naval 
personnel trained the Nationalists intensely to carry out successful convoy operations. A 
map from September 15, 1958 (map 2), shows how U.S. Navy ships—well outside China’s 
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sovereign waters, as indicated on the map by dotted boxes—were stationed to protect 
the Nationalist ships resupplying Jinmen. 
Notwithstanding, Washington’s support for the Nationalists with regard to the offshore 
islands remained conditional. About four months before the crisis broke out, in May 
1958, the NSC, in a lengthy report on Taiwan, had reiterated that “loss of Taiwan and 
the Penghus would out-flank the United States base on Okinawa and would seriously 
MAP 2  
U.S. Navy’s Jinmen Convoy Operations
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breach the Free World’s defense line in the West Pacific, which stretches from South 
Korea and Japan to the Philippines.” This same study, however, hypothesized that when 
attacked by the PRC, Chiang would evacuate “Quemoy and Matsu” but “only after 
strongest U.S. representations” and that during the evacuation there might be “some 
casualties and ship damage due to mines.”51
Washington continued to refuse Taipei a blank check. For example, in August Chiang 
Kai-shek wanted to use Taiwanese planes to bomb the mainland, but Washington  
expressed concern that this might escalate the conflict and draw U.S. forces into it.  
According to Admiral Smoot, a Navy study had proved that for every gun the National-
ists destroyed they might lose a squadron of planes: “This, of course was too big a price 
to pay, and they [Smoot’s staff] were convinced of the proposal’s infeasibility.”52 Chiang 
was not pleased by America’s decision not to conduct “retaliatory air attacks against 
Communist air fields, et cetera,” calling its attitude “inhuman” and “unfair” to his sol-
diers on the offshore islands and generally “destructive of public morale.” Ambassador 
Everett F. Drumright in Taipei reported that Chiang’s “reaction was the most violent I 
have seen him exhibit and at one point he called our policy ‘not that of an allied nation.’”53
In early September 1958, the New Zealand embassy in Washington, acting on behalf 
of the U.S. government, appealed to the Soviet ambassador, Mikhail Menshikov, “to 
restrain” Beijing.54 Late that month the PRC sent a message through Indian intermedi-
aries that if the Nationalists withdrew from the islands they would not be attacked in 
the process and that leaders in Beijing were “not concerned to press immediately their 
claims to Taiwan.”55 The Chinese were, however, clearly concerned about further U.S. 
intervention; they warned their artillery not to aim at American ships. However, Mao 
Zedong refused to accept American demands that a cease-fire precede Sino-U.S. talks to 
resolve the crisis. For this reason, a negotiated settlement appeared unlikely. 
By the end of October 1958, the convoying situation had been largely resolved; the Com-
munists now allowed the Nationalists to send in convoys on even-numbered days. As a 
result, the Navy’s tasking changed: “U.S. Commanders are instructed to convoy only in 
case of military necessity, which would be limited to situations where the Communists 
attack supply convoys on even numbered days.” So long as the Nationalist supply ships 
were not attacked, U.S. ships did not need to escort them at all. Admiral Smoot had 
agreed to the even-numbered-day plan but Admiral Felt had disagreed, and “in light 
of political considerations, Secretary Dulles [had sided] with Admiral Felt.” But the 
president had decided that “pending further instructions, [the Navy] would not engage 
in convoying operations unless the Chinese Communists attempted by sea and/or air 
to interfere with the re-supply on even days in what we regard as international waters.”56 
However, not wanting to force the Nationalists to “jump through a hoop” at the PRC’s 
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bidding, the United States would support them if “they might feel a political reason to 
attempt some resupply on the days when the Chicoms had announced they would fire.”57
Dulles Convinces Chiang to Withdraw 
One way to de-escalate the crisis was to get the Nationalist troops off the offshore islands. 
The American and British governments were in constant consultation. On September 
9, 1958, the British chargé in Beijing, Sir Duncan Wilson, warned that to obtain “great 
power status” the PRC was willing to foment foreign crises, that the “Chinese Govern-
ment seems thoroughly arrogant and overconfident in their diplomacy.” The Chinese 
leaders’ staying power was almost limitless, since they were “ready, if necessary, to 
sacrifice enormous numbers of men in limited military operations” and would deliber-
ately “extend” a limited war rather than look defeated. Wilson argued, with his “Dutch, 
Norwegian, Danish and Pakistan colleagues” in agreement, that to resolve the ongoing 
crisis the PRC must “have at least a diplomatic victory to show their people” to cite as an 
excuse to “back down.”58 
Washington was more concerned than ever that fighting in the Taiwan Strait might 
escalate into all-out war. Further, as Dulles told Eisenhower in August 1958, Jinmen and 
Mazu were now so integrated with Taiwan and the Penghus that he “doubted whether 
there could be an amputation without fatal consequences to Formosa itself.”59 On Octo-
ber 13 General Twining reported to Eisenhower that the Joint Chiefs and Dulles had just 
concluded that once the PRC artillery fire “quiets” it would be necessary to “withdraw 
at least two-thirds of the Chinese Nationalist Troops.” Eisenhower agreed but cautioned 
that the next step was to convince Chiang Kai-shek of it: “We must accomplish our end 
through persuasion rather than pressure, since otherwise we will be charged with re-
versing the stand we have taken.” In response, Twining proposed that Chiang be offered 
American assistance to “modernize his Army; we could partially modernize his Air 
Force, although this would be very expensive; we could give him shipping and amphibi-
ous lift to enlarge his capabilities for flexible action; perhaps we could even give him 
additional economic aid.”60 
Dulles summarized for file a conversation he had with Ambassador Lodge on Septem-
ber 19, 1958. Of his goals with regard to Chiang Kai-shek, 
I said that we had tried repeatedly to get the [Taiwanese] government to withdraw or at least greatly 
reduce its forces on Quemoy and Matsu and to treat them as lightly held forward positions to be 
retired from if necessary but that we had constantly come up against the fact that Chiang Kai-shek 
was adamant in rejecting such a viewpoint as incompatible with the entire basis for his government 
and that if we attempted to coerce through a cut-off of military assistance and financial aid, that 
itself would be as destructive of a friendly position on Formosa as though it was taken over overtly 
by the Communists. 
A second issue discussed was stopping the Nationalist attacks against the mainland. To 
de-escalate tensions, Beijing had been told that Washington was working to end them. 
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Dulles told Lodge, however, that he “was not confident that we could get the Chinese 
Nationalists to accept the plan to end ‘provocations’ from the Offshore Islands as we had 
proposed to the Communists.”61
Dulles reported by telephone to Vice President Richard Nixon that repeated attempts 
had been made to get Chiang to give up the offshore islands, even sending Radford 
and Robertson to talk with him, but that Chiang had firmly said no. The dilemma was 
that “we can break them if we cut off aid but if you break them, you lose Formosa.” The 
Americans could not afford to do that: “The broad challenge is are we going to keep 
the Western shores of the Pacific in friendly hands or not? We can fall back initially by 
giving up Q[uemoy] and M[atsu] which will carry with it the loss of Formosa and then 
we lose the Philippines, Japan will make terms with Communist China and we will have 
suffered an overall setback even worse than when we lost the Mainland.”62
On September 21, 1958, the president told Foreign Secretary Lloyd of the United 
Kingdom that “he would be very happy indeed if the United States could make some 
arrangement with Chiang Kai-shek which would not lose face for him but which would 
get his troops off the islands of Quemoy and Matsu.”63 In a separate conversation with 
Dulles, the president “expressed regret that there seemed to be no way to persuade 
Chiang to re-direct the focus of his leadership, in a way which would enable him to re-
group his military forces into more sensible positions.”64 However, Eisenhower clarified 
that “it was essential that the free world keep control of the island of Formosa and that 
if Formosa were lost, then a hole would result in the very middle of the island chain 
of defense. Should the Reds eventually control Formosa, that, in the President’s opin-
ion, would be a real Munich.” If, in the worst case, “Chiang Kai-shek were to quit and 
Formosa went to the Reds, then the overseas Chinese would have no place to go except 
to the Communist camp.”65 To convince Chiang to cooperate, Dulles decided to sign a 
second secret agreement.
The Second Secret Agreement
Reducing forces on the offshore islands would necessarily end the blockade. During 
late October 1958, Dulles’s task was to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to reduce the size of 
Nationalist forces on the islands so as to halt “commando raids and blockades.”66 Eisen-
hower repeatedly wrote “strong” letters to Dulles suggesting that Chiang “be offered an 
amphibious lift in exchange for getting his troops out of Quemoy and Matsu.”67 Dulles 
flew to Taiwan to convince Chiang to withdraw from the offshore islands.68 During 
private talks, however, Chiang refused to withdraw, rejecting “any proposal that seems 
to him to imply retreat from his position as head of the only legitimate Chinese Govern-
ment.”69 Dulles nonetheless urged him “to renounce the use of force in an attempt to 
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reunify China.”70 Doing so would mean “a substantial reduction of forces” on Jinmen 
and Mazu.71 
On October 23, 1958, Dulles reported from Taipei in a telegram for the president’s “eyes 
only” that Chiang had “accepted the principle of an appreciable reduction of forces on 
Quemoy to be effected whenever there was a suspension of the fighting.”72 In return for 
a reduction of forces on Jinmen by “not less than 15,000 men,” including “1 infantry 
division plus additional units and/or individuals,” Dulles had agreed to greater arms 
shipments, including “a minimum of 12 240mm howitzers” and a “minimum of 12 
155mm guns” for Jinmen and four or more 240 mm howitzers plus one battalion of 155 
mm guns, “when available,” for Mazu. The possibility was also raised for “Lacrosse mis-
siles to be considered at a later date,” a “minimum of 1 tank battalion,” and, if changes 
to the M-8 assault gun proved “feasible,” “sufficient converted vehicles to motorize 2 
battalions of infantry.”73 The Nationalists had eight months to reduce their forces on the 
offshore islands, and “the target date for completion of the implementation of the above 
agreement is June 30, 1959.” That this quid pro quo was more a “face-saving” measure 
for Chiang than a true ROC necessity is made apparent in a comment by Oliver M. Gale, 
special assistant to the secretary of defense: “The materiel and equipment outlined in 
this agreement had already been earmarked for GRC and do not actually represent an 
increase in previously planned assistance.”74
Left unstated but implicit in the agreement was that any cut in forces on the offshore 
islands would necessarily terminate the Nationalists’ decadelong blockade of China. 
Certainly, this was one of the American goals that Dulles outlined to the British Foreign 
Office immediately before he left for Taiwan to meet with Chiang Kai-shek.75 The 
blockade was no longer considered by the United States as important as before, since the 
PRC was already beginning to experience an economic implosion due to the Great Leap 
Forward. Meanwhile, it was well-known in Washington that Sino-Soviet diplomatic 
relations were in decline. As Gordon Chang has pointed out, Eisenhower was careful not 
to comment on that relationship, for fear of strengthening it. Even his memoir barely 
mentions the point, so as “to avoid saying anything that could hinder the emergence of 
the Sino-Soviet split.”76 
Dulles clearly wanted to put even more pressure on the Sino-Soviet alliance, telling 
newspapermen in Newport, Rhode Island, that he did not think the PRC or USSR acted in 
“accordance with treaty obligations” and that there “have been plenty of treaty obligations 
which they have evaded or broken.”77 According to a Bonn intelligence report, the Soviet 
premier, Nikita Khrushchev, had warned Mao about the risks of attacking the offshore 
islands, but Mao had dismissed the warning. Mao had been convinced that it would force 
a retreat, as had happened in the Dachen Islands three years before, and that “liberating” 
these Nationalist-held islands “was necessary for internal and external prestige reasons 
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and that Nationalist loss of the islands would undermine their position, increase their 
large rate of military defections, and facilitate Communist subversive activity.”78 
Nevertheless, on October 6, 1958, the PRC halted the shelling of Jinmen, after forty-four 
days. Civilian casualties were 138 dead and 324 injured; dead and wounded soldiers 
numbered close to three thousand. In addition, an estimated seven thousand buildings 
on Jinmen were either damaged or destroyed.79 Sporadic artillery fire from the PRC side 
would continue for the next twenty years, ending for good only in January 1979 after 
President Jimmy Carter and Chairman Deng Xiaoping recognized each other’s gov-
ernments. This barrage took place on alternate days of the week, and the shells mainly 
contained propaganda leaflets. An estimated one million steel shell casings were fired 
at Jinmen during this period, making it “the longest sustained artillery warfare in world 
military history.”80
It was no “coincidence that the Nationalist naval blockade also ended during 1958, right 
as the time the first signs of what would soon be called the Sino-Soviet ‘split’ began to 
appear.”81 Moscow’s failure to support Beijing in the offshore islands crisis undoubtedly 
helped Washington undermine their alliance. However, failure met all U.S. attempts to 
resolve PRC-Taiwan differences peacefully. On October 27 Selwyn Lloyd wrote to Dulles 
that the Chinese “seem to be in no hurry” to make peace with Taiwan and would “pur-
sue their aims by whatever political means offer themselves from time to time. They do 
not want mediation and their ultimate goal appears to be some direct arrangement with 
the Nationalists.” Lloyd predicted, with great accuracy from the viewpoint of a half a 
century later, “We are, therefore, likely to be in for a fairly long period of such tactics.”82 
Conclusions
A second secret agreement signed by Dulles and Chiang ended the second Taiwan Strait 
crisis. This agreement also had the subsidiary effect of ending the Nationalist blockade 
of the PRC. This blockade had already lasted ten years and, in combination with the on-
going U.S. strategic embargo, had exerted extreme economic pressure on the PRC. Sino-
Soviet economic tensions eventually forced a major realignment in the PRC’s foreign 
trade. But the military standoff over the offshore islands remained unresolved. During 
this crisis the Taiwan Patrol Force “accomplished one of the most important missions of 
her career by playing a major role in aiding the Chinese Nationalists.”83 
According to Dulles, the real dispute was not geography but “human wills.” If the 
United States “seems afraid, and loses ‘face’ in any way, the consequences will be far-
reaching, extending from Viet Nam in the south, to Japan and Korea in the north.”84 
Periodic PLA attacks against Jinmen made it a “whipping boy” for Taiwan itself.85 The 
PRC leaders were pursuing mainly a political, not military, strategy, playing “a ‘cat and 
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mouse’ game with the offshore islands.” To Dulles, therefore, the PRC announcement 
that the shelling of Jinmen might switch from even-numbered to odd-numbered days 
seemed to substantiate this assessment: “This rather fantastic statement seems to con-
firm our analysis of the Chinese Communist attitude as being essentially political and 
propaganda rather than military.”86 
Meanwhile, the U.S. government’s public statements remained intentionally vague about 
whether it might use military force to support the Nationalist bases on Jinmen and 
Mazu. However, a secret December 26, 1959, operation order specified that the offshore 
islands “are not covered by this agreement” but acknowledged that the United States had 
committed itself not only to the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores but also—most 
importantly—to the offshore islands of Jinmen and Mazu, “insofar as a threat to them is 
considered to be a threat against Taiwan and the Penghus.”87 The decision to defend any 
offshore island that posed a direct threat, if in PRC hands, to Taiwan arguably included 
the use of atomic bombs, a question that was indeed hotly argued during both the Truman 
and Eisenhower administrations.
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The Possibility of the Use of Atomic Weapons
Nothing is too deceitful in war. (兵不厭詐. )
To most outside observers, the forces facing each other across the Taiwan Strait in the 
early 1950s may have seemed unevenly matched, in favor of the United States and its 
allies. However, asymmetric warfare can give advantages to both sides. For example, 
in the Korean War enormous manpower had allowed China to send “human waves” 
against the United Nations troops. Therefore, on the American side the possibility of 
being forced to use atomic weapons, in particular against an invasion force aimed at 
Taiwan, was seriously discussed. 
During the early 1950s, atomic bombs were often thought of as much like regular 
bombs. The use of the A-bomb was considered in Korea and later in Vietnam during the 
Dien Bien Phu crisis. With regard to Taiwan, during July 1950 Truman authorized the 
movement to Guam of B-29 bombers capable of carrying atomic bombs. Meanwhile, an 
air unit in Guam was given control of nonradioactive atomic-bomb components, the 
nuclear core to be provided only in an emergency. This information was leaked to the 
New York Times so as to give the PRC pause about attacking Taiwan.1
During times of crisis, planning sessions often included discussion on using atomic 
bombs. For example, on September 12, 1954, a top-secret NSC paper on the Taiwan 
Strait crisis warned that a war with China over the offshore islands would necessarily 
bring a sharp rise in tension that would “probably lead to our initiating the use of atomic 
weapons.”2 Clearly, that possibility was considered an important element in the defense 
of Taiwan.
Consideration of the Nuclear Option
It is still unclear whether the U.S. government would have actually used A-bombs in 
Korea or to halt a PRC invasion of Taiwan. On August 6–8, 1950, MacArthur evidently 
told W. Averell Harriman (Truman’s special assistant and administrator of the Marshall 
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Plan, former ambassador to the USSR and secretary of commerce) that if the PRC 
attacked Taiwan, Seventh Fleet ships, fighter jets from the Philippines and Okinawa, 
B-29s, and other aircraft could destroy the invasion force. It would be a one-sided battle: 
“Should the Communists be so foolhardy as to make such an attempt, it would be the 
bloodiest victory in Far East history.”3 
Although use of the A-bomb may not have been specifically discussed during these 
meetings (Harriman had been sent to see MacArthur, then commanding UN forces in 
Korea and the occupation of Japan, soon after the general held a controversial meeting 
with Chiang Kai-shek), the fact that MacArthur mentioned the (A-bomb-capable) B-29s 
suggests that he had their use in mind. Even if not, the employment of atomic weapons 
was certainly considered later. On December 1, 1950, for example, the Chief of Staff of 
the U.S. Army, Gen. J. Lawton Collins, stated that if the Russians actively intervened in 
the Korean conflict “we would have to consider the threat of the use of the A-bomb.”4 On 
December 27, Secretary of State Acheson asked what would happen if Russia intervened 
in Korea, and was told that there would be retaliation against Port Arthur (a Russian-
held port in Manchuria) and Vladivostok, “using the atom bomb.”5 
On September 12, 1954, during the first Taiwan Strait crisis, the JCS similarly recom-
mended considering the use of nuclear weapons against China. However, when the 
decision to evacuate the Dachen Islands was made during January 1955, it was deter-
mined that “atomic weapons will not be used.”6 A special “Atomic Operations” annex to 
the Dachens operations plan specified that if the enemy attacked the evacuation forces, 
commanders could assume that the “use of atomic weapons will be authorized.” A list of 
possible target cities was marked out when the annex was declassified, on December 29, 
2011, but this statement remains: “Other targets suspected as source of enemy attacks may 
be nominated by COMSEVENTHFLT for atomic strikes.” 7
On February 21, 1955, Dulles warned Eisenhower that a Communist buildup across 
from Jinmen and Mazu meant these islands might soon be indefensible “in the absence 
of massive U.S. intervention, perhaps with atomic weapons.”8 On March 7, Dulles, 
recently returned from Taiwan, advised Eisenhower that to support Chiang Kai-shek’s 
position on the offshore islands might “require the use of atomic missiles,” to which the 
president replied that “he thoroughly agreed with this” but not with “weapons of mass 
destruction” (considered as larger atomic bombs or nuclear devices). Still, Eisenhower 
acknowledged, “with the number of planes that we had available in the Asian area, it 
would be quite impractical to accomplish the necessary results in the way of putting out 
airfields and gun emplacements without using atomic missiles.”9 
On March 10, Dulles stated at an NSC meeting that the United States might use atomic 
weapons against China if it attacked Taiwan: “Determination must soon be made 
taiwan’s offshore islands  97
Macintosh HD:Users:Ursula.Curran.ctr:Desktop:_NP_44_Taiwan_s Offshore Islands_PRINTER:NP_44 book Folder:NP_44_Chapter6.indd January 29, 2019 4:05 PM
whether in such defense atomic weapons will be tactically used. The need for such use, 
to make up for deficiency in conventional forces, outweighs the repercussive effect of 
such use upon free world nations in Europe and the Far East (especially Japan, where 
attempt[s] may be made to immobilize U.S. forces). U.S. and world public opinion must 
be prepared.”10
The next day, Eisenhower summarized the situation during a meeting at which both 
Dulles brothers, Radford, Twining, Carney, and Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster (the presi-
dent’s defense liaison officer) were present. He declared, according to the aide-mémoire, 
that
the U.S. should do every practical thing that could be done to help the Chinats to defend themselves; 
that if it was necessary later for the U.S. to intervene, it should do so with conventional weapons; 
that the U.S. should improve the air defense of the Formosa air fields, but should avoid greatly 
augmenting U.S. troops on Formosa; that we should give the best possible advice and training to the 
Chinats about how to take care of themselves; that he recognized that if we had to intervene with 
conventional weapons, such intervention might not be decisive; that the time might come when the 
U.S. might have to intervene with atomic weapons, but that should come only at the end, and we 
would have to advise our allies first.11
On March 15, Admiral Stump told the president that at the current levels the Com-
munist air force could be held off by “U.S. conventional operations” but that if the 
PRC moved “air forces in strength into the area, the U.S. would have to be prepared to 
employ atomic weapons.”12 Stump later specified that if airfields deep in Fujian Province 
were used to attack the offshore islands or Formosa, the “danger [they] would pose to 
the U.S. fleet units would require that [they] be destroyed” with “special weapons”—that 
is, atomic weapons.13 
At this point, atomic weapons were considered as being just one option in a large arsenal 
and as fundamentally like the others. Eisenhower publicly confirmed that “A-bombs 
can be used . . . as you would use a bullet.” About ten days later, on March 25, the CNO, 
Admiral Carney, stated that the president was planning to destroy Red China’s “military 
potential,” which certainly implied possible use of the atomic bomb.14 But how the public 
would react to such an attack was an important factor. Admiral Radford later reflected 
that to defend the offshore islands against a determined PRC attack “it would undoubt-
edly be necessary to use atomic weapons.” Eisenhower would have had to “consider 
feeling generated throughout the world and in China too, particularly if many civilians 
were killed.”15 Because of the potential negatives of using atomic weapons, they were 
often, even then, thought of mainly as deterrents.
Atomic Bombs as Deterrents
Atomic bombs were in fact thought to be perfect deterrent weapons. One idea of how 
best to deter a PRC attack on the offshore islands was to “let it be known that the 
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presently deployed U.S. fighter unit on Formosa has an atomic capability—as do the 
carrier task forces in the area—and that they will use them to repel attack.” A second 
suggestion was to redeploy a fighter-bomber wing with “atomic capability to Korea and, 
perhaps, another to Formosa.” If these were not sufficient, then “even more conclusive 
actions by the U.S.” could include “practice bombings-up of bomber units in the Far 
East with tactical atomic weapons” or even the “test of a penetration [that is, of bun-
kers or runways] A-Bomb on some stand-by airfield, possibly in the Marianas’ or other 
islands under U.S. control in the Eastern Pacific.”16 
One adviser suggested to Dulles that if the Communists took the offshore islands from 
the Nationalists, the United States could “from time to time, drop an A-bomb on them 
to neutralize them and give the CHICOMS no advantage by their capture.” But Dulles 
thought this would “accomplish nothing but the killing of a number of harmless fisher-
men.” It would also be a “considerable waste of armament.”17 That was a concern, in that 
“we cannot splurge our limited supply of atomic weapons without serious danger to the 
entire international balance of power; and therefore any use which is made of them must 
be very carefully planned and thought out.”18 
In addition, the use of large numbers of atomic bombs to defend the islands could 
backfire, since it might involve the “wholesale use of atomic weapons against the densely 
populated mainland where land bursts would be required which would have a [radioac-
tive] fall-out which might involve heavy casualties.”19 There would also “be [a] risk of 
large civilian casualties through after-effects, and indeed the inhabitants of Quemoy, 
and even of Taiwan, might not be immune under certain atmospheric and wind condi-
tions.” Such a strategy, then, would not be in the “long-range interest of the Republic 
of China,” since the use of atomic weapons might “destroy any hope of good will and 
future favorable reception of the Republic of China by the [mainland] Chinese people.”20 
Furthermore, it “might alienate Asian opinion and ruin Chiang Kai-shek’s hopes of 
ultimate welcome back to the mainland.”21 
Chinese leaders responded quickly to these American announcements. In February 
1955, Mao Zedong warned the Finnish ambassador that “if the Americans atomic-
bombed Shanghai or Peking, ‘they’ [meaning the Soviets] would retaliate by wiping out 
American cities, which would cause the replacement of the present leaders of the United 
States.” The Finnish ambassador checked with the Soviet ambassador, who assured him 
that “if the Americans bombed the Chinese mainland, the Soviet Government would 
give the Chinese all possible support under the Sino-Soviet Agreement.”22 
There was enormous concern in Washington that Moscow would use atomic bombs to 
support Beijing. The use of the phrase “all possible support” certainly implied that the 
USSR might resort to nuclear weapons to back China. However, Eden warned Dulles 
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that Russia’s goal might be quite different: “Involving US in these islands will put US on 
weakest ground with its allies and public opinion generally . . . [and the] Russians would 
probably find this situation to their advantage.”23 In other words, embroiling the PRC 
and the United States in a no-win conflict over the offshore islands would potentially 
give the USSR increased leverage over both.
Tactical Nuclear Bombs and Missiles
As weapons development progressed, smaller atomic bombs were created that could be 
used in tactical warfare. In April 1955, the Chief of Staff of the Army, Ridgway, notified 
the chairman of the JCS, Twining, that if requested as many as seven of the Army’s eight 
batteries of M31 Honest John missiles (truck-mounted, surface-to-surface, unguided 
“artillery rockets” with a fifteen-mile range, organized in batteries of four launchers 
each) could be transferred to Taiwan; one of these batteries would be diverted from Ja-
pan to Taiwan in June 1955, while six batteries in Europe could be redeployed to Taiwan. 
According to an appendix dated April 4, 1955, this would allocate 161 nuclear missiles 
to Taiwan. While the Honest John missile could be used with conventional warheads, 
it was primarily intended to use the Mark 7 bomb’s nuclear components. According to 
Ridgway: “Honest John batteries would provide a significant contribution to the defense 
of the island of Formosa. Their most effective use would be with atomic warheads.”24 
As Eisenhower reminded the Joint Chiefs in July 1955, however, the very “principle of 
having a considerable amount of dispersal” of missile batteries was to “limit the effects 
of surprise attack.”25 
Because any American use of atomic weapons might spur the USSR into responding, 
the United States began to develop tactical nuclear weapons (that is, of even shorter 
range). Admiral Felt later recounted that by the end of the 1950s new breakthroughs 
made many more military options available and that “at that time we had plans for use 
of tactical nuclear weapons.”26 During June 1957, President Eisenhower met with Drs. 
Ernest O. Lawrence, Mark M. Mills, and Edward Teller to talk about the development of 
“clean” nuclear weapons and “tactical” fusion weapons. According to Teller, clean weap-
ons could be “easily packaged,” their effects consisting “only in the damage sought, i.e., 
only in the area of initial effects, free of fall-out outside this area.” Lawrence emphasized 
that the development of “clean” nuclear weapons, as opposed to “dirty” bombs with 
widespread radioactivity effects, would be necessary to make such weapons useful on 
the battlefield, and “our failure could truly be a ‘crime against humanity.’” In any case, 
“after clean weapons have been developed, it is possible to put ‘additive materials’ with 
them to produce radioactive fall-out if desired.”27
In May 1958, the NSC examined the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict with China. 
The report assumed that the president would give permission but also that “nuclear 
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weapons will be employed with the greatest selectivity, initially against the invading  
forces and supporting facilities, then against other airfield complexes, ports, staging 
bases, communications networks and similar military targets.” While the report  
assumed also that the USSR would come to China’s assistance, it assessed that “Soviet 
support would not be expected to include provision of nuclear weapons, at least not at 
the commencement of hostilities.”28
Many military officers during this period did not believe that tactical nuclear weapons, 
as opposed to larger A-bombs, would lead to a larger war. On August 14, 1958, General 
Twining told Eisenhower that if the Chinese communists attacked the offshore islands, 
the American response might include “small atomic weapons.” When questioned, 
Twining said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff “did not expect atomic retaliation if we attacked 
the two or three airfields nearest the coast with atomic weapons.”29 On August 29, a 
draft operational plan was sent to the Pacific Fleet stating, “It is probable that initially 
only conventional weapons will be authorized, but prepare to use atomic weapons. 
Prepare, if the use of atomic weapons is authorized, to extending bombing of ChiCom 
targets deeper into China as required.”30 
Also on the 29th, the president met with Acting Secretary of State Herter, Allen Dulles, 
Dulles’s deputy Gen. Charles P. Cabell, Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald A. Quarles, 
General Twining, and Admiral Burke, among others, to formulate guidance for 
CinCPac. Three possible enemy scenarios were outlined: (a) simple harassment and 
interdiction, (b) an attack on one or more offshore islands, and (c) an attack “extend-
ing operations against Taiwan.” It was decided to suspend the atomic decision for the 
present:
With regard to phase a, Mr. Quarles suggested that our action broadly should be to support the 
Chinese Nationalists but try to stay out of the battle ourselves. In case phase b develops, we should 
authorize our commander to join the battle, but not to use atomic weapons nor to extend the area of 
combat beyond the immediate tactical area, including air fields. In case phase c develops, we would 
expect our commander to seek further instructions for more extended action. The President said 
he retains some question as to whether we should not authorize tactical atomic weapons in case of 
phase b. However, we cannot be sure this would be necessary, and since we do not want to outrage 
world opinion, perhaps we had better reserve this. 
It was settled, however, that even in scenario a, the Chinese Nationalists could under-
take “hot pursuit” against the enemy and that U.S. Navy “escort and protection opera-
tions could be authorized to the extent deemed militarily necessary and beyond Chinat 
capabilities, but confined to international waters.”31 
Control over use of atomic bombs rested with the president. The final message to 
Admiral Stump had a note at the end: “It was emphasized that during all three phases, 
atomic weapons could not be used until after specific authority has been obtained 
from the President.”32 Asked by a reporter whether he could assure the public that local 
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commanders would really ask Washington “for permission to use such weapons which 
are available” and if so whether they would wait to “receive a reply or approval,” Dulles 
responded, “I certainly can. The orders are very, very strict with regard to that.”33
Also on the 29th, another message to CinCPac was circulated internally, in draft. It 
clearly stated the U.S. government’s intent: “The United States Government will not 
permit the loss of the offshore islands to Chinese Communist aggression. In case of 
major air or amphibious attacks, which in the opinion of the United States seriously 
endanger the islands, the United States will concur in the ChiNat attack of ChiCom 
close-in mainland bases. In such an event, the United States will reinforce the ChiNats 
to the extent necessary to assure the security of these islands. This action may include 
joining in the attack of ChiCom bases, with atomic weapons used if needed to gain the 
military objective.”34
Anglo-American Discussions about the Use of Atomic Bombs
If American military leaders treated atomic bombs like any other weapon, many 
civilian leaders in Washington were not as optimistic. Perhaps Dulles considered the 
question moot; as he told Prime Minister Macmillan in September 1958, “It seems that 
the Sino-Soviet strategy is designed to put strains upon us at many separate places and 
our various commitments to N.A.T.O., in Korea, to individual allies, are spreading our 
forces too thin for comfort—certainly unless atomic weapons are to be used.”35 Never-
theless, later that month Eisenhower assured Selwyn Lloyd that nuclear weapons would 
be used only for an “all-out effort rather than a local effort” and “that he did not plan 
to use nuclear weapons in any local situation at the present time.”36 Owing to fears that 
first use of atomic weapons could lead to reprisals, however, Admiral Felt was eventu-
ally directed to draw up a plan to defend Taiwan using only conventional weapons, 
which took some doing.37
Ongoing American-British talks on the use of nuclear weapons were particularly 
important, especially since Eisenhower thought a bit differently from his advisers, who 
were against using these weapons. Ike informed Churchill in Bermuda in 1953 that if 
the Communists orchestrated another major attack in Korea, “we intended to use every 
weapon in the bag, including our atomic types.” With regard to the “use of atomic bomb 
in Korea in the event hostilities are initiated by the Reds,” Eisenhower argued that the 
“atom bomb has to be treated just as another weapon in the arsenal,” in particular since 
“anyone who held up too long in the use of his assets in atomic weapons might suddenly 
find himself subjected to such wide-spread and devastating attack that retaliation would 
be next to impossible.”38
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On September 2, 1958, General Twining explained to Dulles that a seven-to-ten-kiloton 
airburst would have a lethal range of three or four miles but that there would be “virtu-
ally no fall out.” If tensions over the Taiwan Strait got out of hand, it might be necessary 
to use tactical weapons against the PRC: “The initial attack would be only on five coast 
airfields (with one bomb being used per airfield).”39 However, a different report from the 
JCS on the same day envisioned using ten-to-eighty-kiloton weapons and “for air burst, 
not ground burst,” which suggested higher levels of fallout. The use of atomic weapons 
against the mainland, as the second report argued, would be a necessity, since “con-
ventional weapons would not be adequate to accomplish the elimination of the [PRC] 
installations.”40
Assessment of all the factors involved convinced the secretary of state of the importance 
of a determined resistance: “If the Chicoms believe the US would actively intervene to 
throw back an assault, perhaps using nuclear weapons, it is probable there would be 
no attempt to take Quemoy by assault and the situation might quiet down, as in 1955.” 
While there would be “strong popular revulsion against the US in most of the world,” 
especially in Asia and “particularly harmful to us in Japan,” there was hope that if 
“relatively small detonations were used with only air bursts, so that there would be no 
appreciable fallout or large civilian casualties, and if the matter were quickly closed, the 
revulsion might not be long-lived.”41
During January 1958, Vice Adm. Austin K. Doyle, now Commander, U.S. Taiwan 
Defense Command, also reported that B61 Matadors (surface-to-surface, radio-guided, 
seven-hundred-mile cruise missiles) had been stationed in Taiwan and were “now set 
up ready for action if trouble should start.” Although Doyle refused to say whether any 
atomic weapons were in Taiwan, it was public knowledge by this time that the Matador 
missiles were capable of delivering nuclear payloads in the forty-to-fifty-kiloton range. 
During 1958, the U.S. Navy also began to deploy the Mark 101 Lulu nuclear depth 
bomb. With its eleven-kiloton payload, the weapon was intended to destroy deeply 
submerged submarines.42 
Conclusions
American views of atomic warfare changed during the 1950s from one of immediate 
use of the A-bomb, to deterrence, to selective employment of tactical weapons. The U.S. 
Navy was operating in a highly sensitive part of Asia, where the nuclear weapons of 
China’s ally, the USSR, represented a special strategic concern (as would, after the PRC 
exploded its own atomic bomb in 1964, those of China itself). U.S. warships conducting 
patrols had always to be wary of the PRC’s intentions. The danger of a small clash grow-
ing into a nuclear exchange was ever present. 
taiwan’s offshore islands  103
Macintosh HD:Users:Ursula.Curran.ctr:Desktop:_NP_44_Taiwan_s Offshore Islands_PRINTER:NP_44 book Folder:NP_44_Chapter6.indd January 29, 2019 4:05 PM
Without a doubt, U.S. nuclear policy had a direct impact on Taiwan. For example, 
according to declassified reports, the U.S. military stored numerous atomic bombs in 
Taiwan, and these weapons were not removed until the early 1970s.43 Also, during the 
mid-1960s the Nationalists began their own nuclear weapons program. In 1976, under 
pressure from the American government, Taiwan agreed to dismantle its program 
(following the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis, President Lee Teng-hui would propose 
reactivating it). 
Although the nuclear aspect of U.S. policy toward the Taiwan Strait was always kept 
highly secret, it was clear from 1950 onward that atomic weapons, both large bombs and 
smaller tactical devices, were available in the region should they be needed to prevent a 
PRC invasion of Taiwan. Over time, however, conventional systems like the Sidewinder 
air-to-air missile were perceived as more useful and began to replace them, at least the 
tactical atomic weapons. Also, as the Sino-Soviet “monolith” began to crumble during 
the late 1950s, it became less likely that the Soviet Union would come to China’s rescue.
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Using Taiwan to Undermine  
the Sino-Soviet Alliance
Kill two birds with one stone. (一石二鳥.)
Rather than resort to force in the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. government hoped to defuse 
military tension and to focus instead on longer-term goals, such as breaking up the 
Sino-Soviet alliance. As early as November 3, 1948, the CIA hypothesized that “when 
the issue of subservience to Moscow has become more immediate than that of ‘US im-
perialism,’ Chinese nationalism will prove stronger than international Communism.”1 
A national intelligence estimate of September 10, 1952, identified three specific issues 
that might at some point undermine this alliance: “The Chinese Communists might 
make demands upon the USSR, or even take action, incompatible with long-range 
Soviet global interests”; “Frictions might arise because of Soviet inability or disinclina-
tion to supply capital equipment”; and resistance might emerge to “a Communist world 
dominated from Moscow.”2 
China seemed to be the weaker partner in the Sino-Soviet alliance; the Russians had 
surrounded themselves with friendly governments in the Baltics and Eastern Europe, 
while “in the Far East there was a more direct confrontation between the Communist 
and non-Communist world.”3 This was exemplified in the PRC-ROC standoff over the 
offshore islands, and in the determination of each Chinese government to reunify all of 
China under its respective authority. In December 1954, for example, Taiwan’s Foreign 
Minister Yeh had vehemently opposed any “two-China” theory.4 But during a February 
10, 1955, conversation Dulles cautioned Yeh that the solution to the communist threat 
would take time. Instead of trying to “force Chinese unification by military means” the 
United States and Taiwan should focus on “the vulnerability of Communist regimes to 
economic and other pressures.”5
In particular, Washington hoped to undermine the Sino-Soviet alliance with economic 
tools. As early as January 17, 1951, the NSC had suggested that making China more 
106  the newport papers
Macintosh HD:Users:Ursula.Curran.ctr:Desktop:_NP_44_Taiwan_s Offshore Islands_PRINTER:NP_44 book Folder:NP_44_Chapter7.indd January 29, 2019 4:05 PM 
economically dependent on Russia “might strain their relations.”6 On May 4, 1951, it 
recommended specific measures: to “continue United States economic restrictions 
against China” and “persuade other nations to adopt similar positions” so as to “stimu-
late differences between the Peiping [Beijing] and Moscow regimes.”7 Dulles’s goal was 
to “strain the Sino-Soviet alliance by compelling the Chinese to increase economic 
and military demands for Soviet support to the point where Moscow would be forced 
to drop Beijing.”8 The primary means for carrying out this ambitious policy were the 
multilateral export controls, which “continued or enhanced stresses and strains on the 
ties between Communist China and its Soviet partners.”9
“All Feasible Overt and Covert Means” 
On September 15, 1947, the CIA assessed that the goal of Soviet removal of industrial 
machinery from Manchuria, which had begun in 1946, was to make China a “de- 
industrialized source of food and raw materials for the Soviet Far East,” which, of 
course, would help make China a “minimum military threat to the USSR.”10 The NSC 
urged in 1949 that the U.S. government, while avoiding the “appearance of intervention” 
in China, “should be alert to exploit through political and economic means any rifts 
between the Chinese Communists and the USSR.”11 
On October 13, 1948, the NSC submitted a highly prescient report entitled “United 
States Policy toward China.” It argued that while the USSR desired to exploit China’s 
natural resources, 
it is the political situation in China which must arouse the aggressive interest of the Kremlin. In the 
struggle for world domination—a struggle which the Kremlin pursues essentially through political 
action (even in civil war)—the allegiance of China’s millions is worth striving for. That allegiance is 
worth struggling for if only to deny it to the free world. In positive terms, China is worth having be-
cause capture of it would represent an impressive political victory and, more practically, acquisition 
of a broad human glacis from which to mount a political offensive against the rest of East Asia. 
The CIA wisely concluded that Stalin would want the Chinese communists to dominate 
some part of China. He would not want all of it: “China is too big, too populous.”12 
Stalin’s desire for control, of course, completely ignored Mao Zedong’s intention to unify 
the whole country under the Chinese Communist Party, which meant, the CIA argued, 
that the Soviet government had to oppose him: “Even Mao and his colleagues cannot be 
permitted eventually to acquire all of it [mainland China]—the temptation [to attempt 
to do so] might be too great for them, especially as they would have, in part, risen to 
power on the heady wine of nationalism. The Kremlin prefers, where possible, not to 
take chances in such matters.”13 The USSR was particularly concerned that Chinese 
nationalism had been exacerbated by its own predatory actions against China, includ-
ing “obvious Kremlin cupidity in northern Manchuria, its extraterritorial activities in 
Sinkiang and the dispatch of the Soviet Ambassador with the Nationalist Foreign Office 
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to Canton” in the far south. Thus, “the full force of nationalism remains to be released 
in Communist China.”14
On January 5, 1950, Truman told Senators Knowland and H. A. Smith that he “felt the 
Soviets were going to encounter increasing difficulties by way of their program of subju-
gation” of China.15 The obvious American policy choice would be the opposite of what-
ever the USSR wanted. Thus, a Sino-Soviet split could be accomplished in a number of 
ways, including using “all feasible overt and covert means, consistent with a policy of 
not being provocative of war, to create discontent and internal divisions within each 
of the Communist-dominated areas of the Far East, and to impair their relations with 
the Soviet Union and with each other, particularly by stimulating Sino-Soviet estrange-
ment.”16 Dean Acheson advised Truman on November 17, 1949, that the best policy was 
to “detach” China from its “subservience to Moscow and over a period of time encour-
age those vigorous influences which might modify it.” Truman thought “this was the 
correct analysis.”17 
Soviet Eyes Are Bigger Than Their Stomachs
Arguably the most important U.S. government policy, however, was the most coun-
terintuitive: to let the Communists dominate all of mainland China. The reasoning 
was actually quite simple: “There appears to be no chance of a split within the Party or 
between the Party and the USSR until the time of Communist domination of China.”18 
At that point it would be necessary to make China as dependent as possible on the 
Soviet Union. To that end, prior to Mao Zedong’s visit to Moscow in early 1950, the U.S. 
government refused to recognize Beijing, which meant “the Chinese Communists can-
not now play off one great power against another, since they have no non-Soviet allies at 
the moment.”19 
Truman did this on purpose. Having learned as a boy the classic Ozark saying about 
how one’s eyes are bigger than one’s stomach, Truman meant to push the Soviet Union 
and China closer together in order ultimately to break them apart. According to one 
CIA report, the first part of that plan was exactly what the Soviet government was trying 
to do: “In China, Soviet policy is currently directed toward creating a situation that will 
preclude any possibility of the Chinese Communists asserting their independence from 
the Soviet bloc. The USSR undoubtedly assumes that, since the Chinese Communist 
program depends on Soviet aid, the Peiping regime will not resist Soviet penetration.”20 
The USSR was particularly interested in the “realignment of China’s foreign trade with 
the Soviet area instead of China’s traditional trading partners among the Western 
nations.”21 
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By early 1950 the United States was considering using Taiwan’s strategic position to 
exert economic pressure on the PRC. On January 5 Maj. Edward C. Spowart, United 
States Army Reserve, suggested to Truman that they could “turn the table” on Russia: 
“If we sent Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek [sic] the necessary military equipment such 
as radar, tanks (preferably M-5a)[,] light bombers, fighter craft, and small arms and am-
munition with which he can defend Formosa and continue his attacks on the mainland 
from Formosa and place a blockade around China proper, Communist China’s only 
sources of supply would be from Russia; and when Russia failed to keep the civilian and 
military personnel supplied with food, clothing and other essential materials, Commu-
nism will have failed in China.”22 
On May 17, 1951, the NSC announced that the nation’s top goals were to “detach China 
as an effective ally of the USSR and . . . [d]eny Formosa to any Chinese regime aligned 
with or dominated by the USSR.”23 According to Consul General Walter McConaughy 
in Hong Kong, the Korean War made the PRC “so thoroughly dependent on the USSR 
for weapons and ammunition for the Korean war . . . [that] the point has now been 
reached where additional dependence on the Soviets may hasten the day when the 
Chinese become disillusioned with Russian aid.”24 The NSC directed its Psychological 
Strategy Board to “place maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power, including 
the relationships between the USSR, its satellites, and Communist China.”25 The idea 
was to promote “conflict between Chinese national interest and Soviet imperialism.”26 
On December 22, 1954, Dulles told Eisenhower that he was counting on “the tradi-
tional Chinese dislike of foreigners which was bound in the long run to impair relations 
with Russia.”27 Or as Ike’s longtime Army friend William R. Gruber had put it, more 
succinctly, “Every nation that has ever tried to control China has mired down in the 
attempt.”28 
A major focus of the U.S. government was cutting China’s imports of necessary goods. 
The Western commodities China’s factories most needed included raw cotton ($75 
million’s worth in 1951 dollars came from outside the Soviet bloc); chemicals, dyes, and 
drugs ($30 million); crude rubber ($25 million); iron and steel products ($25 million); 
machinery, vehicles, and cereals ($14 million); petroleum products ($12 million); jute 
products ($10 million); and nonferrous metals and manufactures ($10 million). Buying 
these from the Soviet bloc would require “long and costly transport routes” that would 
“likely involve losses on the part of one or the other of the trading partners.”29 Such 
economic warfare “would make Communist China more dependent on the very limited 
Chinese rail facilities connecting with the USSR,” which in turn would “hamper current 
industrial production, retard industrial development and might seriously limit China’s 
ability to sustain large-scale military operations.”30 
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Dulles explained to the Canadian cabinet during a visit to Ottawa that the PRC’s goal 
was to expand its power throughout East Asia: “I felt that the Chinese Communists felt 
that they were strong enough to make a worthwhile try at driving US influence away 
from the entire offshore island chain from the Aleutians to New Zealand and becom-
ing themselves dominant in that part of the world.”31 One method of diverting or even 
stopping them was to exploit the “present weaknesses” of both the Soviet Union and the 
People’s Republic, particularly those that might undermine their alliance. The Soviet 
Union, for instance, was facing severe challenges, including “unreadiness to wage gen-
eral war, conflicts over its foreign policy, trouble in its leadership[,] and [an] agricultural 
crisis”; how, leaders in the White House asked, might these factors be used to impact 
“Soviet willingness adequately to support [it] indirectly or to become directly involved 
in Chinese Communist military operations against the off-shore islands or Formosa?”32 
As noted earlier, the Nationalist blockage of Chinese coastal shipping meant that much 
of the PRC’s domestic north–south trade had to be carried by train and most of its 
international trade over the Trans-Siberian Railway. Some of that trade then passed 
through Russia to a number of friendly Eastern European countries, but “at the moment 
transportation facilities limit this possibility.”33 (China did still conduct international 
maritime trade, but largely in either foreign-registered vessels or in Hong Kong ships, 
which were—in theory at least—neutral.) That diversion resulted in four additional 
costs: “(a) excessive transport costs, (b) adverse terms of trade for China, (c) significant 
delays in the delivery of industrial goods and consequent difficulties in procurement 
and planning, and (d) restrictions on Communist China’s ability to earn foreign ex-
change and to obtain credit.” In such added transport costs alone, it was estimated that 
China spent $32 million in 1955 and the USSR from $53 million to $76 million, a total 
extra transport cost of approximately $100 million. When higher prices for imported 
goods were factored in, it was calculated that China had to spend $172 million in 1955 
just to offset the trade controls. Although, admittedly, the sum total of these costs was 
“small,” the total effect was huge, aside from the enormous strains on China’s railway 
system and the Trans-Siberian Railway: “They have an important immediate impact on 
military-industrial expansion which increases internal economic pressures and restricts 
Communist China’s ability to embark on new military ventures in the Far East.”34 
All this was on purpose. The result was that by 1957, fully “50 percent of China’s foreign 
trade was with the USSR.”35 When Anthony Eden argued that trade restrictions on 
China should be the same as those on Russia, the U.S. side replied that “even though 
the Soviets might try to ship considerable quantities of supplies to China, a much longer 
route and higher expense was involved for the Communists, and consequently we did 
not see any advantage in relaxing controls in the East.”36
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The Impact of Sino-Soviet Relations on a Taiwan Strait Resolution
The relationship between Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations and the first Taiwan Strait 
crisis is too rarely considered. Following Stalin’s death in 1953, the leadership of the 
USSR was in turmoil. The last thing his successors wanted was to be dragged into a 
new world war over the Taiwan Strait, especially one that might become nuclear. At 
the same time that the U.S. government was attempting to restrain Chiang Kai-shek, 
therefore, the USSR was actively reducing its military support for China. In fact, just as 
the first Taiwan Strait crisis reached its peak in early 1955, Moscow withdrew important 
defensive installations from its former naval base at Lüshun. This action made Manchu-
ria vulnerable to attack from the sea by the U.S. Navy, which put pressure on Beijing to 
de-escalate its military operations in the Taiwan Strait. 
On February 1, 1955, Eisenhower wrote a long letter to General Gruenther in Europe. 
The president made it clear that while U.S. policy included breaking up the Sino-Soviet 
alliance, it should not be achieved through war: 
I do not believe that Russia wants war at this time—in fact, I do not believe that if we became en-
gaged in rather a bitter fight along the coast of China, Russia would want to intervene with her own 
forces. She would, of course, pour supplies into China in an effort to exhaust us and certainly would 
exploit the opportunity to separate us from our major allies. But I am convinced that Russia does 
not want, at this moment, to experiment with means of defense against the [atomic] bombing that 
we could conduct against her mainland. At the same time, I assume that Russia’s treaty with Red 
China comprehends a true military alliance, which she would either have to repudiate or take the 
plunge. As a consequence of this kind of thinking, she would probably be in a considerable dilemma 
if we got into a real shooting war with China. It would not be an easy decision for the men in the 
Kremlin, in my opinion. 
Eisenhower’s goal, therefore, was to “do what we believe to be right” and by showing 
firmness undermine the enemy’s constant attempts “to disrupt the solidarity of the free 
world’s intentions to oppose their aggressive practices.” 37
Changes in Sino-Soviet relations were an important backdrop to the peaceful resolution 
of the first Taiwan Strait crisis. In Moscow, political infighting continued through until 
February 20, 1956, when during the Twentieth Party Congress Nikita Khrushchev, as 
first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, delivered his “secret speech” 
denouncing Stalin. During those three years, Mao Zedong attempted to renegotiate 
some of the more onerous aspects of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty, and he began to assert 
his own leadership over the international communist movement.
Even before Stalin’s death in 1953, important alterations in the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty 
had been made, especially concerning the status of the Manchurian port cities of Lüshun 
and Dalian. According to a 1952 agreement, all Soviet military forces were scheduled 
to withdraw from these Manchurian ports by May 31, 1955. Moscow also agreed to 
transfer “the installations in the area of the Port Arthur [Lüshun] naval base to the 
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Government of the People’s Republic of China.” When Moscow agreed to return the 
various Manchurian railways and the Lüshun naval base without charge, Mao evidently 
thought that the USSR would also leave the large-caliber guns that were protecting the 
port. But at the last minute Khrushchev refused, demanding instead that China pay for 
the guns at full price: “These are very expensive weapons[;] we would be selling them at 
reduced prices.”38 Also, as noted earlier, the Soviet Union’s decision in 1955 to strip the 
base of its main defensive weapons left China highly vulnerable, the Sino-Japanese War 
of 1894–95 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 having shown that its ports could 
easily be reduced from the sea. 
These Russian actions were, perhaps, purposeful. During May 1955, Dulles told Mo-
lotov during meetings in Vienna that “we had obtained from the Chinese Nationalists 
arrangements which we thought would enable us to influence the situation for peace 
from our side and he suggested that the Soviet Union could do the same with the Chi-
nese Communists.” That was so particularly because “the Chinese Communists were 
dependent upon Russia for various strategic supplies and planes and could not develop 
their plans without Russian support.”39 Khrushchev’s decision to strip the port defenses 
was a clear sign that the USSR was unwilling to back an offensive to retake the offshore 
islands. He further hinted that the USSR’s nuclear umbrella might not cover the Taiwan 
Strait. 
With its northern ports now defenseless, the PRC had little choice but to back down 
from its aggressive stance far to the south. The Eisenhower administration realized 
immediately that Beijing’s policies had changed. Prior to February 1955, the PRC at-
tacks on the offshore islands had seemed clearly intended as the “first phase of an attack 
against Taiwan . . . by force.” However, after the enactment of the Formosa Resolution 
on January 29 and the Senate’s approval of the Mutual Defense Treaty on February 9, 
1955, “Communist propaganda on this subject [fell] to its lowest point for the past year,” 
apparently owing at least in part to the sobering effect of the “display of U.S. sea and air 
power in the area.”40 The immediate crisis appeared to be over. On April 23, 1955, Bei-
jing even announced that it was willing to negotiate the status of Taiwan, and on May 1 
the PRC halted the shelling of Jinmen Island. Three months later, on August 1, as a sign 
of goodwill, China released eleven captured American airmen, who had previously been 
sentenced to lengthy jail terms.41 
One can only speculate on the impact of Sino-Soviet relations on Beijing’s decision to 
halt the southern offensive against Taipei. Certainly, the firmness of north/south link-
ages had been shown before, in particular by the impact of Eisenhower’s “unleashing 
Chiang” policy: it had spurred on the successful negotiation of the Korean armistice, 
and in turn had then freed the PLA to redeploy troops to the south. Now, lacking Soviet 
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support in the north, Beijing called off the attack against the offshore islands. During 
the first Taiwan Strait crisis, the PRC’s leaders had clearly felt that given the correlation 
of forces, they had little choice but to back down. Ultimately, China’s coercive tactics 
against Taiwan did not succeed, in large part because the USSR “failed to come to the 
PRC’s rescue when it was intimidated by the United States.”42
Growing Sino-Soviet Economic Tension
Behind the scenes were several important Sino-Soviet diplomatic factors that contrib-
uted to the second cross-strait crisis, in 1958. For instance, the PRC’s determination to 
break the Nationalist blockade ultimately arose from Sino-Soviet disagreement over the 
“Great Leap Forward,” China’s recently adopted economic plan. Second, Mao’s deci-
sion to shell Jinmen in 1958 without first seeking Soviet approval can be portrayed as “a 
challenge not just to Taipei and Washington but to Moscow’s domination of the interna-
tional Communist movement as well.”43
On the economic side, it has been shown how the U.S.-led economic embargo had 
caused the PRC’s economic dependency on the USSR to grow rapidly throughout the 
1950s. In 1950 the PRC had borrowed three hundred million U.S. dollars from the 
USSR, a sum clearly insufficient to solve China’s economic problems. The PRC’s inter-
vention that fall in the Korean War led not only to huge military losses but to greater 
indebtedness to the USSR, since to “add insult to injury, Stalin . . . demanded payment 
from China for the Soviet military equipment he had sent to Korea.”44 
During August 1958, Mao initiated his second five-year plan—the “Great Leap 
Forward”—a program of rapid, forced industrialization and agricultural collectiviza-
tion. The combined effects of the Nationalist blockade and the U.S. embargo forced Mao 
to rely mainly on imports from the USSR for support: “Imports from the Soviet Union 
rose by an astounding 70 per cent in 1958 and 1959.”45 But Beijing’s constant demands 
on Moscow would entail a heavy cost. During the summer of 1958, for example, Mao 
requested Soviet-built nuclear submarines. When Khrushchev asked how China would 
pay for them, Mao responded that “China had unlimited supplies of food.” Beginning 
in 1959—when the catastrophic Great Leap was producing the Great Famine, in which 
ultimately tens of millions starved—the PRC exported millions of tons of grain, worth 
an estimated U.S.$935 million, largely to fund its purchases from the USSR.46 
To increase these foreign grain sales, however, the PRC needed to increase its maritime 
trade. To that end, Chinese officials attempted to exploit Anglo-American differences 
in trade policy. Also, Mao put pressure on Taiwan to give up its last offshore island 
bases, the “only part of the mainland” the Nationalists still controlled.47 Chiang’s goal of 
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returning would be undermined, and the PRC could finally claim to have reunified all 
of mainland China. 
All these foreign policy, economic, and political factors contributed to Mao’s decision in 
August 1958 to attack Jinmen. According to secret reports given to President Eisen-
hower, morale in the PRC was “so bad that the regime has just cancelled the visas of 
all foreign newspapermen and ordered them out of the country, apparently to prevent 
reports of how bad the situation is.”48
Archival documents prove that Truman’s and Eisenhower’s administrations both meant 
to separate Russia and China. On November 18, 1958, Ike discussed with Dulles “our 
policy of holding firm until changes would occur within the Sino-Soviet bloc.” It was 
neither a quick nor easy goal to achieve: “He [the president] felt that these [changes] 
were inevitable but realized that the policy we were following might not be popular. 
There were some who wanted to give in; others who wanted to attack. The policy that 
required patience was rarely popular.”49 
Conclusions
Faced with the prospect of “losing” China, American policy was to let the Russians have 
all the mainland. As early as January 2, 1950, Truman was told that the Chinese would 
never follow the “Moscow line”: the “Chinese are not built that way.” Furthermore, “Asia 
for the Asiatics” feelings had long been potent in China, and the Russians were “not ac-
cepted by Orientals as Asiatics.”50 In 1957, former French premier Edgar Faure, visiting 
Beijing, found that the U.S. policy of isolating the PRC would “increase China’s extreme 
dependency on the USSR.”51 Indeed, one of Dulles’s prime strategic goals was to push 
the USSR and the PRC together so as to tear them apart. That political outcome was 
largely achieved.
In the immediate aftermath of the Sino-Soviet split, which occurred right after the 1958 
Taiwan Strait crisis, the PRC’s trade with the USSR began to decline, just as its trade 
with the West began to grow. Chinese grain trade with Canada and Australia helped 
offset the effects of the Great Famine. In one historian’s view, 
China’s dependence on Soviet assistance inevitably created heavy economic burdens on Moscow 
and could slow down Soviet development, thus making the Moscow-Beijing alliance quite costly. On 
the other hand, Sino-Soviet economic leverage placed the Kremlin in a politically favorable position 
from which to dictate relations within the alliance and influence the [Chinese Communist Party]’s 
domestic and foreign policies. This paradoxical situation turned out to be a major contributor to the 
collapse of the Soviet economic cooperation and the eventual deterioration of the alliance between 
the two Communist powers.52
The U.S. government carried out a highly secretive and complex policy, using a wide 
variety of military, economic, and political means, of driving China and the USSR 
together so as to heighten their mutual hostility. In the end, the “indirect and long-term 
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effect” of U.S. policies such as the strategic embargo produced such stress in Beijing’s 
economic relations with Moscow that by 1960 it had “led to the disintegration of the 
Sino-Soviet alliance.”53 Control over the offshore islands had been crucial to the ultimate 
success of these policies.
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Conclusion
The Offshore Islands’ Strategic Significance during the 
Cold War
Blood is thicker than water. (血濃於水.)
Tensions during the 1950s between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan were fo-
cused mainly on offshore islands in or near the Taiwan Strait. The U.S. government was 
concerned that a spark in this critical theater might erupt into war, perhaps even global 
conflict between the United States and the Sino-Soviet “monolith.” Washington usually 
sought to lessen tensions over the offshore islands through its diplomatic relations with 
Taipei. But at other times Washington actively sought to exert military pressure—by 
“unleashing Chiang”—to force Beijing to move military units. As Senator Alexander 
Smith told Secretary of State Dulles during April 1955, if Korea and Indochina were the 
two flanks, Taiwan was the center, and “we should keep open a threat to the center in 
order to protect the two flanks.”1 In this regard, the Taiwan Patrol Force acted much like 
a vernier light switch, allowing the U.S. Navy to “dial” up or down cross-strait tension 
to suit larger East Asia policy objectives.2
Truman’s refusal to become involved in China’s civil war saved the United States from 
a quagmire. On January 11, 1949, the National Security Council argued that while the 
“objective of the U.S. with respect to China is the eventual development by the Chinese 
themselves of a unified, stable and independent China friendly to the U.S.,” its goal 
was “not likely to be accomplished by any apparent Chinese group or groups [in] the 
foreseeable future.”3 On September 26, 1952, Truman received a “fan” letter quoting an 
admission in a speech the previous day by Senator Herbert H. Lehman of New York, a 
considerably more liberal-leaning Democrat than Truman, that China “could have been 
saved, if at all, [only] by all-out military intervention on our part.” Not only would the 
United States have “become bogged down in the immense expanse of China, in a war 
to keep Chiang-Kai-Shek in power, [but it] . . . would have cost us millions of men and 
billions of dollars.”4
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American diplomacy with Chiang Kai-shek proved to be one of the greatest challenges. 
As the Department of State warned on January 19, 1949, when working with Taiwan 
the “choice is not between satisfactory and unsatisfactory courses of action but rather 
of the least of several evils or an amalgam of the lesser of them.”5 Two U.S.-Taiwanese 
secret agreements, one signed in December 1954 and the other in October 1958, allowed 
Washington to exert crucial leverage over Chiang to minimize the chances that a small 
conflict in the Taiwan Strait might accidentally escalate. By keeping the agreements 
secret Chiang could retain “face” even while ceding actual authority to Washington. 
But there was also a highly negative side to secrecy. Because the specific terms of these 
agreements were unknown to the public, Washington often received the lion’s share of 
global blame for rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait, even though it was in fact often 
working behind the scenes to quell them. Secrecy also offered Chiang greater public 
leverage to obtain his goals. In the end, however, all this was a price that Eisenhower 
and Dulles decided they would willingly pay to keep the peace in East Asia, where U.S. 
military policy in the Taiwan Strait was critical to stability. 
On October 12, 1950, a top-secret CIA study assessed that “without direct Soviet 
participation and given strong naval and air assistance by the US armed forces, the 
Chinese Nationalist defense forces are capable of holding Formosa against a determined 
Chinese Communist invasion.”6 In March 1956 the British intelligence services con-
cluded that although the Communists were capable of launching a full-scale attack on 
the offshore islands, it is “highly improbable that they will conduct military operations 
of this magnitude as long as the Seventh Fleet remains in the area.” Instead of invad-
ing, therefore, the PRC decided, incorrectly, that time was on its side, that “it would be 
pointless to fight for areas which they hope to acquire in due course through subversion 
and propaganda.”7 
 
The most important U.S. military goal was to protect Taiwan from invasion by the PRC. 
An equally important political goal, however, was reassuring America’s other East Asian 
allies, including Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia, that the PRC could 
not expand onto the first island chain. As early as June 10, 1949, Chennault warned, “A 
Communist Asia Means the Loss of the Pacific Islands” and further that “the loss of China 
sets off a chain reaction that may take months or even several years to accomplish.”8 
This was an early description of the dreaded “domino effect”—with the theory that the 
fall of even a small East Asian nation to communism would lead to the fall of the rest. 
The Japanese were especially impacted by Russian and Chinese expansionism. In early 
1950, Hollington K. Tong, the U.S.-educated ROC ambassador to Japan and the United 
States, argued, “As long as the National Government survives at Formosa, with its 
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constant threat of invasion of the mainland, Russia will go slow in its aggressive action 
against Japan. It is important to American security in Japan thus to keep Russia off-
base in China.”9 During 1955, a Japanese official in Taipei emphasized that it was “the 
strategic value of the island itself,” dominating the sea-lanes from Japan to the south, 
and “keeping it from the Chinese Communists” that mattered most to Tokyo.10 Eisen-
hower privately told his friend Lew Douglas, “It is true that our strategic situation would 
be seriously—possibly even fatally—damaged in the Western Pacific if we should lose 
Formosa to the Communists.”11 
During 1958, discussing upcoming talks with Chiang Kai-shek, Dulles told the Brit-
ish that if the Japanese thought the United States was weaker than China, “they would 
go over to the Chinese Communists just as quickly as they could.”12 However, owing 
to Japan’s World War II experience with the A-bomb, using atomic weapons to prove 
American strength could be equally dangerous; Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II in 
Tokyo warned that the consequences of using atomic weapons “could range from denial 
by the Japanese Government of continued use of our bases in Japan, either for opera-
tions or logistical support, to a strike by Japanese labor on the bases, which would make 
them virtually inoperable.”13 This complex situation tied Washington’s hands; it had to 
support Taipei militarily but try its best to avoid using atomic bombs to do so.
It was widely believed that the best interest of all Asian countries could be furthered by 
forming a “Pacific Pact,” similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Europe. 
However, as Gen. Douglas MacArthur told Truman at their October 15, 1950, meeting  
at Wake Island, “due to lack of homogeneity of the Pacific nations” these countries 
did not want to cooperate but instead wanted “assurance of security from the United 
States.”14 America’s Asian alliances and coalition partners looked to the United States to 
protect Taiwan. As Dulles freely admitted, aiding the Nationalists might end up involv-
ing the United States in a “civil dispute.” But China was not the only case of a divided 
country. Dulles listed others as “Korea, Germany, Austria, Vietnam and Laos. . . .”  
According to Dulles: “If there were armed attacks from the Communist portions of 
these countries against the non-Communist portions, we would aid the latter and in 
fact did so in Korea.”15 
In January 1950, President Truman was warned privately: “If we lose Formosa we will 
have lost not only a perfect military base for Army operations, but the controlling link 
between China, the Philippines, Indo China, Siam, Burma and all of India; and it is a 
well known fact that the Philippines will go Communist within a short period after the 
fall of Formosa.”16 Letting the PRC take the offshore islands would eventually lead to 
Chinese pressure against Taiwan sufficient to “bring about a government which would 
eventually advocate union with Communist China and the elimination of US positions 
on the islands.”17 
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Should this happen, Truman was told (in another evocation of the domino theory), 
it would “seriously jeopardize” the anticommunist island barrier composed of Japan, 
South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. Other Southeast Asian 
states, including Indonesia, Malaya, Cambodia, Laos, and Burma would “probably come 
fully under Communist influence.” Finally, American bases on Okinawa would become 
“untenable” and Japan would “probably fall within the Sino-Soviet orbit.” These losses 
would happen gradually, over many years, but “the consequences in the Far East would 
be even more far-reaching and catastrophic than those which followed when the United 
States allowed the Chinese mainland to be taken over by the Chinese Communists, 
aided and abetted by the Soviet Union.”18 
 
One method to dissuade the PRC from invading Taiwan was to provide the National-
ists with a dependable supply of military equipment and training to defend themselves, 
though not sufficiently advanced to allow Taiwan to attack the mainland. As a result, 
according to a U.S. intelligence advisory committee report of April 1957, in the near 
term the “Nationalists are very unlikely to launch an invasion or, in the absence of 
Chinese Communist provocation, to initiate other major military action.”19 Because 
the Chinese on Taiwan were displaying “a degree of cooperation and intelligent ef-
fort scarcely equaled elsewhere in American experience,” this partnership proved to 
be a “strategic bargain” for Washington: the “creation of United States military bases 
has been rendered unnecessary by the size and effectiveness of the Chinese military 
establishment.”20 This smaller “footprint” helped to relieve tension. After a particularly 
bad incident involving American military personnel and local civilians in Taiwan, 
Eisenhower is recorded as having told Dulles that “we must have a very serious look at 
these Asiatic countries, and decide whether we can stay there. It does not seem wise, if 
they hate us so much.”21 On June 4, 1957, Eisenhower told Senator Alexander Wiley, a 
Wisconsin Republican, that stationing troops in foreign countries “should only be done 
when impossible to avoid it”; he was doing what he “could to get our troops out, but of 
course it would be risking the collapse of our position in the Far East if we were to pull 
out of Formosa and Korea.”22 
The chairman of the JCS posed Washington’s dilemma in the following terms: “Are we 
to risk loss of American prestige and influence in [the] world, through loss of the Off-
shore Islands occasioned by failure to exert a maximum defense; or are we to risk loss 
of prestige and influence, through limited use of nuclear weapons to hold the Islands.” 
Given these two options, the JCS reached a “consensus that we should take the second 
risk” and told President Eisenhower, “If we were to decide not to, we would have to 
recast our whole philosophy of defense planning. If we do not decide to take the second 
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risk, each succeeding crisis and its concomitant decisions will become increasingly dif-
ficult for us.”23 
Secretary Dulles’s stance on the use of atomic weapons was clear: as he once told 
General Twining, “There was no use of having a lot of stuff and never being able to 
use it.”24 Dulles reminded the president that “we have geared our defenses to the use 
of these [atomic weapons] in case of hostilities of any size, and . . . if we will not use 
them when the chips are down because of adverse world opinion, we must revise our 
defense setup.”25 But the fact that the United States was committed to protecting the 
offshore islands and Taiwan did not mean it advocated an attack on the mainland. On 
June 25, 1962, Rusk, now secretary of state, explained to the British foreign secretary, 
Alec Douglas-Home, that “Chiang Kai-shek would have no United States support if he 
attempted to attack the mainland,” and it was agreed that the British chargé d’affaires 
would tell PRC leaders that the “United States had done and were doing everything pos-
sible to restrain the Nationalists from provocative action.”26 
 
In the midst of a life-and-death Cold War struggle, appeasement of communism was 
not considered to be an option. This left only two alternatives: “In the fullness of time 
either the communists will cease to be communists, whether by revolution or evolution, 
or the United States and its friends will have to fight them, whether in global or local 
wars.”27 Truman was accused of having given up on China, thereby losing “to our coun-
try most of the fruits of the victory won by our fighting men in the Pacific theatre.”28 
However, at this point evolution was clearly preferable to global warfare. Eisenhower 
argued that it was necessary to “wage the cold war in a militant, but reasonable, style 
whereby we appear to the people of the world as a better group to band with than the 
Communists.” If that was done correctly, “we have got a real fighting chance of bringing 
this world around to the point where the Communist menace, if not eliminated, will be 
so minimized it cannot work.”29
That was an extremely long-term policy, not one that brought immediate benefits, but 
the U.S.-sponsored strategic sanctions and the Nationalist blockade that followed from 
it were highly successful in forcing evolutionary change on the PRC. With American 
training, equipment, and financial backing, it was hoped that “the blockade of war 
goods, partially effective now [there were an estimated thousand foreign-ship arrivals 
per year], will grow more effective as the naval and air forces of Nationalist China are 
built up with U.S. aid.”30 
A prime goal of the economic sanctions and blockade was to break up the Sino-Soviet 
alliance. Chennault warned in 1949 that it might take “decades or centuries” to subvert 
the “Communist dynasty in China.”31 But Secretary of State Acheson told Governor 
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Thomas E. Dewey of New York in an April 10, 1950, telephone conversation that the 
only flicker of “hope in the Far East is to drive a wedge between Peking and Moscow,” a 
policy that it would be “unwise” for Dewey ever to mention in a public speech.32 As early 
as December 1954, an NSC paper, “Policy toward the Far East,” stated that a major ob-
jective was “disruption of the Sino-Soviet alliance through actions designed to intensify 
existing and potential areas of conflict or divergence of interest between the USSR and 
Communist China.”33 In May 1955, Senator Mundt congratulated Eisenhower for duly 
keeping the “Communists guessing. . . . [I]t creates much uneasiness among Communist 
high echelons in Russia and China.”34 
On the surface, the American and British economic policies with the PRC differed 
dramatically, but the two nations in fact sought the same goal: splitting the Sino-Soviet 
alliance apart and bringing the PRC into the Western “camp.” In 1955, Eden even told 
Eisenhower that “the British government would always hope to be on the American side 
in every quarrel.”35 Britain did not follow the U.S. lead in cutting China completely off 
from international trade, but only because London thought it better to leave the door 
open by conducting limited trade, just in case China decided to turn to the West. This 
difference on means caused significant friction in Anglo-American relations. In private 
communications, however, Selwyn Lloyd reassured John Foster Dulles in September 
1958 that “your troubles are our troubles. . . . [I]s there any way in which we can help?”36 
The Anglo-American “carrot-and-stick” diplomatic approach had the desired long-
term impact on China, in the end contributing to Beijing’s decision to turn more to 
the West. Eisenhower was a firm supporter of the Republic of China on Taiwan, but on 
April 17, 1955, he told Dulles “that in the long run, unless the unexpected happened, it 
might be necessary to accept the ‘Two China’ concept.” The president “spoke of ‘5–10 or 
12 years.’”37 Dulles declared to Molotov a month later that there was no need to let the 
Taiwan Strait start a world war: “Surely the situation could continue another decade or 
longer if the alternative was the risk of war within a year.”38 
Clearly, Washington was in no rush to solve the problem. By the late 1950s, a decade 
after the creation of the PRC, tension between China and the Soviet Union had reached 
a breaking point. Mao Zedong’s attempt to pay off China’s enormous debt to the USSR 
had brought nationwide famine.39 Some historians have argued that the resulting Sino-
Soviet rift took Washington by “surprise” and that the U.S. government did not adopt 
policies to “expedite the estrangement.”40 But others have seen that Dulles “sought to 
split the Chinese and Russians by driving them ever closer together.”41 The Sino-Soviet 
monolith’s collapse during the late 1950s represented the full achievement of Truman’s 
 and Eisenhower’s strategic objectives. During the next decade, Mao Zedong gradually  
turned China farther from the Soviet Union and closer to the West. In 1969, fourteen 
 years after Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s evolutionary statements, President Richard 
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Nixon—who had been Eisenhower’s vice president—was to begin the process of recog-
nizing the People’s Republic of China.
 
Even while the PRC was facing economic collapse, Taiwan was, with American assis-
tance, on a completely different developmental path. British officials reported during 
1955 that “Formosa is prosperous (with United States aid) and the people, whose stan-
dard of living is much higher than that of most Oriental countries, seem contented.”42 
Having eschewed a simple military solution to China’s unification, Chiang Kai-shek 
prophetically told an Australian newspaper that Taiwan would focus on economic 
growth: “We shall continue to build up Taiwan as an example of what free men can 
do.”43 American support was absolutely crucial to what was often called the “Taiwan 
miracle.” As Eisenhower put it, “The vigorous and skilled population on Taiwan, the 
record of growth in investment and output, [and] the very real potential for accelera-
tion, offer a prospect for a convincing demonstration that under free institutions a pace 
and degree of achievement can eventually be obtained in excess of that resulting under 
totalitarianism.”44 
In December 1956, the importance of this miracle to the rest of East Asia was plain: 
“Taiwan is becoming a show window of the free world, which impresses friends and foes 
alike with the constancy and success of American policy.”45 The NSC’s policy for Taiwan 
emphasized also the need for greater democracy to accompany the growing economy, 
for “an increasingly efficient Government of the Republic of China (GRC), evolving 
toward responsible representative government, capable of attracting growing support 
and allegiance from the people of mainland China and Taiwan, and serving as the focal 
point of the free Chinese alternative to Communism.”46 Successful examples such as 
Taiwan were called by the diplomat James W. Riddleberger the “reverse-domino effect.” 
Once these “islands of development” were formed, they could “give assistance and inspi-
ration in their turn to other underdeveloped countries which are further behind in the 
growth process.” By 1960, Taiwan was at the stage where it could help other developing 
countries, specifically by extending “technical assistance to free Vietnam.”47
Defeating global communism was Eisenhower’s overarching challenge; the defense of 
Taiwan was one major component of it. As he told Senator Knowland on January 26, 
1955, “Co-existence is the absence of killing each other. I don’t say it is satisfactory or 
that I like it. It simply means you and I are not killing each other off.” With regard to 
Formosa and China, the “most we could ever have would be dual recognition of Nation-
alist China and Red China,” but “at present neither side would accept it.” Eisenhower 
concluded fatalistically: “Time seems to be the final arbiter of history.”48
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Eisenhower spoke of his global view also with his friend Lew Douglas: “The central 
fact of today’s life is that we are in a life-and-death struggle of ideologies. It is freedom 
against dictatorship; Communism against capitalism; concepts of human dignity 
against the materialistic dialectic.” America’s opponents in this life-and-death struggle 
were playing by new rules: “They have complete contempt for any of those concepts 
of honor, decency and integrity which must underlie any successful practice of inter-
national law and order as we have always understood it.” Sometimes Eisenhower was 
pessimistic: “I have come to the conclusion that some of our traditional ideas of inter-
national sportsmanship are scarcely applicable in the morass in which the world now 
flounders.”49 
By 1958, the small offshore islands in the Taiwan Strait, most of which an average 
American could not have named or pointed to on a map, had helped to exacerbate Sino-
Soviet relations to the point of a split. This outcome was no accident but the result of 
measured and carefully thought-out policies pursued by the Truman and Eisenhower 
administrations. Among the most important were the strategic embargo adopted by the 
Truman administration in 1950 and support of the ten-year Nationalist blockade, which 
collectively and indirectly produced enormous friction between China and the USSR. 
That friction and rising military and political tensions eventually resulted in the Sino-
Soviet split. Harry S. Truman’s successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, is usually credited 
for bringing these policies to fruition, but a wide variety of documents prove that these 
Cold War policies were nonpartisan and that they were embraced and supported by 
both presidents, a lesson contemporary politicians might do well to heed.  
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